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ABSTRACT
Toward Privacy in High-Dimensional Data Publishing
Rui Chen, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2012
Nowadays data sharing among multiple parties has become inevitable in var-
ious application domains for diverse reasons, such as decision support, policy de-
velopment and data mining. Yet, data in its raw format often contains person-
speciﬁc sensitive information, and publishing such data without proper protection
may jeopardize individual privacy. This fact has spawned extensive research on
privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), which balances the fundamental trade-
oﬀ between individual privacy and the utility of published data. Early research
of PPDP focuses on protecting private and sensitive information in relational and
statistical data. However, the recent prevalence of several emerging types of high-
dimensional data has rendered unique challenges that prevent traditional PPDP
techniques from being directly used. In this thesis, we address the privacy concerns
in publishing four types of high-dimensional data, namely set-valued data, trajectory
data, sequential data and network data. We develop eﬀective and eﬃcient non-
interactive data publishing solutions for various utility requirements. Most of our
solutions satisfy a rigorous privacy guarantee known as diﬀerential privacy, which
has been the de facto standard for privacy protection. This thesis demonstrates that
our solutions have exhibited great promise for releasing useful high-dimensional data
without endangering individual privacy.
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With the current trend of digitalization, individual privacy is more subject to intru-
sions than ever before. Various personal information is being collected in diﬀerent
application domains, for example, retailing business, healthcare departments, public
transit agencies, and online social networks. Such personal information in its raw
format often contains person-speciﬁc sensitive information. Therefore, improper in-
formation sharing among diﬀerent parties may jeopardize individual privacy. This
is exempliﬁed by several real-life privacy incidents given below.
Massachusetts voter list. Sweeney [107] successfully re-identiﬁed the former
governor of Massachusetts by linking a public voter list with a medical database pub-
lished by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission through the combination
of zip code, date of birth and gender (called the quasi-identiﬁer [33]). Sweeney [107]
further indicated that for 87% of the U.S. population such characteristics had been
recorded and available, which would likely make them identiﬁable based on only
such quasi-identiﬁers.
AOL search queries. On August 4, 2006, AOL published approximately 20 mil-
lion search queries collected from 650,000 users over a 3-month period. User identity
information (e.g., such as name or SSN) had been replaced by some pseudonymous
user IDs before release, but three days later, it had to remove the release due to the
1
re-identiﬁcation of a user [56].
Netﬂix prize data. Netﬂix, the largest on-demand Internet streaming media
service provider, released the anonymized movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers for a
contest with the purpose of improving the accuracy of its recommendation system.
However, Netﬂix had to cancel the contest because Narayanan and Shmatikov [94]
revealed that when combining with the information in the public Internet Movie
Database (IMDb), users in the released Netﬂix dataset could be re-identiﬁed with
high probability.
These real-world privacy concerns have stimulated strong demands for privacy
protection in data sharing. The current practice of information sharing primar-
ily relies on policies and guidelines on the types of data that can be released and
agreements on the proper use of published data. For example, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [96] has become the standard privacy
rule for medical data sharing. However, this approach alone may lead to either
excessive data distortion or insuﬃcient privacy protection. Comprehensive tech-
nological solutions are indispensable for providing formal, provable privacy guar-
antees. Consequently, extensive research has been conducted on privacy-preserving
data publishing (PPDP) [46] with the goal of publishing useful data while protecting
individual privacy even in a hostile environment. The essential trade-oﬀ between
data utility and individual privacy forms the foundation of PPDP.
Early works on PPDP focus on protecting private and sensitive information
in relational data, which is of a ﬁxed schema with a small number of dimensions.
In the context of relational data, various traditional privacy models (referred to as
partition-based privacy models [49] in the sequel), such as k-anonymity [104], [108],
-diversity [85] and conﬁdence bounding [114], and many anonymization approaches
have been proposed. These eﬀorts have successfully shown their strength of privacy
protection in publishing relational data, and have also raised expectations of eﬀective
privacy-preserving techniques for more complex data types.
2
In recent years, several emerging types of high-dimensional data, including
set-valued data, trajectory data, sequential data and network data, have become
prevalent. While they have become important sources of data analysis, they have
simultaneously posed novel technical challenges that prevent traditional PPDP ap-
proaches from being directly used. The solutions developed in the context of rela-
tional data are useful for thwarting identity linkage and attribute linkage privacy
attacks [46] in the case of small numbers of dimensions, however, they cannot be
used eﬀectively in the high dimensional case. Aggarwal [3] pointed out that with the
increase of dimensionality one has to face with a choice of either undesirable data
utility or insuﬃcient privacy protection, known as the curse of high dimensionality.
From the perspective of data utility, increasing dimensionality requires more infor-
mation to be suppressed, rendering the released data useless; from the perspective of
privacy, increasing dimensionality makes each record more distinctive from others,
leaving the target victim easier to identify and therefore harder to protect. Further-
more, high dimensionality naturally poses challenges on computational complexity.
Therefore, more eﬀective and eﬃcient solutions must be developed so that real-life
high-dimensional data could be successfully handled.
In this thesis, we concentrate on developing practical technical solutions for
these types of high-dimensional data under rigorous privacy models while provid-
ing meaningful data utility for various data analysis tasks. In addressing privacy
concerns in high-dimensional data publishing, the ﬁrst eﬀort is to identify an appro-
priate privacy model. Recently, new types of privacy attacks, such as composition
attack [49], deFinetti attack [67] and foreground knowledge attack [118], have been
identiﬁed on the approaches derived using partition-based privacy models, demon-
strating their vulnerability to an adversary’s background knowledge. Due to the
deterministic nature of partition-based privacy models, it is foreseeable that more
types of privacy attacks could be discovered on these privacy models in the future.
Consequently, over the last few years diﬀerential privacy [37] has become the
3
de facto successor to partition-based privacy models. Diﬀerential privacy, stemming
from the ﬁeld of statistical disclosure control, provides strong privacy guarantees
independent of an adversary’s background knowledge, computational power or sub-
sequent behavior. It, in general, requires that the outcome of any analysis should
not overly depend on a single data record. It follows that even if a user had opted to
be included in the database, there would not be a signiﬁcant change in any compu-
tation based on the database. Therefore, this assures every record owner that any
privacy breach will not be a result of participating in a database.
However, the strong privacy guarantee provided by diﬀerential privacy does
not come without cost. There are two natural settings of data sanitization under
diﬀerential privacy: interactive and non-interactive. In the interactive setting, a
sanitization mechanism sits between the users and the database. Queries posed by
the users and/or their responses must be evaluated and may be modiﬁed by the
mechanism in order to protect privacy; in the non-interactive setting, a data pub-
lisher computes and releases a sanitized version of a database, possibly a synthetic
database, to the public and hence it could be used for any analysis. There have
been some lower bound results [34], [37], [38] of diﬀerential privacy, indicating that
only a limited number of queries could be answered; otherwise, an adversary would
be able to precisely reconstruct almost the entire original database, resulting in a
serious compromise of privacy. Therefore, most recent works have concentrated on
designing various interactive mechanisms that answer only a sublinear number, in
the size of the underlying database, of queries in total, regardless of the number of
users. Once this limit is reached, either the database has to be shut down, or any
further query would be rejected. This limitation has greatly hindered their applica-
bility, especially in the scenario where a database is made available to many users
who legitimately need to pose a large number of queries. Naturally, one would favor
a non-interactive release that could be used to answer an arbitrary large number of
queries or for various data analysis tasks.
4
Blum et al. [12] pointed out that the aforementioned lower bounds could be
circumvented in the non-interactive setting at the cost of preserving usefulness for
only restricted classes of queries. However, they did not provide an eﬃcient algo-
rithm. A series of subsequent works [39], [125], [126] aimed to propose more eﬃcient
non-interactive sanitization mechanisms. However, all these works are of runtime
complexity at least linear in the output domain size. These progresses, however, are
still not suﬃcient to handle high-dimensional data, because the output domain sizes
of high-dimensional data are typically exponentially large. To tackle this technical
challenge, in this thesis, we initiate a line of data-dependent solutions, which adap-
tively narrows down the output domain by using noisy information obtained from
the underlying database. These data-dependent solutions not only achieve reason-
able runtime complexity (e.g., linear in the input data size) but also have a positive
impact on the resulting utility as there is no need to add noise to every possible
entry in the output domain, which accumulates noise quickly.
Protecting individual privacy is one aspect of the problem of PPDP. Another
equally important aspect is preserving utility in sanitized data for data analysis. In
this thesis, we preserve data utility of diﬀerent data types for various data analy-
sis tasks, ranging from more general tasks, such as counting query and cut query,
to more concrete tasks, such as frequent sequential pattern mining and frequent
itemset mining. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate that useful high-
dimensional data could be released even under rigorous privacy models.
1.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we study the problem of privacy-preserving data publishing over
four emerging types of high-dimensional data, namely set-valued data, trajectory
data, sequential data and network data. The key contributions of this thesis are
summarized below.
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1.1.1 Set-Valued Data Sanitization
Set-valued data, such as transaction data, web search queries, and click streams,
has become a major source for various data mining tasks. All existing sanitiza-
tion techniques [17], [50], [62], [110], [111], [128], [129] developed for publishing set-
valued data are dedicated to partition-based privacy models, which are vulnerable
to privacy attacks based on background knowledge. In contrast, diﬀerential pri-
vacy provides strong privacy guarantees independent of an adversary’s background
knowledge, computational power or subsequent behavior. Existing data publishing
approaches for diﬀerential privacy, however, are not adequate in terms of both utility
and scalability in the context of set-valued data due to its high dimensionality.
This thesis is the ﬁrst study of publishing set-valued data via diﬀerential pri-
vacy. Our work initiates the line of data-dependent solutions for achieving diﬀerential
privacy, which allows diﬀerential privacy to be eﬃciently and eﬀectively applied to
diﬀerent types of data. In particular, we propose a probabilistic top-down partition-
ing algorithm to generate a diﬀerentially private release for set-valued data, which
scales linearly with the input data size. We prove that our result is (δ, β)-useful for
the class of counting queries, the foundation of many data mining tasks. We show
that our approach maintains high utility for counting queries and frequent item-
set mining and scales to large datasets through extensive experiments on diﬀerent
real-life set-valued datasets.
1.1.2 Trajectory Data Sanitization
With the increasing prevalence of location-aware devices, trajectory data has been
generated and collected in various application domains. Trajectory data carries rich
information that is useful for many data analysis tasks. Yet, improper publishing
and use of trajectory data could jeopardize individual privacy. In this thesis, we ac-
knowledge the emerging data publishing scenario, in which trajectory data needs to
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be published with sensitive attributes, and consequently propose the (K,C)L-privacy
model, which takes into consideration not only identity linkage attacks on trajectory
data, but also attribute linkage attacks via trajectory data. This is the ﬁrst work to
introduce local suppression to trajectory data sanitization. Our framework allows
the adoption of various data utility metrics for diﬀerent data mining tasks. As an
illustration, we aim at preserving both instances of location-time pairs and frequent
sequences in a trajectory database, both being the foundation of many trajectory
data mining tasks. Our experiments on both synthetic and real-life datasets sug-
gest that the framework is both eﬀective and eﬃcient to overcome the challenges
in trajectory data sanitization. In particular, compared with the previous works in
the literature, our proposed local suppression method can signiﬁcantly improve the
data utility in sanitized trajectory data.
1.1.3 Sequential Data Sanitization
As a simpliﬁed form of trajectory data, sequential data is being increasingly used in
a variety of applications, spanning from genome and web usage analysis to location-
based recommendation systems. Publishing sequential data is important, since it
enables researchers to analyze and understand interesting patterns. In particular, we
are motivated by the data sharing scenario at the Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al
(STM), the public transit agency in Montreal area. In this thesis, we propose two
alternative solutions for publishing sequential data under the rigorous diﬀerential
privacy model.
Publishing sequential data via preﬁx tree. We propose an eﬃcient data-
dependent yet diﬀerentially private sequential data sanitization approach based on
a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree structure. Moreover, as a post-processing step, we
make use of the inherent consistency constraints of a preﬁx tree to conduct con-
strained inferences, which lead to better utility. To our best knowledge, this is the
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ﬁrst work to introduce a practical solution for publishing large volume of sequential
data under diﬀerential privacy. We examine data utility in terms of two popular
data analysis tasks conducted at the STM, namely counting queries and frequent
sequential pattern mining. Extensive experiments on real-life STM datasets conﬁrm
that our approach maintains high utility and is scalable to large datasets.
Publishing sequential data via n-grams. Due to its inherent sequentiality and
high-dimensionality, it is challenging to apply diﬀerential privacy to sequential data.
As an alternative, we address this challenge by employing a variable-length n-gram
model, which extracts the essential information of a sequential database in terms of
a set of variable-length n-grams. Our approach makes use of a carefully designed
exploration tree structure and a set of novel techniques based on the Markov as-
sumption in order to lower the magnitude of added noise. The published n-grams
are useful for many purposes. Furthermore, we develop a solution for generating a
synthetic database, which enables a wider spectrum of data analysis tasks. Exten-
sive experiments on real-life datasets demonstrate that our approach substantially
outperforms the state-of-the-art techniques.
1.1.4 Network Data Sanitization
With the increasing popularity of information networks, research on privacy-preserving
network data publication has received substantial attention recently. Most existing
works focus on preventing node re-identiﬁcation from adversaries with structural
background knowledge. In contrast, research on thwarting edge disclosure (e.g., in-
ferring if there is a direct link between two individuals) is less fruitful, largely due
to lack of a formal privacy model. The recent emergence of -diﬀerential privacy
has shown great promise for rigorous edge disclosure protection. Yet -diﬀerential
privacy is vulnerable to data correlation, which hinders its application to network
data that may be inherently correlated.
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In this thesis, we propose a stronger variant of -diﬀerential privacy, known
as (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, which provides privacy guarantee even when a record
is correlated to at most k − 1 other records. We present the concept of correlated
sensitivity, which allows Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism to be used
for achieving (, k)-diﬀerential privacy. We subsequently provide a holistic solution
for non-interactive network data publication. The basic idea is to adaptively identify
dense regions of the adjacency matrix of a network dataset by a data-dependent
partitioning process, and then reconstruct a noisy adjacency matrix by a novel use
of exponential mechanism, which is of independent interest. To our best knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst work providing an eﬃcient and eﬀective solution for publishing
real-life network data in the spirit of diﬀerential privacy. Extensive experiments
demonstrate that our approach performs well on diﬀerent types of real-life network
datasets.
1.2 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces four important privacy models, the common anonymiza-
tion mechanisms and popular utility metrics.
• Chapter 3 provides an in-depth literature review of the state-of-the-art tech-
niques in PPDP for diﬀerent data types. In particular, we summarize the
recent applications of diﬀerential privacy. Our survey of recent developments
of privacy-preserving data publishing has been published in [46].
• Chapter 4 studies the problem of publishing set-valued data for data mining
tasks under the diﬀerential privacy model. We propose a probabilistic top-
down partitioning algorithm that is scalable to high-dimensional set-valued
data while providing guaranteed utility. The results of this chapter have been
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published in [25].
• Chapter 5 studies the problem of privacy-preserving trajectory data publish-
ing under a realistic heterogeneous data publishing scenario. We develop a
generic sanitization framework for trajectory data, which accommodates var-
ious utility metrics. The results of this chapter have been published in [23].
• Chapter 6 proposes two alternative solutions to publishing sequential data
under diﬀerential privacy. The results of this chapter have been published
in [22], [20].
• Chapter 7 presents a stronger variant of -diﬀerential privacy, known as (, k)-
diﬀerential privacy, for correlated data, and provides a holistic solution for
non-interactive network data publication under (, k)-diﬀerential privacy. The
results of this chapter are currently under review in [24].




In privacy-preserving data publishing, there is a fundamental trade-oﬀ between pri-
vacy and utility [66]. At one extreme, the data holder may publish nothing so that
privacy can be perfectly protected, but the resulting data utility is zero. At the other
extreme, the data holder may directly publish the raw data without any anonymiza-
tion attempt so that the data utility can be maximized, but no privacy protection
can be guaranteed. Thus, it is of importance for the data holder to ﬁnd a reason-
able trade-oﬀ between privacy and utility. This requires the following concepts to
be deﬁned: privacy model, anonymization mechanism, and utility metric.
2.1 Privacy Models
In 1977, Dalenius [32] provided a very stringent deﬁnition of privacy protection:
“access to the published data should not enable the attacker to learn anything
extra about any target victim compared to no access to the database, even with
the presence of any attacker’s background knowledge obtained from other sources”.
In real-life applications, such an absolute privacy protection is impossible due to
the presence of an attacker’s background knowledge [36]. For this reason, most
literature on privacy-preserving data publishing considers more relaxed, but more
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practical notions of privacy protection by assuming that an attacker has limited
background knowledge. With his background knowledge, the attacker can perform
diﬀerent kinds of privacy attacks. Accordingly, diﬀerent kinds of privacy models
have been proposed. In this section, we will focus on four most fundamental privacy
models, namely, k-anonymity [104], [108], -diversity [85], conﬁdence bounding [114]
and diﬀerential privacy [37].
In general, a privacy threat occurs when an attacker is able to link a record
owner to a record in a published data table, to a sensitive attribute in a published
data table, or to the published data table itself. We call these identity linkage,
attribute linkage, and membership linkage, respectively. In the most basic form of
PPDP, the data holder has a table of the form
D(Explicit Identifier,Quasi Identifier, Sensitive Attributes,Non−Sensitive Attributes),
where Explicit Identifier is a set of attributes containing information that ex-
plicitly identiﬁes record owners such as name and social security number (SSN);
Quasi Identifier (QID) is a set of attributes that could potentially identify record
owners; Sensitive Attributes consist of sensitive person-speciﬁc information such as
disease, salary, and disability status; and Non − Sensitive Attributes contain all
attributes that do not fall into the previous three categories [16]. The four sets of
attributes are disjoint. Furthermore, most works assume that each record in the
table belongs to a distinct record owner, known as microdata. Previous works have
indicated that simply removing explicit identiﬁers is insuﬃcient to protect individ-
ual privacy. Based on quasi-identiﬁers, an attacker is still able to perform several
types of privacy attacks, as explained below.
Identity linkage attack. In an identity linkage attack, some value qid on QID
identiﬁes a small number of records in the released table T , called a group. If the
target victim’s QID matches the value qid, the victim is vulnerable to being linked
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Table 2.1: Raw patient data
Job Sex Age Disease
Engineer Male 35 Hepatitis
Engineer Male 38 Hepatitis
Lawyer Male 38 HIV
Writer Female 30 Flu
Writer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
to the small number of records in the group. In this case, the adversary faces only a
small number of possibilities for the victim’s record, and with the help of background
knowledge, there is a chance that the adversary could uniquely identify the victim’s
record from the group.
Example 2.1.1. Suppose that a hospital wants to publish patients’ records in Ta-
ble 2.1 to a research center. The explicit identiﬁers have been removed. If an
adversary knows that the record of Bob, a male lawyer who is 38 years old, is in the
table, he can infer that Bob is infected with HIV because there is only one record
with qid = 〈Lawyer,Male, 38〉.
Attribute linkage attack. In an attribute linkage attack, the adversary may not
need to precisely identify the record of the target victim, but could still infer his
sensitive values from the published dataset T based on the set of sensitive values
associated with the group to which the victim belongs. In case some sensitive values
predominate in the group, a successful inference becomes relatively easy.
Example 2.1.2. From Table 2.1, an adversary can observe that the sensitive at-
tribute of all records with qid = 〈Dancer, Female, 30〉 is of the same value, HIV .
Therefore, the adversary can easily infer that the target victim Emily, a 30-year-old
female dancer, has HIV with 100% conﬁdence provided that he knows that Emily’s
record is in Table 2.1, even though he cannot uniquely identify her record.
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Table 2.2: 3-anonymous patient data by generalization
Job Sex Age Disease
Professional Male [35-40) Hepatitis
Professional Male [35-40) Hepatitis
Professional Male [35-40) HIV
Artist Female [30-35) Flu
Artist Female [30-35) HIV
Artist Female [30-35) HIV
Artist Female [30-35) HIV
Membership linkage attack. Both identity linkage and attribute linkage assume
that an adversary already assures that the victim’s record is in the released table
T . However, in some cases, the presence (or the absence) of the victim’s record in T
already reveals the victim’s sensitive information. Suppose a hospital releases a data
table with a particular type of disease. Identifying the presence of the victim’s record
in the table is already damaging. A membership linkage occurs if an adversary can
conﬁdently infer the presence or the absence of the victim’s record in the released
table.
2.1.1 k-Anonymity
To prevent identity linkage attacks through QID, Samarati and Sweeney [104], [108]
proposed the notion of k-anonymity: if a record in the table has some value qid,
then at least k − 1 other records should also have the value qid. In other words,
the minimum group size on QID is at least k. A table satisfying this requirement is
called k-anonymous. In a k-anonymous table, each record is indistinguishable from
at least k − 1 other records with respect to QID. Consequently, the probability of
linking a victim to a speciﬁc record through QID is at most 1/k.
Example 2.1.3. Table 2.2 shows a 3-anonymous table by generalizing QID =
{Job, Sex,Age} from Table 2.1 using the taxonomy trees in Figure 2.1. It has two














Figure 2.1: Taxonomy trees for Job, Sex, Age.
35)〉. Since each group contains at least 3 records, the table is 3-anonymous.
The k-anonymity model assumes that QID is known to the data publisher.
Most works consider a single QID containing all attributes that can be potentially
used to launch a privacy attack. The more attributes included in QID, the more
protection k-anonymity would provide. On the other hand, this also implies that
more information distortion is needed to achieve k-anonymity because the records
in a group have to agree on more attributes.
2.1.2 -Diversity
k-anonymity protects identity linkage attacks, but fails to prevent attribute linkage
attacks. Consequently, Machanavajjhala et al. [85] proposed the diversity principle,
called -diversity, to thwart attribute linkage attacks. The -diversity model requires
every qid group to contain at least  “well-represented” sensitive values. Based on
diﬀerent interpretations of well-representedness, there are several instantiations of
this principle. The simplest understanding of “well-represented” is to ensure that
there are at least  distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each qid group.
This distinct -diversity privacy model automatically satisﬁes k-anonymity, where
k = , because each qid group contains at least  records. Distinct -diversity cannot
prevent probabilistic inference attacks because some sensitive values are naturally
more frequent than others in a group, enabling an adversary to conclude that a
record in the group is very likely to have those values. For example, Flu is more
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common than HIV . This motivates the following two stronger notions of -diversity.




P (qid, s) log(P (qid, s)) ≥ log() (2.1)
where S is a sensitive attribute, P (qid, s) is the fraction of records in a qid group
having the sensitive value s. The left-hand side, called the entropy of the sensitive
attribute, has the property that more evenly distributed sensitive values in a qid
group produce a larger value. Therefore, a larger threshold value  implies less
certainty of inferring a particular sensitive value in a group. Note that the inequality
does not depend on the choice of the log base.


















= log(1.8). So the table satisﬁes entropy -diversity if  ≤
1.8.
One limitation of entropy -diversity is that it does not provide a probability
based risk measure, which tends to be more intuitive to a human data publisher.
For example, being entropy 1.8-diverse in Example 2.1.4 does not convey the risk
level that the attacker has 75% probability of succeeding in inferring the sensitive
value HIV where 3 out of the 4 record owners in the qid group have HIV . Also,
it is diﬃcult to specify diﬀerent protection levels based on varying sensitivity and
frequency of sensitive values.
The recursive (c, )-diversity makes sure that the most frequent value does not
appear too frequently, and the less frequent values do not appear too rarely. Let m
be the number of sensitive values in a qid group. Let fi denote the frequency of the
ith most frequent sensitive value in a qid group. A qid group is (c, )−diverse if the
frequency of the most frequent sensitive value is less than the sum of the frequencies
of them−+1 least frequent sensitive values multiplying by some publisher-speciﬁed
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constant c, i.e., f1 < c
∑m
i= fi. A table is said to have recursive (c, )-diversity if
all of its groups have (c, )-diversity. Similarly, the recursive (c, )-diversity is not
intuitive for a data publisher to specify the desired level of privacy protection.
2.1.3 Conﬁdence Bounding
Wang et al. [114] proposed an alternative privacy model to protect attribute linkage
attacks. They considered bounding the conﬁdence of inferring a sensitive value
from a qid group by specifying one or more privacy templates of the form, 〈QID →
s, h〉, where s is a sensitive value, QID is a quasi-identiﬁer, and h is a threshold.
Let Conf(QID → s) be maxconf(qid → s) over all qid groups on QID, where
conf(qid → s) denotes the percentage of records containing s in the qid group. A
table satisﬁes 〈QID → s, h〉 if Conf(QID → s) ≤ h. In other words, 〈QID → s, h〉
bounds the attacker’s conﬁdence of inferring the sensitive value s in any group on
QID to at most h.
For example, with QID = {Job, Sex,Age}, 〈QID → HIV, 10%〉 states that
the conﬁdence of inferring HIV from any group on QID is no more than 10%. For
the data in Table 2.2, this privacy template is violated because the conﬁdence of
inferring HIV is 75% in the group 〈Artist, Female, [30− 35)〉.
The conﬁdence measure has two advantages over recursive (c, )-diversity and
entropy -diversity. First, the conﬁdence measure is more intuitive because the risk is
measured by the probability of inferring a sensitive value. The data publisher relies
on this intuition to specify the acceptable maximum conﬁdence threshold. Second,
it allows the ﬂexibility for the data publisher to specify a diﬀerent threshold h for
each combination of QID and s according to the perceived sensitivity of inferring
s from a group on QID. The recursive (c, )-diversity cannot be used to bound the
frequency of sensitive values that are not the most frequent. Conﬁdence bounding
provides greater ﬂexibility than -diversity in this aspect.
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2.1.4 -Diﬀerential Privacy
All aforementioned privacy models are called partition-based models. They provide
privacy protection by enforcing certain syntactic requirements on the released data.
Recent research indicates that partition-based privacy models are vulnerable to an
adversary’s background knowledge. In contrast, diﬀerential privacy [37] is a more
semantic deﬁnition, which provides strong privacy guarantees independent of an
adversary’s background knowledge. Diﬀerential privacy requires that the removal
or addition of a single database record does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome of
any analysis. It ensures a data record owner that any privacy breach will not be
a result of participating in the database since anything that is learnable from the
database with his record is also learnable from the one without his record. Formally,
diﬀerential privacy [37] is deﬁned as follow. Here the parameter, , speciﬁes the
degree of privacy oﬀered.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (-diﬀerential privacy). A privacy mechanism A gives -diﬀerential
privacy if for any dataset D1 and D2 diﬀering on at most one record, and for any
possible sanitized dataset D˜ ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) = D˜] ≤ e × Pr[A(D2) = D˜] (2.2)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A.
One salient merit of diﬀerential privacy is its composition properties, which
provide privacy guarantees in case of sequential release. Any sequence of compu-
tations that each provides diﬀerential privacy in isolation also provides diﬀerential
privacy in sequence, which is known as sequential composition [87]. The implication
is that diﬀerential privacy is robust to collusions among adversaries.
Theorem 2.1. Let Ai each provide i-diﬀerential privacy. A sequence of Ai(D)
over the dataset D provides (∑i i)-diﬀerential privacy.
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In some special cases, in which a sequence of computations is conducted on
disjoint datasets, the privacy cost does not accumulate, but depends only on the
worst guarantee of all computations. This is known as parallel composition [87].
This property could and should be used to obtain good performance.
Theorem 2.2. Let Ai each provide i-diﬀerential privacy. A sequence of Ai(Di)
over a set of disjoint datasets Di provides (max(i))-diﬀerential privacy.
2.2 Anonymization Mechanisms
Normally, a given raw dataset is very unlikely to satisfy a speciﬁed privacy model.
Certain anonymization mechanisms need to be applied to the raw dataset, making it
less precise, in order to achieve the privacy model. This is usually done by applying a
sequence of anonymization operations, which naturally leads to the trade-oﬀ between
privacy and utility. It is worth mentioning that there may exist more than one
anonymization mechanism to achieve a speciﬁc privacy model. However, in many
cases, it is important to choose a right anonymization mechanism in order to obtain
a better trade-oﬀ. So far, four kinds of anonymization mechanisms have been widely
used, namely generalization, suppression, bucketization and perturbation.
2.2.1 Generalization
The generalization mechanism generates anonymous releases by replacing some at-
tribute values by more general values. For a categorical attribute, a speciﬁc value
can be replaced with a general one according to a given taxonomy; for a numerical
attribute, exact values can be replaced with an interval that covers the exact values.
Usually, no-predetermined taxonomy is given for a numerical attribute. We have
seen taxonomy trees for both categorical and numerical attributes in Figure 2.1.
In Example 2.1.3, we achieved 3-anonymity by generalizing QID according to the
taxonomy trees in Figure 2.1.
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Generalization can be performed using either global recoding scheme or local
recoding scheme. The global recoding scheme further includes full-domain general-
ization scheme, subtree generalization scheme and sibling generalization scheme as
explained below.
Full-domain generalization scheme [74], [104], [108]. In this scheme, all values
of an attribute are generalized to the same level of the taxonomy tree. For example,
in Figure 2.1, if Lawyer and Engineer are generalized to Professional, then it also
requires generalizing Dancer and Writer to Artist. The search space for this scheme
is much smaller than the search spaces for the other schemes below, but the data
distortion is the largest because of the same granularity level requirement on all
paths of a taxonomy tree.
Subtree generalization scheme [9], [47], [48], [64], [115]. In this scheme, at a non-
leaf node, either all child values or none are generalized. For example, in Figure 2.1,
if Engineer is generalized to Professional, this scheme also requires the other child
node, Lawyer, to be generalized to Professional, but Dancer and Writer, which
are child nodes of Artist, can remain ungeneralized.
Sibling generalization scheme [74]. This scheme is similar to the subtree gen-
eralization, except that some siblings may remain ungeneralized. A parent value is
then interpreted as representing all missing child values. For example, in Figure 2.1,
if Engineer is generalized to Professional, and Lawyer remains ungeneralized,
Professional is interpreted as all jobs covered by Professional except for Lawyer.
This scheme produces less distortion than subtree generalization scheme because it
only needs to generalize the child nodes that violate the speciﬁed threshold.
Cell generalization scheme [74], [120], [127]. In all of the above schemes, if a
value is generalized, all its instances in the raw dataset are generalized. Therefore,
such schemes are called global recoding. In cell generalization, also known as local
recoding, some instances of a value may remain ungeneralized while other instances
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Table 2.3: 2-anonymous patient data by suppression
Job Sex Age Disease
* Male * Hepatitis
* Male * Hepatitis
* Male * HIV
Writer Female 30 Flu
Writer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
are generalized. For example, in Table 2.1 Engineer in the ﬁrst record is generalized
to Professional, while Engineer in the second record can remain ungeneralized.
Compared with global recoding schemes, this scheme is more ﬂexible; therefore,
it produces a smaller data distortion. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
the utility of data could be adversely aﬀected by this ﬂexibility, which causes a
data exploration problem: most standard data mining methods treat Engineer and
Professional as two independent values, but, in fact, they are not. For example,
building a decision tree from such a generalized table may result in two branches,
Professional → class1 and Engineer → class2. It is unclear which branch should
be used to classify a new engineer. Though very important, this aspect of data
utility has been ignored by all works that employed the local recoding scheme. Data
produced by global recoding does not suﬀer from this data exploration problem.
2.2.2 Suppression
Suppression is a straightforward anonymization mechanism. Unlike generalization,
the suppression mechanism does not require any given taxonomy. It produces a
release candidate by replacing some attribute values by a special symbol (e.g., “*”
or “Any”), which indicates that the value has been suppressed. Table 2.3 presents
a 2-anonymous table from Table 2.1 using suppression, in which certain values are
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Table 2.4: Bucketized patient data
Job Sex Age BID
Engineer Male 35 1
Engineer Male 38 1
Lawyer Male 38 1
Writer Female 30 2
Writer Female 30 2
Dancer Female 30 2









replaced by wildcard values, “*”. Analogous to generalization, there are also dif-
ferent schemes for suppression. Record suppression [9], [64], [74], [104] refers to the
operation that suppresses an entire record. Value suppression [113], [114] refers to
the operation that suppresses every instance of a given value in a table. Cell sup-
pression (or local suppression) [31], [92] refers to the operation that suppresses some
instances of a given value in a table. Cell suppression results in less data distortion,
but usually requires greater computational complexity.
2.2.3 Bucketization
The basic idea of the bucketization mechanism is to break the correlation between
quasi-identiﬁers and sensitive values. It ﬁrst partitions the records in the original
data table into non-overlapping buckets, each of which is assigned a unique BID.
For each bucket, it randomly permutes the sensitive attribute values, and then
publishes its projection on the quasi-identiﬁer attributes and also its projection
on the permuted sensitive attribute. Table 2.4 presents a release candidate of the
bucketization mechanism from Table 2.1. After bucketization, the sensitive value of
a victim becomes indistinguishable from the rest in the same bucket.
The main limitation of this mechanism is that its application requires clearly
deﬁned sensitive attributes and non-overlapping buckets. This requirement prevents
it from being applied to certain types of data, for example, set-valued data and
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trajectory data. Moreover, since the quasi-identiﬁers are published without any
modiﬁcation, an adversary is likely to be able to perform an identity linkage by
joining some external tables.
2.2.4 Perturbation
Perturbation mechanisms have been used for a long period of time in the ﬁeld of
statistical disclosure control. Adam and Wortmann [2] have provided a complete
summary of perturbation mechanisms that have been widely employed. In this sec-
tion, we focus on two standard perturbation mechanisms that are used for achieving
diﬀerential privacy, namely Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism. A fun-
damental concept of both mechanisms is the global sensitivity of a function [37] that
maps underlying datasets to (vectors of) reals.





for all D1,D2 diﬀering in at most one record.
Roughly speaking, functions with lower sensitivity are more tolerant towards
changes of a dataset and, therefore, allow more accurate diﬀerentially private mech-
anisms.
Laplace Mechanism
For the analysis whose outputs are real, a standard mechanism to achieve diﬀerential
privacy is to add Laplace noise to the true output of a function. Dwork et al. [37]
propose the Laplace mechanism which takes as inputs a database D, a function
f , and the privacy parameter . The noise is generated according to a Laplace
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distribution with the probability density function (pdf) p(x|λ) = 1
2λ
e−|x|/λ, where λ
is determined by both GS(f) and the desired privacy parameter .
Theorem 2.3. For any function f : D → Rd, the mechanism A
A(D) = f(D) + Laplace(GS(f)/) (2.4)
gives -diﬀerential privacy.
For example, for a single counting query Q over a dataset D, returning Q(D)+
Laplace(1/) maintains -diﬀerential privacy because a counting query has a sensi-
tivity 1.
Exponential Mechanism
For the analysis whose outputs are not real or make no sense after adding noise,
McSherry and Talwar [89] propose the exponential mechanism that selects an output
from the output domain, r ∈ R, by taking into consideration its score of a given
utility function q in a diﬀerentially private manner. The exponential mechanism
assigns exponentially greater probabilities of being selected to outputs of higher
scores so that the ﬁnal output would be close to the optimum with respect to q.
The chosen utility function q should be insensitive to changes of any particular
record, that is, has a low sensitivity. Let the sensitivity of q be GS(q) = max∀r,D1,D2
|q(D1, r)− q(D2, r)|.













Privacy is one aspect of privacy-preserving data publishing; utility is the other. In
general, each anonymization operation increases privacy, but decreases utility. To
obtain a better trade-oﬀ between privacy and utility, we prefer the anonymization
operations that increase more privacy at the cost of less utility loss. This requires
the quantiﬁcation of data utility. Consequently, some utility metrics have been pro-
posed for measuring either the usefulness of the anonymized data or the information
loss due to the anonymization process. Such utility metrics roughly fall into three
categories: general purpose metrics, special purpose metrics and trade-oﬀ purpose
metrics.
2.3.1 General Purpose Metrics
In many cases, the data publisher does not know how the published data will be
analyzed by the recipient. In this case, general purpose metrics are needed. The
basic idea of general purpose metrics is to measure the “similarity” between the
original data and the anonymized data, which underpins the principle of minimal
distortion [104], [108]. One of the most intuitive general purpose information met-
rics is the number of anonymization operations (e.g., generalization or suppression)
performed on a dataset [104]. For example, generalizing 10 instances of Engineer to
Professional causes 10 units of distortion, and further generalizing these instances
to ANY Job causes another 10 units of distortion. In addition, ILoss [124] and
discernibility metric (DM) [106] are two examples of general purpose metrics that
are widely used. ILoss charges a penalty for generalizing a value in a record in-
dependently of other records, while the discernibility metric addresses the notion
of loss by charging a penalty to each record for being indistinguishable from other
records with respect to QID.
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2.3.2 Special Purpose Metrics
If the purpose of the data is known at the time of publication, it can be taken
into account during the anonymization process to better preserve data utility. For
example, if the data is published for modeling the classiﬁcation of a target attribute
in the table, then it is important not to generalize the values whose distinctions are
essential for discriminating the class labels in the target attribute. This intuition is
reﬂected in the classiﬁcation metric. Iyengar [64] proposed the classiﬁcation metric
or CM to measure the classiﬁcation error on the training data. The idea is to charge
a penalty for each record suppressed or generalized to a group in which the records
class is not the majority class. The intuition is that a record having a non-majority
class in a group will be classiﬁed as the majority class, which is an error because
it disagrees with the record’s original class. Special purpose metrics are especially
important for diﬀerential privacy, under which we can guarantee utility for only
restricted classes of data analysis tasks.
2.3.3 Trade-oﬀ Purpose Metrics
All above information metrics aim at preserving maximum data usefulness, but the
problem is that the anonymization operation that gains maximum information may
also lose so much privacy that no other anonymization operation can be performed.
The idea of trade-oﬀ metrics is to consider both the privacy and information re-
quirements at every anonymization operation and to determine an optimal trade-oﬀ




The privacy concern in data publishing was ﬁrst arisen in the ﬁeld of oﬃcial statis-
tics in the 1960s. In the context of statistical databases, the objective of privacy
protection is to protect conﬁdentiality of any individual entity in the database while
allowing its users to retrieve aggregate statistics [2]. Recently, with the fast develop-
ment of data mining techniques, there are increasing demands on publishing entire
database records, instead of just aggregate statistics [46]. Such demands obviously
present greater challenges to privacy protection, and have spawned a new wave of
research on PPDP towards data mining purpose. In this section, we present an
in-depth literature review on the recent developments of PPDP.
3.1 Sanitizing Statistical Data
Statistical databases are maintained by various organizations to support their short-
term and long-term planning activities. The users of statistical databases are entitled
to submit interactive queries for aggregate statistics. The aggregate statistics may
disclose an individual’s sensitive information that is stored in the database, such as
income, disease, and credit rating. Therefore, the problem of sanitizing statistical
data, also known as statistical disclosure control [2], [13], is to protect conﬁdentiality
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based on the interactive query model.
Perturbation is the most important sanitization approach used in statistical
disclosure control due to its simplicity, eﬃciency, and ability to preserve statistical
information. The general idea of perturbation is to replace the original data val-
ues with some synthetic data values so that the statistical information computed
from the perturbed data does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the statistical information
computed from the original data. The perturbed data records do not correspond to
real-world record owners, so the attacker cannot perform the sensitive linkages or
recover sensitive information from the published data. Following the general idea,
three concrete sanitization methods have been widely used, namely additive noise,
data swapping, and synthetic data generation. Additive noise [2], [13] is often used
for hiding sensitive numerical data (e.g., salary). The basic idea is to replace the
original sensitive value s with s + r where r is a random value drawn from some
distribution. Privacy is measured by how closely the original values of a modiﬁed
attribute can be estimated [5]. Two papers [44], [70] showed that some simple statis-
tical information, like means and correlations, can be preserved by adding random
noise. Data swapping can be used to protect both numerical attributes [102] and
categorical attributes [101]. It sanitizes a data table by exchanging values of sensi-
tive attributes among individual records while maintaining the low-order frequency
counts or marginals. Synthetic data generation builds a statistical model from the
raw data and then samples points from the model. These sampled points form the
synthetic data for data publication instead of the original data.
Recently, Dwork et al. [37] proposed an insightful privacy notion based on the
principle that the risk to a record owner’s privacy should not substantially increase
as a result of participating in a statistical database. Instead of comparing the prior
and posterior probabilities before and after accessing the published data, Dwork et
al. proposed to compare the probability change of an adversary on databases with
and without the record owner’s data. Consequently, Dwork et al. [37] proposed
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a privacy model called -diﬀerential privacy to ensure that the outcome of any
analysis is insensitive to the removal or addition of a single database record. It
follows that even if a user had opted to be included in the database, there would
not be a signiﬁcant change in any computation based on the database. Therefore,
this assures every record owner that any privacy breach will not be a result of
participating in a database.
Diﬀerential privacy lies on a rigorous mathematical foundation, and has been
shown to guarantee formal, provable privacy protection independent of an adver-
sary’s background knowledge and computational power. These days, diﬀerential
privacy has gained substantial attention and become the de facto standard for pri-
vacy protection. We review the recent applications of diﬀerential privacy in Sec-
tion 3.6.
3.2 Sanitizing Relational Data
The traditional k-anonymity model [104], [108] and its extensions [75], [120], [85],
[95], [77], [114] were originally proposed to protect private and sensitive informa-
tion in the context of relational data. All these privacy models are based on
the common assumption that an adversary may use any or even all attributes
in the quasi-identiﬁer (QID) to launch identity and attribute linkage attacks. k-
anonymity [104], [108] prevents identity linkage attacks by requiring every qid group
in a table to contain at least k records. Most works on k-anonymity focus on
anonymizing a single data table; however, a real-life database usually contains mul-
tiple relational tables. Nergiz et al. [95] proposed a privacy model called MultiR
k-anonymity to ensure k-anonymity on multiple relational tables. Their model as-
sumes that a relational database contains a person-speciﬁc table PT and a set of
tables T1, · · · , Tn, where PT contains a person identiﬁer Pid and some sensitive
attributes, and Ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, contains some foreign keys, some attributes in
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QID, and sensitive attributes. The general privacy notion is to ensure that for each
record owner o contained in the join of all tables PT  T1  · · ·  Tn, there exist
at least k − 1 other record owners who share the same QID with o.
-diversity [85] and conﬁdence bounding [114] aim to prevent attribute linkage
attacks. -diversity requires every qid group to contain at least  “well-represented”
sensitive values, while conﬁdence bounding limits an adversary’s conﬁdence of infer-
ring a sensitive value in any qid group to a certain threshold. (α, k)-anonymity [120]
incorporates both k-anonymity and conﬁdence bounding into a single privacy model,
requiring every qid in a table T to be shared by at least k records and conf(qid →
s) ≤ α for any sensitive value s, where k and s are data publisher speciﬁed thresh-
olds. Li et al. [77] observed that when the overall distribution of a sensitive attribute
is skewed, -diversity does not prevent attribute linkage attacks. Consider a patient
table where 95% of records have Flu and 5% of records have HIV. Suppose that a qid
group has 50% of Flu and 50% of HIV and, therefore, satisﬁes 2-diversity. However,
this group presents a serious privacy threat because any record owner in the group
could be inferred as having HIV with 50% conﬁdence, compared to 5% in the overall
table. To prevent skewness attacks, Li et al. [77] proposed a privacy model, called
t-closeness, that requires the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any qid group to
be close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table. t-closeness uses the
earth mover’s distance (EMD) to measure the closeness between two distributions of
sensitive values, and requires the closeness to be within t. (, δ)k-dissimilarity [116]
thwarts both identity and attribute linkage attacks for a much wider range of data
models, where the proximity of sensitive values is deﬁned by an arbitrary function.
In the above privacy models, only very limited background knowledge is con-
sidered. Yet, recent works have shown the importance of integrating an adversary’s
background knowledge in privacy quantiﬁcation. A common challenge faced by all
research on integrating background knowledge is to determine what and how much
knowledge should be considered. Li and Li [78] modeled an adversary’s background
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knowledge by mining negative association rules from the data and then using them
in the anonymization process. Chen et al. [19] argued that since it is infeasible
for a data publisher to anticipate the background knowledge possessed by an adver-
sary, the interesting research direction is to consider only the background knowledge
that arises naturally in practice and can be eﬃciently handled. In particular, three
types of background knowledge are considered in [19]: knowledge about the target
individual, knowledge about other individuals, and knowledge about the group of
individuals having the same sensitive value as that of the target individual. The
three-dimensional knowledge is quantiﬁed as a (, k,m) triplet, which indicates that
an adversary knows: (1)  sensitive values that the target individual t does not
have, (2) the sensitive values of other k individuals, and (3) m individuals having
the same sensitive value as that of t. Then, the authors proposed the skyline privacy
criterion, which allows the data publisher to specify a set of incomparable (, k,m)
triplets, called a skyline, along with a set of conﬁdence thresholds for a sensitive
value δ in order to provide more precise and ﬂexible privacy quantiﬁcation. The
major shortcoming of privacy skyline is its limited expressive power of background
knowledge. For example, it fails to express probabilistic background knowledge.
Du et al. [35] speciﬁcally modeled an adversary’s background knowledge in
the form of probabilities, for example, P (OvarianCancer|Male) = 0. The primary
privacy risks in PPDP come from the linkings between the sensitive attributes (SA)
and the quasi-identiﬁers (QI). Quantifying privacy is, therefore, to derive P (SA|QI)
for any instance of SA and QI with the probabilistic background knowledge. Du et
al. [35] formulated the derivation of P (SA|QI) as a non-linear programming prob-
lem. Currently, the paper is limited in handling only equality background knowl-
edge constraints. Since both papers [19], [35] are unaware of the exact background
knowledge possessed by an adversary, Li et al. [79] proposed a generic framework
to systematically model diﬀerent types of background knowledge an adversary may
possess. Yet, in this paper the authors limit their scope to background knowledge
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that is consistent with the original dataset T . Then, modeling background knowl-
edge is to estimate the adversary’s prior belief of the sensitive attribute values over
all possible QI values. This can be achieved by identifying the underlying prior
belief function that best ﬁts T using a kernel regression estimation method.
3.3 Sanitizing Set-Valued Data
Due to the nature of high dimensionality in set-valued data, the extensive research
on privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) for relational data does not ﬁt well
with set-valued data [46]. Some recent papers have started to address the problem
of anonymizing set-valued data for the purpose of data mining [17], [50], [62], [110],
[111], [128], [129]. These existing works can be broadly divided into two categories
according to whether they distinguish the items between sensitive and non-sensitive.
Ghinita et al. [50] and Xu et al. [128], [129] deliberately divided all items in
the universe into either sensitive or non-sensitive, and further assumed that an ad-
versary’s background knowledge is strictly conﬁned to non-sensitive items, which
are considered quasi-identiﬁers for launching privacy attacks. In [50], an adversary
is modeled with background knowledge of arbitrary number of non-sensitive items.
They proposed a bucketization-based approach that limits the probability of infer-
ring a sensitive item to a speciﬁed threshold, while preserving correlations among
items for frequent pattern mining. In addressing the high dimensionality of set-
valued data, Xu et al. [129] bounded the background knowledge of an adversary to
at most p non-sensitive items, and intended to prevent both identity attacks and
attribute attacks. Speciﬁcally, global suppression was employed with the goal of
preserving as many item instances as possible. Xu et al. [128] improved the ap-
proach proposed in [129] in two ways: instead of preserving item instances, they
aimed to preserve frequent itemsets; they presented a border representation, which
avoids enumerating an exponential number of moles and nuggets.
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All these works suﬀer from two main drawbacks. First, when an adversary
is aware of some, even few, sensitive items, other sensitive items could be learned.
Second, in many cases there does not exist a consensus of “sensitive”. Items sensitive
to someone may not be sensitive to others. Cao et al. [17] addressed the ﬁrst concern
by assuming that an adversary may possess background knowledge on sensitive
items and proposed a privacy notion ρ-uncertainty, which bounds the conﬁdence of
inferring a sensitive item from any subset of items (sensitive or non-sensitive) to ρ.
They employed both global suppression (for both sensitive and non-sensitive items)
and global generalization (for only non-sensitive items).
In addressing the second concern, He and Naughton [62] and Terrovitis et
al. [110], [111] eliminated the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive. Any
item could be both sensitive and non-sensitive at the same time. Incorporating
both k-anonymity and conﬁdence bounding in such a setting is a challenging, if
not impossible, task due to the inherent conﬂicting requirements of the two privacy
models. As a result, these authors considered only identity attacks. Similar to the
idea of [128] and [129], Terrovitis et al. [110] proposed to bound the background
knowledge of an adversary by the maximum number m of items and proposed a
new privacy model, km-anonymity, a relaxation of k-anonymity. They achieved km-
anonymity by a bottom-up global generalization solution. To improve the utility,
recently Terrovitis et al. [111] provided a local recoding method for achieving km-
anonymity. He and Naughton [62] pointed out that km-anonymity provides a weaker
privacy protection than k-anonymity and proposed a top-down local generalization
solution under k-anonymity. We argue that even k-anonymity provides insuﬃcient
privacy protection for set-valued data. Consider an extreme case in which all records
are identical. If an adversary assures the presence of the victim in the table, he learns
every item of the victim without any background knowledge.
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3.4 Sanitizing Trajectory and Sequential Data
More broadly, sequential data can be considered as a special kind of trajectory
data. Due to the ubiquitousness of trajectory data and sequential data, some re-
cent works [1], [109], [100], [130], [63], [93] have started to study privacy-preserving
trajectory data publishing from diﬀerent perspectives. Abul et al. [1] proposed the
(k, δ)-anonymity model based on the inherent imprecision of sampling and position-
ing systems, where δ represents the possible location imprecision. The core step of
their anonymization method is based on space translation. The general idea is to
modify trajectories so that k diﬀerent trajectories co-exist in a cylinder of the ra-
dius δ. One limitation of this approach lies in the fundamental assumption that the
trajectories are of some extent of imprecision, which may not be true for trajectory
data from many sources, for example, purchase data, RFID data and transit data.
Terrovitis and Mamoulis [109] modeled an adversary’s background knowledge
as a set of projections of sequences in a sequential database, and assumed that the
data holder has to be aware of all such adversarial knowledge. They consequently
proposed a data suppression technique that limits the conﬁdence of inferring the
presence of a location in a sequence to a pre-deﬁned probability threshold while
minimizing the average diﬀerence between the original dataset and the published
one. The assumption of knowing all adversarial knowledge before publishing the data
is possible in the speciﬁc scenario described in their paper, but it is not applicable
in general in the context of sequential data.
Pensa et al. [100] proposed a variant of k-anonymity model for sequential data
with the goal of preserving frequent sequential patterns and developed the brute
force pattern-preserving k-anonymization (BF-P2kA) algorithm, which consists of
three steps. In the ﬁrst step, the sequences in the raw dataset are used to build a
preﬁx tree. Then the preﬁx tree is pruned to make sure that all branches are with a
support greater than k. After this, the pruned infrequent sequences are re-appended
to the preﬁx tree based on longest common subsequence (LCS). In the last step, an
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anonymous dataset is re-generated based the processed preﬁx tree.
Yarovoy et al. [130] argued that in moving object databases, there does not
exist a ﬁxed set of QID attributes for all moving objects (MOB). They considered
timestamps as the QIDs and assumed that an attacker conducts privacy attacks
based on an attack graph. A moving object database satisﬁes MOB k-anonymity if
every node in the attack graph G has at least degree k and G is symmetric. The
MOB anonymization algorithm is composed of two steps: identifying anonymiza-
tion groups and generalizing the groups to common regions according to the QIDs
while achieving minimal information loss, which is measured as the reduction in the
probability of accurately determining the position of an object over all timestamps
between the raw MOD D and its anonymous version D∗. An underlying assumption
of MOB k-anonymity is that the data publisher must be aware of the QIDs of all
moving objects in the MOD to publish. However, the paper left the acquisition of
QIDs for a data publisher unsolved.
Monreale et al. [93] presented an approach based on spatial generalization in
order to achieve k-anonymity. The novelty of their approach lies in a generalization
scheme that depends on the underlying trajectory dataset rather than a ﬁxed grid
hierarchy. Fung et al. [45] proposed a trajectory anonymization algorithm based
on global suppression, and their utility metric is the number of location-time pair
instances suppressed due to anonymization. Hu et al. [63] presented the problem
of k-anonymizing a trajectory database with respect to a sensitive event database.
The goal is to make sure that every event is shared by at least k users. Speciﬁcally,
they developed a new generalization mechanism known as local enlargement, which
achieves better utility than conventional hierarchy- or partition-based generalization.
All these works [1], [109], [100], [130], [63], [93] are limited to privacy protection
for only identity linkage attacks based on k-anonymity, however, recently researchers
have realized that k-anonymity bears some inherent limitations on trajectory data
anonymization. For example, in the emerging data publishing scenario, trajectory
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data is published with some other sensitive attributes. Even though an individual
can be hidden in a group with size greater than k, an adversary can still infer his
sensitive information if the group does not have enough diversity on the sensitive
attributes. Therefore, it is valuable to employ more rigorous privacy models to the
problem of trajectory data anonymization. In addition, all these approaches are
eﬀective in some speciﬁc scenarios. A generic anonymization framework that is able
to accommodate diﬀerent data utility requirements is still indispensable.
3.5 Sanitizing Network Data
Since Backstrom et al.’s study [7] of privacy attacks on social networks, the problem
of privacy-preserving network data publishing has received increasing attention.
A large line of research studies how to prevent a node from re-identiﬁcation
against an adversary with background knowledge on the network structure (and
node attributes). Liu and Terzi [82] proposed the notion of k-degree anonymity,
which requires that for every node v there exist at least k − 1 other nodes with
the same degree as v. Zhou and Pei [133] demanded that any vertex cannot be re-
identiﬁed in an anonymized graph with probability greater than 1
k
by an adversary
equipped with 1-neighborhood background knowledge. Hay et al. [60] generalize a
graph by grouping nodes into partitions with size at least k, and only release the size
of each partition and the density of edges. Cormode et al. [30] anonymize graphs
using label lists based on a critical safety condition and then release only the number
of edges among diﬀerent node classes.
Recently, Zou et al. [134] proposed k-automorphism, which resists any struc-
tural attack by enforcing k− 1 automorphic functions in the published data. Cheng
et al. [26] presented the notion of k-security based on k-isomorphism. It requires an
input graph to be transformed to k disjoint isomorphic subgraphs. The strong point
of k-isomorphism is that it prevents not only node re-identiﬁcation but also edge
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disclosure (i.e., an adversary should not be able to determine if two nodes are con-
nected with probability > 1
k
). However, k-isomorphism’s ability in preventing edge
disclosure is still limited. Yuan et al. [132] introduced a framework that provides
personalized privacy protection. Speciﬁcally, they deﬁned three levels of protec-
tion requirements and combined label generalization and other structure protection
techniques in order to achieve improved utility.
Another line of research aims at obfuscating an adversary’s certainty of the
presence of a link between two targets. Ying and Wu [131] developed randomized
edge addition, deletion and switch methods with the goal of preserving spectrum of
networks. Liu et al. [83] considered a special situation where edges are weighted.
They proposed two privacy preserving strategies, one based on a Gaussian random-
ization multiplication and the other based on a greedy perturbation algorithm, in
order to preserve shortest paths between pairs of nodes. Wu et al. [122] presented
a low rank approximation based reconstruction algorithm, which recovers spectral
properties of a randomized graph. In general, all these works lack a formal privacy
deﬁnition and are only resistant to certain types of privacy attacks.
3.6 Applications of Diﬀerential Privacy
In the last few years, diﬀerential privacy has been gaining considerable attention in
various data sharing scenarios. Most of the research on diﬀerential privacy concen-
trates on the interactive model with the goal of either reducing the magnitude of
added noise [61], [76], [103] or releasing certain data mining results [8], [11], [43],
[71], [84]. Lately, several works [12], [39], [125], [126] have started to address the
use of diﬀerential privacy in PPDP as a substitute for k-anonymity and its exten-
sions. Blum et al. [12] demonstrated that it is possible to release synthetic private
databases that are useful for all queries over a discretized domain from a concept
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class with polynomial VC-dimension1. However, their solution is not eﬃcient, taking
runtime complexity of superpolynomial(|C|, |I|), where |C| is the size of a concept
class and |I| the size of the item universe. This fact makes their mechanism imprac-
tical for real applications. To improve the eﬃciency, Dwork et al. [39] proposed
a recursive algorithm of generating a synthetic database with runtime complexity
of polynomial(|C|, |I|). This improvement, however, is still insuﬃcient to handle
real-life high-dimensional datasets because |C| is an exponential function of |I|.
Xiao et al. [126] proposed a two-step algorithm for relational data. It ﬁrst issues
queries for every possible combination of attribute values to the PINQ interface [87],
and then produces a generalized output using the perturbed dataset returned by
PINQ. Apparently, this approach is computationally expensive in the context of
high-dimensional data. For example, for set-valued data it requires issuing a total
of 2|I| − 1 queries, where |I| is the total number of possible items. The works
reported in [12], [39], [126] are based on the query model. In contrast, Xiao et
al. [125] assumed that their algorithm has direct and unconditional access to the
underlying relational data. They proposed a wavelet-transformation based approach
that lowers the magnitude of noise than adding independent Laplace noise. Similarly,
the algorithm needs to process all possible entries in the entire output domain, which
causes a scalability problem for high-dimensional data.
With the wide acknowledgment of diﬀerential privacy, some papers [58], [66],
[54] have started to apply diﬀerential privacy to network data from diﬀerent perspec-
tives. All these works consider a special instantiation of diﬀerential privacy, known
as edge-diﬀerential privacy [58], where a neighbor of a network dataset is obtained
by either adding/removing an edge or by adding/removing an isolated node. Edge-
diﬀerential privacy protects individual edges from being disclosed. Hay et al. [58]
studied the publication of a private estimate of the degree distribution of a network
1Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is a measure of the complexity of a concept in the class.
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via constrained inferences. Karwa et al. [66] provided eﬃcient algorithms for an-
swering triangles, k-triangles and k-stars with instance-dependent noise. Gupta et
al. [54] gave new algorithms for generating a non-interactive release that is useful
for cut queries. The key idea is to pair an iterative database construction algorithm
with a distinguisher, which returns a cut query with a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent value
on an intermediate database, in order to give increasingly accurate approximations
with respect to cut queries. However, as explained later in Chapter 7, there are





Set-valued data, such as transaction data, web search queries, and click streams,
refers to the data in which each record owner is associated with a set of items drawn
from a universe of items [62], [110], [111]. Sharing set-valued data provides enormous
opportunities for various data mining tasks in diﬀerent application domains such as
marketing, advertising, and infrastructure management. However, such data often
contains sensitive information that could violate individual privacy. Such privacy
concerns are even exacerbated in the emerging computing paradigms, for example
cloud computing. Therefore, set-valued data needs to be sanitized before it can be
released to the public. In this chapter, we consider the problem of publishing set-
valued data that simultaneously protects individual privacy under the framework of
diﬀerential privacy [37] and provides guaranteed utility to data analysts.
There has been some existing research [17], [50], [62], [110], [111], [128], [129] on
publishing set-valued data based on partition-based privacy models [49], for example
k-anonymity [108] (or its relaxation, km-anonymity [110], [111]) and/or conﬁdence
bounding [17], [114]. However, the recent discovery of several privacy attacks [67],
[94], [119] has questioned the capability of partition-based privacy models on privacy
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protection. The vulnerability of partition-based privacy models is largely due to their
deterministic nature, which makes them fail to resist an adversary with substantial
background knowledge. This fact motivated our use of diﬀerential privacy to provide
formal, provable privacy guarantees for set-valued data publication. However, the
application of diﬀerential privacy to set-valued data publishing is very challenging,
especially in terms of eﬃciency due to its high dimensionality. By deﬁnition, any
diﬀerentially private mechanism has to be insensitive to the addition/removal of a
single record, which, in the context of set-valued data, could be an arbitrary itemset
derived from the item universe I. To mask this record, existing techniques [12], [39],
[125], [126] explicitly consider a total of 2|I|−1 itemsets that can be derived from I.
Since |I| in a real-life application could be over a thousand, these approaches can
hardly be applied to a real-life data sharing scenario.
In addressing this problem, we initiate the line of data-dependent solutions,
which adaptively narrow down the output domain by using noisy answers obtained
from the underlying database. A data-dependent solution also has a positive impact
on the resulting utility as there is no need to add noise to every possible entry in
the output domain. The main technical challenge is how to make use of a speciﬁc
dataset while satisfying diﬀerential privacy. In particular, for set-valued data, we
demonstrate that in the presence of a context-free taxonomy tree we can eﬃciently
generate a sanitized release of set-valued data in a diﬀerentially private manner
with guaranteed utility for counting queries and many other data mining tasks.
Unlike the use of taxonomy trees in the generalization mechanism for partition-
based privacy models, where the taxonomy trees are highly speciﬁc to a particular
application, the taxonomy tree required in our solution does not necessarily need to
reﬂect the underlying semantics and, therefore, is context-free. This feature makes
our approach ﬂexible for applying to various kinds of set-valued datasets. In this
chapter, we also discuss how to apply the data-dependent idea to other data types.
Contributions. We summarize the contributions of this chapter as follows.
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• This is the ﬁrst study of publishing set-valued data via diﬀerential privacy. The
previous anonymization techniques [17], [50], [62], [110], [111], [128], [129] de-
veloped for publishing set-valued data are dedicated to partition-based privacy
models. Due to their deterministic nature, they cannot be used for achieving
diﬀerential privacy. In this chapter, we propose a probabilistic top-down parti-
tioning algorithm that provides provable utility under diﬀerential privacy, one
of the strongest privacy models.
• This is the ﬁrst work that proposes an eﬃcient non-interactive approach scal-
able to high-dimensional set-valued data with guaranteed utility under diﬀer-
ential privacy. We stress that our goal is to publish the data, not data mining
results. Publishing data provides much greater ﬂexibilities for data miners
than publishing data mining results. We show that a more eﬃcient and ef-
fective solution could be achieved by making use of the underlying dataset,
instead of explicitly considering all possible outputs as used in the existing
works [12], [39], [125], [126]. For a set-valued dataset, it could be done by a
top-down partitioning process based on a context-free taxonomy tree. The use
of a context-free taxonomy tree makes our approach applicable to all kinds of
set-valued datasets. We prove that the result of our approach is (δ, β)-useful
for counting queries, which guarantees the usefulness for data mining tasks
based on counts, e.g., mining frequent patterns and association rules [55]. We
argue that the general idea of data-dependent solutions has a wider applica-
tion, for example, to relational data in which each attribute is associated with
a taxonomy tree. This implies that some traditional data publishing methods,
such as TDS [48] and Mondrian [75], could be adapted to satisfy diﬀerential
privacy.
The results of this chapter have been published in [25].
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Table 4.1: A sample set-valued dataset
Rec. # Items






7 {I1, I2, I3, I4}
8 {I2, I3, I4}
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Set-Valued Data
Let I = {I1, I2, ..., I|I|} be the universe of items, where |I| is the size of the item
universe. The multiset D = {D1, D2, ..., D|D|} denotes a set-valued dataset, where
each record Di ∈ D is a non-empty subset of I. Table 4.1 presents an example of
set-valued datasets with the item universe I = {I1, I2, I3, I4}.
Given the item universe I, the output domain O of a set-valued database is
composed of all possible itemsets that can be derived from I. Therefore, the size of
the output domain |O| =∑|I|k=1 (|I|k ) = 2|I| − 1.
Example 4.2.1. Given I = {I1, I2, I3}, the associated output domainO = {{I1}, {I2},
{I3}, {I1, I2}, {I1, I3}, {I2, I3}, {I1, I2, I3}}. The size of O is 23 − 1 = 7.
4.2.2 Context-Free Taxonomy Tree
A set-valued dataset could be associated with a single taxonomy tree. In the classic
generalization mechanism, the taxonomy tree required is highly speciﬁc to a partic-
ular application. This constraint has been considered a major limitation of applying
generalization [4]. The reason of requiring an application-speciﬁc taxonomy tree is
that the release contains generalized items that need to be semantically consistent
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Figure 4.1: A context-free taxonomy tree of the sample data.
with the original items. In our approach, we publish only original items; therefore,
the taxonomy tree could be context free.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Context-Free Taxonomy Tree). A context-free taxonomy tree is a
taxonomy tree, whose internal nodes are a set of their leaves, not necessarily the
semantic generalization of the leaves.
For example, Figure 4.1 presents a context-free taxonomy tree for Table 4.1,
and one of its internal nodes I{1,2,3,4} = {I1, I2, I3, I4}. We say that an item can be
generalized to a taxonomy tree node if it is in the node’s set. For example, I1 can
be generalized to I{1,2} because I1 ∈ {I1, I2}.
4.2.3 Utility Metrics
Due to the lower bound results [34], [37], [38], we can only guarantee the utility of
restricted classes of queries [12] in the non-interactive setting. In this chapter, we
aim to develop a solution for publishing set-valued data that is useful for counting
queries (also known as count queries).
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Counting Query). For a given itemset U ∈ O, a counting query Q
over a dataset D is deﬁned to be Q(D) = |{D ∈ D : U ⊆ D}|.
We choose counting queries because they are crucial to several key data mining
tasks over set-valued data, for example, mining frequent patterns and association
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rules [55]. We employ (δ, β)-usefulness [12] to theoretically measure the utility of
sanitized data for counting queries.
Deﬁnition 4.3 ((δ, β)-usefulness). A privacy mechanismA is (δ, β)-useful for queries
in class C if with probability 1 − β, for every Q ∈ C and every dataset D, for
D˜ = A(D), |Q(D˜)−Q(D)| ≤ δ.
(δ, β)-usefulness is eﬀective to give an overall theoretical estimation of utility,
but fails to provide intuitive experimental results. Therefore, we experimentally
measure the utility of sanitized data for a counting query Q by its relative error [125],




where s is a sanity bound used to mitigate the inﬂuences of queries with extremely
small selectivities [125], [123]. Selectivity is deﬁned as the fraction of records in the
dataset satisfying all items in Q [125].
4.3 Sanitization Algorithm
In this section, we present a Diﬀ erentially-private sanitization algorithm (given in
Algorithm 4.1) that recursively Part itions a given set-valued dataset based on a
context-free taxonomy tree (DiﬀPart).
4.3.1 Partitioning Algorithm
Intuitively, a diﬀerentially private release of a set-valued dataset could be generated
by adding Laplace noise to a set of counting queries. A simple yet infeasible approach
can be achieved by employing Dwork et al.’s method [37]: ﬁrst generate all distinct
itemsets from the item universe; then for each itemset issue a counting query and add
Laplace noise to the answer. This approach suﬀers from two main drawbacks in the
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Algorithm 4.1: DiﬀPart
Input: Raw set-valued dataset D
Input: Fan-out f
Input: Privacy budget 
Output: Sanitized dataset D˜
1: D˜ ← ∅;
2: Construct a taxonomy tree T with fan-out f ;
3: Partition p ← all records in D;
4: p.cut ← the root of T ;
5: p.˜ = /2;
6: p.α = p.˜/|InternalNodes(p.cut)|;
7: Add p to an initially empty queue Q;
8: while Q = ∅ do
9: Dequeue p′ from Q;
10: Sub-partitions P ← SubPart Gen(p′, T );
11: for each sub-partition pi ∈ P do
12: if pi is a leaf partition then
13: Npi = NoisyCount(|pi|, /2 + pi.˜);
14: if Npi ≥
√
2C1/(/2 + pi.˜) then
15: Add Npi copies of pi.cut to D˜;
16: end if
17: else





context of set-valued data. First, it requires a total of 2|I|− 1 queries, giving rise to
a scalability problem. Second, the noise added to the itemsets that never appear in
the original dataset accumulates exponentially, rendering the release useless for data
analysis tasks. In fact, these are also the main limitations of other non-interactive
approaches [12], [39], [125], [126] when applied to set-valued data. We argue that
an eﬃcient solution could be achieved by taking into consideration the underlying
dataset. However, attention must be paid because identifying the set of counting
queries based on the input dataset may leak its sensitive information and, therefore,
violate diﬀerential privacy.
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We ﬁrst provide an overview of DiﬀPart. It starts by creating the context-free
taxonomy tree. It then generalizes all records to a single partition with a common
representation. We call the common representation the hierarchy cut, consisting
of a set of taxonomy tree nodes. It recursively distributes the records into disjoint
sub-partitions with more speciﬁc representations in a top-down manner based on the
taxonomy tree. For each sub-partition, we determine if it is empty in a noisy way
and further split the sub-partitions considered “non-empty”. Our approach stops
when no further partitioning is possible in any sub-partition. We call a partition a
leaf partition if every node in its hierarchy cut is a leaf of the taxonomy tree. Finally,
for each leaf partition, the algorithm asks for its noisy size (the noisy number of
records in the partition) to construct the release. Our use of a top-down partitioning
process is inspired by its use in [62], but with substantial diﬀerences. Their approach
is used to generate a generalized release satisfying k-anonymity while ours is to
identify the set of counting queries used to publish diﬀerentially private data.
Algorithm 4.1 presents our approach in more detail. It takes as inputs the raw
set-valued dataset D, the fan-out f used to construct the taxonomy tree, and also
the total privacy budget  speciﬁed by the data publisher, and returns a sanitized
dataset D˜ satisfying -diﬀerential privacy.
Top-down partitioning. The algorithm ﬁrst constructs the context-free taxonomy
tree T by iteratively grouping f nodes from one level to an upper level until a single
root is created. If the size of the item universe is not divided by f , smaller groups
can be created.
The initial partition p is created by generalizing all records in D under a
hierarchy cut of a single taxonomy tree node, namely the root of T . A record can
be generalized to a hierarchy cut if every item in the record can be generalized to
a node in the cut and every node in the cut generalizes some items in the record.
For example, the record {I3, I4} can be generalized to the hierarchy cuts {I{3,4}}




































































































































































Figure 4.2: The partitioning process.
queue Q.
For each partition in the queue, we need to generate its sub-partitions and
identify the non-empty ones for further partitioning. Due to noise required by
diﬀerential privacy, a sub-partition cannot be deterministically identiﬁed as non-
empty. Probabilistic operations are needed for this purpose. For each operation,
a certain portion of privacy budget is required to obtain the noisy size of a sub-
partition based on which we decide whether it is “empty”. Algorithm 4.1 keeps
partitioning “non-empty” sub-partitions until leaf partitions are reached.
Example 4.3.1. Given the dataset in Table 4.1 and a fan-out value 2, a possible
taxonomy tree is presented in Figure 4.1, and a possible partitioning process is
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Partitions {I{3,4}}, {I{1,2}, I3} and {I{1,2}, I4} are considered
“empty” and, therefore, not further partitioned.
Privacy budget allocation. The use of the total privacy budget  needs to be
carefully allocated to each probabilistic operation to avoid unexpected termination
of the algorithm. Since the operations are used to determine the noisy sizes of the
sub-partitions resulted from partition operations, a naive allocation scheme is to
bound the maximum number of partition operations needed in the entire algorithm
and assign an equal portion to each of them. This approach, however, does not
perform well. Instead, we propose a more sophisticated adaptive scheme. We reserve
/2 to obtain the noisy sizes of leaf partitions, which are used to construct the
release, and use the rest /2 to guide the partitioning process. For each partition,
we independently calculate the maximum number of partition operations further
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needed and assign privacy budget to partition operations based on the number.
The portion of privacy budget assigned to a partition operation is further
allocated to the resulting sub-partitions to check their noisy sizes (to see if they
are “empty”). Since all sub-partitions from the same partition operation contain
disjoint records, due to the parallel composition property [87], the portion of privacy
budget could be used in full on each sub-partition. This scheme guarantees that
more speciﬁc partitions always obtain more privacy budget, complying with the
rationale that more general partitions contain more records and, therefore, are more
resistant to a smaller privacy budget. We prove this statement after introducing
how to calculate the maximum number of partition operations in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. Given a non-leaf partition p with a hierarchy cut and an associ-
ated taxonomy tree T , the maximum number of partition operations needed to reach
leaf partitions is |InternalNodes(cut)| = ∑ui∈cut |InternalNodes(ui, T )|, where
|InternalNodes(ui, T )| is the number of internal nodes of the subtree of T rooted at
ui.
Proof. Given a partition p, our algorithm selects one non-leaf taxonomy tree node
from its hierarchy cut to expand at a time. Our algorithm stops when every non-leaf
taxonomy tree node in p’s hierarchy cut is specialized to a leaf node. For a non-leaf
node u in the hierarchy cut, in the worst case, it will be replaced by the combination
containing all its children. If the children are not leaf node, they need to be split,
and in the worst case again, it will be replaced by the combination containing all
its children. That is, we need to go through all internal nodes of the subtree of T
rooted at u. Therefore, in order to make all non-leaf nodes in p’s hierarchy cut to
leaf nodes, we need, in the worst case,
∑
ui∈cut |InternalNodes(ui, T )| partitionings
(partition operations).
Take the dataset in Table 4.1 as an example. Consider a partition with the
hierarchy cut {I{1,2,3,4}}. After the ﬁrst partitioning, the sub-partition with the
hierarchy cut {I{1,2}, I{3,4}} represents the worst case. Suppose I{1,2} is selected to
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split, the sub-partition with the hierarchy cut {I1, I2, I{3,4}} presents the worst case.
After that, we need one more split on I{3,4}. Therefore, in the worst case, the total
number of partition operations required is 3, which is the number of internal nodes
of the taxonomy tree in Figure 4.1.
Now we prove that our adaptive allocation scheme always assigns more pri-
vacy budget to more speciﬁc partitions. Let ni be the maximum number of partition
operations calculated according to Theorem 4.1 and m be the total number of par-
tition operations needed to reach leaf partitions. Let 
2
∏m−2
i=1 (1− 1ni ) · 1nm−1 be the
privacy budget assigned to a partition and 
2
∏m−1
i=1 (1− 1ni ) · 1nm the privacy budget
assigned to its sub-partitions, which are more speciﬁc. We have ni ≥ ni+1 + 1 be-
cause the maximum number of partition operations further needed for a partition is
always one more than that of its sub-partitions (we need at least one more partition







































Using transitivity, we conclude that more speciﬁc partitions always receive
more privacy budget. Each partition tracks its unused privacy budget ˜ and calcu-
lates the portion of privacy budget α for the next partition operation. Any privacy
budget left from the partitioning process is added to leaf partitions.
Example 4.3.2. For the partitioning process illustrated in Figure 4.2, partitions
{I1, I2}, {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}, {I{1,2}, I3, I4}, and {I1, I2, I3, I4} receive privacy budget 5/6,
/6, /6 and 2/3, respectively.
50
Algorithm 4.2: SubPart Gen (Sub-partition generation)
Input: Partition p
Input: Taxonomy tree T
Output: Noisy non-empty sub-partitions V of p
1: Initialize a vector V ;
2: Select a node u from p.cut to partition;
3: Generate all non-empty sub-partitions S;
4: Allocate records in p to S;
5: for each sub-partition si ∈ S do
6: Nsi = NoisyCount(|si|, p.α);
7: if Nsi ≥
√
2C2 × height(p.cut)/p.α then
8: si.˜ = p.˜− p.α;
9: si.α = si.˜/|InternalNodes(si.cut)|;
10: Add si to V ;
11: end if
12: end for
13: j = 1;
14: l = number of u’s children;
15: while j ≤ 2l − |S| do
16: Nj = NoisyCount(0, p.α);
17: if Nj ≥
√
2C2 × height(p.cut)/p.α then
18: Randomly generate an empty sub-partition s′j ;
19: s′j .˜ = p.˜− p.α;
20: s′j .α = s
′
j .˜/|InternalNodes(s′j .cut)|;




25: return V ;
Sub-partition generation. “Non-empty” sub-partitions can be identiﬁed by ei-
ther exponential mechanism or Laplace mechanism. For exponential mechanism, we
can get the noisy number N of non-empty sub-partitions, and then use exponential
mechanism to extract N sub-partitions by using the number of records in a sub-
partition as the score function. This approach, however, does not take advantage
of the fact that all sub-partitions contain disjoint datasets, resulting in a relatively
small privacy budget for each operation and thus less accurate results. For this
reason, we employ Laplace mechanism for generating sub-partitions, whose details
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are presented in Algorithm 4.2.
For a non-leaf partition, we generate a candidate set of taxonomy tree nodes
from its hierarchy cut, containing all non-leaf nodes that are of the largest height in
T , and then randomly select a node u from the set to expand, generating a total of
2l sub-partitions, where l ≤ f is the number of u’s children in T . The sub-partitions
can be exhaustively generated by replacing u by the combinations of its children.
For example, the partition {I{1,2}} generates three sub-partitions: {I1}, {I2} and
{I1, I2}. This technique, however, is ineﬃcient.
We propose an eﬃcient implementation by separately handling non-empty and
empty sub-partitions of a partition p. Non-empty sub-partitions, usually of a small
number, need to be explicitly generated. We issue a counting query for the noisy
size of each sub-partition by Laplace mechanism. We use the noisy size to make
our decision. We consider a sub-partition “non-empty” if its noisy size ≥ √2C2 ×
height(p.cut)/p.α. We design the threshold as a function of the standard deviation
of the noise and the height of p’s hierarchy cut, the largest height of all nodes
in p’s hierarchy cut. The rationale of taking into consideration the height is that
more general partitions should have more records to be worth being partitioned.
A constant C2 is added to the function for the reason of eﬃciency: we want to
prune empty sub-partitions as early as possible. While this heuristic is arbitrary, it
provides good experimental results on diﬀerent real-life datasets.
For empty sub-partitions, we do not explicitly generate all possible ones,
but employ a test-and-generate method: generate a uniformly random empty sub-
partition without replacement only if the noisy count of an empty sub-partition’s
true count 0 is greater than the threshold. To satisfy diﬀerential privacy, empty and
non-empty sub-partitions must use the same threshold. A C2 value that is slightly
greater than 1 can eﬀectively prune most empty sub-partitions without jeopardizing
non-empty ones.
For a leaf partition, we use the reserved /2 plus the privacy budget left from
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the partitioning process to obtain its noisy size. To minimize the eﬀect of noise,
we add a leaf partition p only if its noisy size ≥ √2C1/(/2 + p.˜). Typically, C1 is
a constant in the range of [1, C2]. We argue that since the data publisher has full
access to the raw dataset, she could try diﬀerent C1 and C2 values and publish a
reasonably good release. We consider how to automatically determine C1 and C2
values in future work.
We illustrate how DiﬀPart works in Example 4.3.3.
Example 4.3.3. Given the sample dataset in Table 4.1, a fan-out value 2, and the
total privacy budget , DiﬀPart works as follows (see Figure 4.2 for an illustration).
It ﬁrst creates the context-free taxonomy tree T illustrated in Figure 4.1 and gen-
eralizes all records to a single partition with the hierarchy cut {I{1,2,3,4}}. A portion
of privacy budget /6 is allocated to the ﬁrst partition operation because there are
3 internal nodes in T (and /2 is reserved for leaf partitions).
The algorithm then creates three sub-partitions with the hierarchy cuts {I{1,2}},
{I{3,4}}, and {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}, respectively, by replacing the node I{1,2,3,4} by diﬀerent
combinations of its children, leading records #3, 4, 5, and 6 to the sub-partition
{I{1,2}} and records #1, 2, 7 and 8 to the sub-partition {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}. Suppose that
the noisy sizes indicate that these two sub-partitions are “non-empty”. Further
splits are needed on them. There is no need to explore the sub-partition {I{3,4}}
any more as it is considered “empty”.
The portions of privacy budget for the next partition operations are inde-
pendently calculated for the two partitions. For the partition {I{1,2}}, there is at
most one more partition operation and, therefore, it gets the privacy budget /3;
for the partition {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}, /6 is allocated as there are still two internal nodes
in its hierarchy cut. A further split of {I{1,2}} creates three leaf partitions, {I1},
{I2}, and {I1, I2}. For the partition {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}, assume that I{3,4} is randomly
selected to expand. This generates three sub-partitions: {I{1,2}, I3}, {I{1,2}, I4}, and
{I{1,2}, I3, I4} with record #2 in {I{1,2}, I4}, and records #1, 7, 8 in {I{1,2}, I3, I4}.
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Assume that the partition {I{1,2}, I3, I4} is considered “non-empty”. One more par-
tition operation is needed and /6 privacy budget is allocated.
After the last partitioning, we get three more leaf partitions with the hier-
archy cuts {I1, I3, I4}, {I2, I3, I4} and {I1, I2, I3, I4}. For all leaf partitions, we use
the reserved /2 plus the privacy budget left from the partitioning process to cal-
culate their noisy sizes. This implies 5/6 for {I1}, {I2}, and {I1, I2}, and 2/3 for
{I1, I3, I4}, {I2, I3, I4} and {I1, I2, I3, I4}.
One interesting observation is that with the partitioning process, the hierarchy
cuts of the sub-partitions resulted from the same partition operation become more
similar. For this reason, to some extent the eﬀect of noise for counting queries is
mitigated (recall that the mean of noise is 0).
4.3.2 Analysis
Privacy analysis. The privacy guarantee of our solution is given in Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 4.1 together with Algorithm 4.2 satisﬁes -diﬀerential
privacy.
Proof. In essence, the only information obtained from the underlying dataset is the
noisy sizes of the partitions (or equivalently, the noisy answers of a set of counting
queries). Due to noise, any itemset from the universe may appear in the sanitized
release. In the previous work [87], it has been proven that partitioning a dataset
by explicit user inputs does not violate diﬀerential privacy. However, the actual
partitioning result should not be revealed as it violates diﬀerential privacy. This
explains why we need to consider every possible sub-partition and use its noisy size
to make decision.
Let a sequence of partitionings that consecutively distributes the records in
the initial partition to leaf partitions be a partitioning chain. Due to Theorem 2.2,
the privacy budget used in each partitioning chain is independent of those of other
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chains. Therefore, if we can prove that the total privacy budget used in each par-
titioning chain is less than or equal to , we get the conclusion that Algorithm 4.1
together with Algorithm 4.2 satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy.
Let m be the total number of partitionings in a partitioning chain and ni the
maximum number of partitionings calculated according to Theorem 4.1. We can


























Subject to ni ≥ ni+1 + 1 and nm = 1.
Each item of the right hand side (RHS) of the above equation represents the
portion of privacy budget allocated to a partition operation. The entire RHS gives
the total privacy budget used in the partitioning chain. We prove the correctness of
the equation below.














Subject to ni ≥ ni+1 + 1 and nm = 1.
We add one more non-negative item
∏m−1
i=1 (1− 1ni ) · (1 − 1nm ) to the left hand side
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This completes the proof. Therefore, our approach satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy.
Since nm = 1, we can get that the item added above
∏m−1
i=1 (1− 1ni ) ·(1− 1nm ) =
0. This indicates that our allocation scheme makes full use of the total privacy
budget.
Utility analysis. We theoretically prove that Algorithm 4.1 guarantees that the
sanitized dataset D˜ is (δ, β)-useful for counting queries.
Theorem 4.3. The result of Algorithm 4.1 is (δ, β)-useful for counting queries.
Proof. Given any counting query Q that covers up to m distinct itemsets in the
entire output domain, the accurate answer of Q over the input dataset D is Q(D) =∑m
i=1Q(Ii), where Ii is the itemset covered by Q; the answer of Q over D˜ is Q(D˜) =∑m
i=1(Q(Ii) + Ni), where Ni is the noise added to Ii. By the deﬁnition of (δ, β)-


















We have the following observations.
• For Ii such that Ii /∈ D ∩ Ii /∈ D˜, Ni = 0. Let the size of such Ii be m′ ≤ m.
• For Ii such that Ii ∈ D ∩ Ii ∈ D˜, Ni ∼ Lap(1/¯), where ¯ = /2 + ˜.
• For Ii such that Ii /∈ D ∩ Ii ∈ D˜, Ni ∼ Lap(1/¯), where ¯ = /2 + ˜.
• For Ii such that Ii ∈ D ∩ Ii /∈ D˜, Ni ∼ Lap(1/φ) + γ, where φ = /(2 ·
|InternalNodes(T )|) ≤ ¯ (the smallest privacy budget used in the entire par-
titioning process) and γ =
√
2C2 logf |I|/φ is introduced by the threshold in
Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 4.2.













|Yi|+ (m−m′) · γ
≤ δ
where Yi is a random variable i.i.d from Lap(1/φ). If every |Yi| ≤ δ1 where δ1 =
δ
m−m′ − γ, we have
∑m
i=1 |Ni| ≤ δ. Let us call the event that any single |Y i| > δ1 a
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|Ni| ≤ δ] = Pr[
m−m′∑
i=1
|Yi| ≤ δ − (m−m′) · γ]
≥ (1− Pr[FAILURE])m−m′
≥ (1− exp(−φδ1))m−m′
In [126], it has been proven that





|Ni| ≤ δ] ≥ 1− (m−m′)exp(−φδ1)
≥ 1− (m−m′)exp(φγ − φδ
m−m′ )
This completes the proof.
Complexity analysis. The runtime complexity of Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 4.2
is O(|D| · |I|), where |D| is the number of records in the input dataset D and |I| the
size of the item universe. The main computational cost comes from the distribution
of records from a partition to its sub-partitions. The complexity of distributing the
records for a single partition operation is O(|D|) because a partitioning can aﬀect at
most |D| records. According to Theorem 4.1, the maximum number of partitionings
needed for the entire process is the number of internal nodes in the taxonomy tree
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T . For a taxonomy tree with a fan-out f ≥ 2, the number of internal nodes is |I|−1
f−1 .
Therefore, the overall complexity of our approach is O(|D| · |I|).
Applicability. It is worthwhile discussing the applicability of our approach in the
context of relational data. The core of our idea is to limit the output domain by
taking into consideration the underlying dataset. In this chapter, we propose a
probabilistic top-down partitioning process based on a context-free taxonomy tree
in order to adaptively narrow down the output domain. For relational data, (cate-
gorical) attributes are usually associated with taxonomy trees. Therefore, a similar
probabilistic partitioning process could be used. The diﬀerence is that the partition-
ing process needs to be conducted by considering the correlations among multiple
taxonomy trees. In this case, exponential mechanism could be used in each parti-
tion operation to choose an attribute to split. Diﬀerent heuristics (e.g. information
gain, gini index or max) could be used as the score function. Following the idea, we
maintain that our idea could adapt existing deterministic sanitization techniques,
such as TDS [48] and Mondrian [75], to satisfy diﬀerential privacy. This approach
would outperform existing works [12], [39], [125], [126] on publishing relational data
in the framework of diﬀerential privacy in terms of both utility and eﬃciency for
the same reasons explained in this chapter.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
In the experiments, we examine the performance of our algorithm in terms of utility
for diﬀerent data mining tasks, namely counting queries and frequent itemset mining,
and scalability of handling large set-valued datasets. We compare our approach
(DiﬀPart) with Dwork et al.’s method (introduced in Section 4.3.1 and referred to
as Basic in the following) to show the signiﬁcant improvement of DiﬀPart on both
utility and scalability. The implementation was done in C++, and all experiments
were conducted on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.26GHz PC with 2GB RAM.
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Table 4.2: Experimental dataset statistics.
Datasets |D| |I| max|D| avg|D|
MSNBC 989,818 17 17 1.72
STM 1,210,096 1,012 64 4.82
Two real-life set-valued datasets, MSNBC 1 and STM 2, are used in the ex-
periments. MSNBC originally describes the URL categories visited by users in time
order. We converted it into set-valued data by ignoring the sequentiality, where
each record contains a set of URL categories visited by a user. MSNBC is of a
small universe size. We deliberately choose it so that we can compare DiﬀPart to
Basic. STM records the sets of subway and/or bus stations visited by passengers in
Montre´al area within a week. It is of a relatively high universe size, for which Basic
(and the methods in [12], [39], [125], [126]) fails to sanitize. The characteristics of
the datasets are summarized in Table 4.2, where max|D| is the maximum record
size and avg|D| the average record size.
4.4.1 Data Utility
Following the evaluation scheme from previous works [125], [123], we measure the
utility of a counting query Q over the sanitized dataset D˜ by its relative error with
respect to the actual result over the raw dataset D. Speciﬁcally, the relative error of
Q is computed as |Q(D˜)−Q(D)|
max{Q(D),s} , where s is a sanity bound that weakens the inﬂuence
of the queries with extremely small selectivities. In our experiments, s is set to 0.1%
of the dataset size, the same as [125].
Counting Query. In our ﬁrst set of experiments, we examine the relative error
of counting queries with respect to diﬀerent privacy budgets. For each dataset, we
randomly generate 50, 000 counting queries with varying numbers of items. We call
1MSNBC is publicly available at UCI machine learning repository
(http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.html).



































































































































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d)  = 1.25
Figure 4.3: Average relative error vs. privacy budget.
the number of items in a query the length of the query. We divide the query set
into 5 subsets such that the query length of the i-th subset is uniformly distributed
in [1, i·max|D|
5
] and each item is randomly drawn from I. In the following ﬁgures, all
relative error reported is the average of 10 runs.
Figure 4.3 shows the average relative error under varying privacy budget  from
0.5 to 1.25 with fan-out f = 10 for each query subset. The X-axes represent the
maximum query length of each subset in terms of the percentage of max|D|. The
relative error decreases when the privacy budget increases because less noise is added.
The error of Basic is signiﬁcantly larger than that of DiﬀPart in all cases. When the
query length decreases, the performance of Basic deteriorates substantially because
the queries cover exponentially more itemsets that never appear in the original































































































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d)  = 1.25
Figure 4.4: Average relative error vs. fan-out.
stable with diﬀerent query lengths. It is foreseeable that queries with a length
greater than max|D| result in less error. In addition to better utility, DiﬀPart is
more eﬃcient than Basic, which fails to sanitize the STM dataset due to its large
universe size.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the average relative error under diﬀerent values of fan-out
f with privacy budget  ranging from 0.5 to 1.25 while ﬁxing the query length to be
60% · max|D|. In general, DiﬀPart generates relatively stable results for diﬀerent
fan-out values. For smaller fan-out values, each partitioning receives less privacy
budget; however, there are more levels of partitionings, which increases the chance
of pruning more empty partitions. The fact makes the relative error of smaller
fan-out values comparable to that of larger fan-out values. The insensitivity of our



























































































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d) epsilon = 1.25
Figure 4.5: Average relative error vs. universe size.
publisher easier to obtain a good release.
Figure 4.5 presents the average relative error under diﬀerent universe sizes
with privacy budget  varying from 0.5 to 1.25. We set the fan-out f = 10 and ﬁx
the query length to 10 (we deliberately choose a small length to make the diﬀerence
more observable). Since MSNBC is of a small universe size, we only examine
the performance of DiﬀPart on STM . We generate the test sets by limiting STM ’s
universe size. After reducing the universe size, the sizes of the test sets also decrease.
To make a fair comparison, we ﬁx the dataset size under diﬀerent universe sizes to
800,000. We can observe that the average relative error decreases when the universe
size becomes smaller, because there is a greater chance to have more records falling
into a partition, making the partition more resistant to larger noise. We can also























































































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d)  = 1.25
Figure 4.6: Average relative error vs. dataset size.
error under varying privacy budgets. This is due to the same reason that smaller
universe sizes result in partitions with larger sizes, which are less sensitive to varying
privacy budgets.
In theory, a dataset has to be large enough to obtain good utility under dif-
ferential privacy. We experimentally study how the utility varies under diﬀerent
dataset sizes on the two real-life set-valued datasets. We generate the test datasets
by randomly extracting records from the two datasets. The results are presented
in Figure 4.6, where  varies from 0.5 to 1.25, f = 10, and the query length is
60% ·max|D|. It can be observed that the two datasets behave diﬀerently to vary-
ing dataset sizes. The relative error of MSNBC improves signiﬁcantly when the



































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d)  = 1.25
Figure 4.7: Utility for frequent itemset mining.
the fact that when the dataset size is not large enough, the distribution of the under-
lying records is key to the performance. In addition, we can observe that when the
privacy budget is small, the error is more sensitive to the dataset size. It is because
the number of records in a partition needs to be greater than the magnitude of noise
(which is inversely proportion to the privacy budget) in order to obtain good utility.
Frequent itemset mining. We further validate the utility of sanitized data by
frequent itemset mining, which is a more concrete data mining task. Given a positive
number K, we calculate the top K most frequent itemsets on the raw dataset D
and the sanitized dataset D˜, respectively, and examine their similarity. Let FK(D)
denote the set of top K itemsets calculated from D and FK(D˜) the set from D˜. For
a frequent itemset Fi ∈ FK(D), let sup(Fi, FK(D)) denote its support in FK(D) and
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sup(Fi, FK(D˜)) denote its support in FK(D˜). If Fi /∈ FK(D˜), sup(Fi, FK(D˜)) = 0.








where 1 means that FK(D) is identical to FK(D˜) (even the support of every frequent
itemset); 0 means that FK(D) and FK(D˜) are totally diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, we
employ MAFIA 3 to mine frequent itemsets.
In Figure 4.7, we study the utility of sanitized data for frequent itemset mining
under diﬀerent privacy budgets and diﬀerent K values with f = 10. We observe two
general trends from the experimental results. First, the privacy budget has a direct
impact on frequent itemset mining. A higher budget results in better utility since the
partitioning process is more accurate and less noise is added to leaf partitions. The
diﬀerences of the supports of top K frequent itemsets between FK(D) and FK(D˜)
actually reﬂect the performance of DiﬀPart for counting queries of extremely small
length (because the top-K frequent itemsets are usually of a small length). We can
observe that the utility loss (the diﬀerence between FK(D) and FK(D˜)) is less than
30% except the case  = 0.5 for STM . Second, utility decreases when K value
increases. When K value is small, in most cases the sanitized datasets are able to
give the identical top-K frequent itemsets as the raw datasets, and the utility loss
is mainly caused by the diﬀerences of the supports. When K value becomes larger,
there are more false positives (itemsets wrongly included in the output) and false
drops (itemsets mistakenly excluded), resulting in worse utility. Nevertheless, the
utility loss is still less than 22% when K = 100 and  ≥ 1.0 on both datasets.



















































(a) Runtime vs. |D| (b) Runtime vs. |I|
Figure 4.8: Runtime vs. diﬀerent parameters.
4.4.2 Scalability
We study the scalability of DiﬀPart over large datasets. According to the complexity
analysis in Section 4.3.2, dataset size and universe size are the two factors that
dominate the complexity. Therefore, we present the runtime of DiﬀPart under
diﬀerent dataset sizes and universe sizes in Figure 4.8. Figure 4.8.a presents the
runtime of DiﬀPart under diﬀerent dataset sizes. We generate the test sets in a
similar setting to that of Figure 4.6 and set  = 1.0, f = 10. As expected, the
runtime is linear to the dataset size. Figure 4.8.b studies how the runtime varies
under diﬀerent universe sizes, where  = 1.0 and f = 10. Since MSNBC is of a
small universe size, we only examine the runtime of DiﬀPart on STM . We generate
the test sets in a similar setting to that of Figure 4.5. It can be observed again that
the runtime scales linearly with the universe size. In summary, our approach scales
well to large set-valued datasets. It takes less than 35 seconds to sanitize the STM
dataset, whose |D| = 1, 210, 096 and |I| = 1, 012.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a probabilistic top-down partitioning algorithm for pub-
lishing set-valued data in the framework of diﬀerential privacy. Compared to the
existing works on set-valued data publishing, our approach provides stronger privacy
protection with guaranteed utility. Our work also contributes to the research of dif-
ferential privacy by demonstrating that an eﬃcient data-dependent non-interactive
solution could be achieved by carefully making use of the underlying dataset. Our






Recently, the prevalence of various location-aware devices, such as RFID tags, cell
phones, GPS navigation systems, and point of sale terminals, has made trajectory
data ubiquitous in various domains. The fact has stimulated extensive trajectory
data mining research [52], [72], [73], resulting in many important real-life applica-
tions, such as city traﬃc management [81], homeland security [80], and location-
based advertising [117].
Having access to high-quality trajectory data is the prerequisite for eﬀective
data mining. However, trajectory data often contain detailed information about
individuals, and disclosing such information may reveal their lifestyles, preferences,
and sensitive personal information. Moreover, for many applications, trajectory data
need to be published with other attributes, including sensitive ones, thus incurring
the privacy concern of inferring individuals’ sensitive information via trajectory
data. This emerging data publishing scenario, however, has not been well studied in
existing works. Such privacy concerns often limit trajectory data holders’ enthusiasm
in providing data for further research and applications. Example 5.1.1 illustrates
the potential privacy threats due to trajectory data publishing.
69
Table 5.1: Raw trajectory database T
Rec. # Path Diagnosis ...
1 a1 → d2 → b3 → e4 → f6 → e8 HIV ...
2 d2 → c5 → f6 → c7 → e9 Fever ...
3 b3 → c7 → e8 Hepatitis ...
4 b3 → e4 → f6 → e8 Flu ...
5 a1 → d2 → c5 → f6 → c7 HIV ...
6 c5 → f6 → e9 Hepatitis ...
7 f6 → c7 → e8 Fever ...
8 a1 → d2 → f6 → c7 → e9 Flu ...
Example 5.1.1. A hospital has employed a RFID patient tagging system in which
patients’ trajectory data, personal data, and medical data are stored in a central
database [97]. The hospital intends to release such data (Table 5.1) to data miners
for research purposes. A trajectory is a sequence of spatio-temporal pairs in the
form of (lociti). For example, Record#3 indicates that the tagged patient visited
locations b, c, and e at timestamps 3, 7, and 8, respectively, and has hepatitis (other
information is omitted for the purpose of illustration). With adequate background
knowledge, an adversary can perform two kinds of privacy attacks on the trajectory
database.
Identity linkage attack : If a trajectory in the database is so speciﬁc that not
many patients can match it, there is a chance that with the help of background
knowledge an adversary could uniquely identify the victim’s record and, therefore,
his sensitive information. Suppose an adversary knows that the record of the target
victim, Claude, is in Table 5.1, and that Claude visited locations d and e at times-
tamps 2 and 4, respectively. The adversary can associate Record#1 with Claude
and in turn identify Claude as an HIV patient because Record#1 is the only record
containing both d2 and e4.
Attribute linkage attack : If a sensitive value occurs frequently with some se-
quences of pairs, it is possible to infer the sensitive value from these sequences even
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though the record of the victim cannot be uniquely identiﬁed. Suppose the adver-
sary knows that another victim, Bill, visited a1 and f6. The adversary can infer
that Bill has HIV with 2/3 = 67% conﬁdence because two of the three records
(Records#1, 5, 8) containing a1 and f6 have the sensitive value HIV.
A trajectory database (e.g., Table 5.1) may contain other attributes, such as
gender, age, and nationality. Although they are not explicit identiﬁers, an adversary
may utilize combinations of these attributes as quasi-identiﬁers (QID) to identify
the records and sensitive information of target victims. To thwart privacy threats
due to QIDs, many privacy models, such as k-anonymity [105], -diversity [85], and
conﬁdence bounding [114], have been proposed in the context of relational data.
These privacy models are eﬀective for relational data anonymization; however, they
fail to address the new challenges of trajectory data anonymization, as described
below.
High dimensionality : Trajectory data are usually high-dimensional and cannot
be eﬀectively handled by traditional k-anonymity and its extensions due to the curse
of high dimensionality [3]. Consider a transit system with 300 stations operating 24
hours a day. The corresponding trajectory database would have 300 × 24 = 7200
dimensions, because a trajectory could be represented in a tabular format with 7200
attributes ﬁlled with 0/1 values. Since k-anonymity and its extensions require every
trajectory to be shared by at least k records and/or impose the diversity of sensitive
values in every trajectory group, most data have to be suppressed in order to meet
these kinds of restrictive privacy requirements.
Sparseness : Trajectory data are usually sparse. Consider passengers in transit
systems. Among all available locations and all possible timestamps, they may visit
only a few locations at a few timestamps, making the trajectory of each individual
relatively short. Anonymizing such short trajectories in a high-dimensional space
poses great challenges for traditional anonymization techniques because the trajec-
tories may have little overlap. Enforcing k-anonymity could lower the data utility
71
Table 5.2: (2, 50%)2-privacy preserved database T
′
Rec. # Path Diagnosis ...
1 b3 → e4 → f6 → e8 HIV ...
2 d2 → c5 → f6 → c7 → e9 Fever ...
3 c7 → e8 Hepatitis ...
4 b3 → e4 → f6 → e8 Flu ...
5 d2 → c5 → f6 → c7 HIV ...
6 c5 → f6 → e9 Hepatitis ...
7 f6 → c7 → e8 Fever ...
8 d2 → f6 → c7 → e9 Flu ...
signiﬁcantly.
Sequentiality : Time contains important information for trajectory data min-
ing, but it also brings new privacy threats. Consider two trajectories b3 → e6 and
e3 → b6. They have the same locations and timestamps but in a diﬀerent order
and, thus, are diﬀerent from each other. An adversary could exploit such diﬀerence
in order to increase the chance of a successful linkage attack. Therefore, traditional
k-anonymity is not applicable to trajectory data, and anonymizing trajectory data
requires additional eﬀorts.
Trade-oﬀ between privacy and utility. One common assumption of k-anonymity
and its extensions is that an adversary may use any or even all attributes in QIDs
to perform linkage attacks. Yet this common assumption may be overly restrictive
in the context of trajectory data. In a real-life attack, it is very unlikely that an
adversary can identify all the visited locations along with the timestamps of a victim
because it requires signiﬁcant eﬀorts to collect every piece of such background infor-
mation. If the adversary is able to learn all such information, it is also possible that
he can learn the victim’s sensitive information. Thus, in the context of trajectory
data, it is reasonable to derive a practical privacy model based on the assumption
that an adversary’s background knowledge on a target victim is bounded by at most
L location-time pairs. We call such bounded background knowledge L-knowledge.
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Based on this observation, we propose a new privacy model called (K,C)L-
privacy that requires any subsequence q of any adversary’s L-knowledge to be shared
by either 0 or at least K records in a trajectory database T and the conﬁdence of
inferring any sensitive value in S from q to be at most C, where L and K are positive
integer thresholds, C is a real number threshold in the range of [0, 1], and S is a set
of sensitive values speciﬁed by the data holder. (K,C)L-privacy guarantees that the
probability of succeeding in an identity linkage attack is ≤ 1/K and the probability
of succeeding in an attribute linkage attack is ≤ C. Table 5.2 presents an example of
an anonymous database satisfying (2, 50%)2-privacy from Table 5.1, in which every
sequence q with maximum length 2 is shared by at least 2 records and the conﬁdence
of inferring any sensitive value in S = {HIV,Hepatitis} from q is ≤ 50%.
Protecting privacy is one aspect of anonymizing trajectory data. Another
aspect is preserving data utility in the anonymous data for data mining. The
anonymized data may be used for diﬀerent data mining tasks; therefore, we pro-
pose a generic framework to accommodate diﬀerent utility requirements. As an
illustration, in this chapter we aim to preserve both instances of location-time pairs
and frequent sequences in a trajectory database. The ratio of suppressed instances
is a general measure of anonymized data quality for a wide range of trajectory
data mining tasks [72], [73]; the ratio of suppressed frequent sequences is a direct
indication of anonymized data quality for trajectory pattern mining [52].
Generalization, bucketization, and suppression are the most widely used anonymiza-
tion mechanisms. Generalization requires the use of taxonomy trees, which are
highly speciﬁc to a particular application [4]. In many trajectory data applica-
tions, such domain speciﬁc taxonomy trees are not available. This fact largely
hinders generalization’s applicability on trajectory data anonymization. Bucketiza-
tion merely breaks the correlation between trajectory data and sensitive attributes,
and publishes trajectory data without any modiﬁcation, which fails to protect iden-
tity linkage attacks on trajectory data. In addition, a condensation approach [4] is
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proposed for multi-dimensional data publishing. However, it does not prevent from
attribute linkage attacks in general. Speciﬁcally, for trajectory data, its complex-
ity grows exponentially due to the high dimensionality. Furthermore, there lacks a
way of measuring the similarity of trajectories, which is essential to the condensa-
tion approach. Therefore, in our solution, we employ suppression, both local and
global suppressions, to eliminate privacy threats from a trajectory database. The
introduction of local suppression results in signiﬁcant data utility improvements for
trajectory data anonymization. In global suppression, if a location-time pair p is
selected to be suppressed from a trajectory database T , then all instances of p are
removed from T , whereas in local suppression, some instances of p may remain in-
tact in T while other instances are removed. Global suppression punishes all records
containing p even if the privacy leakage is caused by only one instance of p in one
record. In contrast, local suppression eliminates the exact instances that cause pri-
vacy breaches without penalizing others. Thus, local suppression preserves much
better data utility compared to global suppression.
Contributions. In this chapter, we acknowledge the emerging data publishing sce-
nario, in which trajectory data need to be published with sensitive attributes. This
naturally requires the prevention from both identity linkage attacks and attribute
linkage attacks, which has not been studied in existing works. Based on the practical
assumption that an adversary has only limited background knowledge on a target
victim, we propose the (K,C)L-privacy model for trajectory data anonymization,
which takes into consideration not only identity linkage attacks on trajectory data,
but also attribute linkage attacks via trajectory data. We present an anonymization
framework that supports both local suppression and global suppression with the goal
of preserving data utility for data mining. This is, to the best of our knowledge,
the ﬁrst study introducing local suppression to trajectory data anonymization. In
this section, we tailor our anonymization framework to preserve both instances of
location-time pairs and frequent sequences in trajectory data. The framework itself
74
is open to diﬀerent data mining workloads by incorporating diﬀerent data utility
metrics. We provide comprehensive experimental evaluations on both synthetic and
real-life trajectory datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that our pro-
posed algorithm is both eﬀective and eﬃcient to address the special challenges in
trajectory data anonymization. In particular, local suppression is shown to be es-
sential to enhance the resulting data utility when combined with (K,C)L-privacy.
The results of this chapter have been published in [23].
5.2 Problem Deﬁnition
5.2.1 Trajectory Database
A typical trajectory system generates a sequence of sensory data records of the
general form 〈ID, loc, t〉, where each record indicates that the record owner (or
the object) having the unique identiﬁer ID was detected in location loc at time
t. For example, in transportation systems, a record represents that a passenger
was present in station loc at time t, where ID could be the passenger’s transporta-
tion card number. Diﬀerent types of trajectory data can be easily converted into
the general form by pre-processing steps. For example, GPS data, a typical type
of trajectory data, is of the form 〈ID, (X coordinate, Y coordinate), timestamp〉,
which can be converted by substituting the grid ID/name containing a point for
(X coordinate, Y coordinate). By selecting a proper granularity of a location, this
general form is suitable to represent various kinds of trajectory data for diﬀerent
data mining tasks.
The trajectory of a speciﬁc record owner, representing the owner’s move-
ment history, is composed of a sequence of (loc, t) pairs. A trajectory, denoted
by (loc1t1) → · · · → (locntn), can be constructed by grouping the sensory data
records 〈ID, loc, t〉 by ID and sorting them by the timestamps. The timestamps in
a trajectory are always increasing.
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In addition to trajectory data, a trajectory database may also contain other at-
tributes that are associated with the record owners. Formally, a trajectory database
contains a collection of data records in the form of
(loc1t1) → · · · → (locntn) : s1, . . . , sp : d1, . . . , dm
where (loc1t1) → · · · → (locntn) is a trajectory, si ∈ Si are the sensitive attributes
with values from the domain Si, and di ∈ Di are the quasi-identiﬁers (QIDs) of the
record owner with the values from the domain Di. Given a trajectory database,
an adversary can perform privacy attacks via either trajectories or QID attributes.
Anonymization on relational QID attributes has been extensively studied in previous
works [48], [75], [85], [105], [124]. This chapter focuses on addressing the privacy
threats posed by trajectories.
5.2.2 Privacy Threats
Suppose a data holder wants to publish a trajectory database T to some recipients for
data mining. Explicit identiﬁers, e.g., name, SSN, and ID, have been removed. One
recipient, the adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive values of some target
victim V in T . As explained before, we assume that the adversary knows at most
L spatio-temporal pairs that the victim V has previously visited. Such background
knowledge about the victim V is denoted by κV = (loc1t1) → · · · → (locztz), where
z ≤ L. Using the background knowledge κV , the adversary could identify a group
of records in T , denoted by T (κV ), that “matches” κV . A record matches κV if
κV is a subsequence of the trajectory in the record. For example, in Table 5.1, if
κV = d2 → e4, then Record#1 matches κV , but Record#2 does not. Given the
background knowledge κV , an adversary could identify and utilize T (κV ) to perform
two types of privacy attacks:
1. Identity linkage attack : T (κV ) is a set of candidate records that contains the
victim V ’s record. If the group size of T (κV ), denoted by |T (κV )|, is small,
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then the adversary may identify V ’s record from T (κV ) and, therefore, V ’s
sensitive value.
2. Attribute linkage attack : Given T (κV ), the adversary may infer that V has
sensitive value s with conﬁdence Conf(s|T (κV )) = |T (κV
⋃
s)|
|T (κV )| , where T (κV
⋃
s)
denotes the set of records containing both κV and s. Conf(s|T (κV )) is the
percentage of the records in T (κV ) containing s. The privacy of V is at risk if
Conf(s|T (κV )) is high.
Example 5.1.1 illustrates these two types of attacks.
5.2.3 Privacy Requirement
An adversary’s background knowledge κ could be any non-empty subsequence q with
|q| ≤ L of any trajectory in the trajectory database T . Intuitively, (K,C)L-privacy
requires that every subsequence q with |q| ≤ L in T is shared by at least a certain
number of records, and that the conﬁdence of inferring any sensitive value via q
cannot be too high.
Deﬁnition 5.1 ((K,C)L-privacy). Let L be the maximum length of the background
knowledge. Let S be a set of sensitive values of the sensitive attributes of a trajectory
database T selected by the data holder. T satisﬁes (K,C)L-privacy if and only if
for any subsequence q in T with 0 < |q| ≤ L,
1. |T (q)| ≥ K, where K is a positive integer specifying the anonymity threshold,
and
2. Conf(s|T (q)) ≤ C for any s ∈ S, where 0 ≤ C ≤ 1 is a real number specifying
the conﬁdence threshold.
The (K,C)L-privacy model has several desirable properties. First, it is a gener-
alized version of several existing privacy models: k-anonymity [105] is a special case
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of the (K,C)L-privacy model with L = |d| and C = 100%, where |d| is the number of
dimensions in a given database. -diversity [85] is a special case of (K,C)L-privacy
model with L = |d|, and  = 1/C. Conﬁdence bounding [114] is a special case of
the (K,C)L-privacy model with L = |d| and K = 1. (α, k)-anonymity [121] is also
a special case of (K,C)L-privacy with L = |d|, K = k, and C = α. Second, it is
intuitive for a data holder to impose diﬀerent types and levels of privacy protection
by specifying diﬀerent L, K, and C thresholds.
It is worth noting that (K,C)L-privacy is a stronger privacy notion than other
existing privacy models for trajectory data [1], [100], [109], [130] in the sense that
(K,C)L-privacy thwarts both identity linkages on trajectory data and attribute link-
ages via trajectory data. It is vital to thwart attribute linkage attacks in trajectory
data publishing because more and more trajectory data mining tasks will resort to
both trajectory data and other personal information. For example, Utsunomiya et
al. [112] conducted an interesting passenger classiﬁcation analysis using both passen-
gers’ trajectory data and personal information. A recent investigation [99] further
indicates that there is a need to enrich trajectory data by incorporating sociodemo-
graphic data for data mining tasks.
5.2.4 Utility Requirement
Since we aim at presenting a framework that allows the adoption of various data
utility metrics for diﬀerent data mining tasks, we illustrate the preservation of two
diﬀerent kinds of utility metrics, both instances of location-time pairs and frequent
sequences in a trajectory database. The ratio of suppressed instances is a general
measure of the usefulness of anonymized data for a wide range of trajectory data
mining tasks [72], [73]. In addition, previous works [48], [79] suggest that anonymiza-
tion algorithms can be tailored to better preserve utility if the utility requirement
is known in advance. We also preserve frequent sequences speciﬁcally for trajectory
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pattern mining [52]. However, extracting all possible frequent sequences in a tra-
jectory database is computationally expensive. It is even exacerbated when dealing
with large datasets with long frequent sequences because all subsequences of a fre-
quent sequence are also frequent. A more feasible solution is to preserve maximal
frequent sequences (MFS ).
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Maximal frequent sequence). For a given minimum support thresh-
old K ′ > 0, a sequence q is maximal frequent in a trajectory database T if q is
frequent and no super sequence of q is frequent in T .
The set of MFS in T , denoted by U(T ), is much smaller than the set of frequent
sequences (FS) in T given the same K ′, but still contains the essential information
of FS. Any subsequence of an MFS is also an FS. Once all the MFS have been
determined, the support count of any particular FS can be computed by scanning
U(T ) once.
We emphasize that although in this section we aim at preserving instances
and MFS, the (K,C)L-privacy model and the anonymization framework presented
in Section 5.3 are independent of the underlying utility metric and are ﬂexible enough
to serve other utility requirements. The only change is to replace the greedy function
guiding the anonymization process, which will be further explained in Section 5.3.
5.2.5 Problem Statement
To achieve (K,C)L-privacy for a given trajectory database T , our proposed frame-
work conducts a sequence of local and global suppressions to remove all privacy
threats from T while preserving as much data utility as possible. Global suppres-
sion eliminates all instances of a pair p from T if some instances of p cause privacy
breaches, while local suppression eliminates only the instances of p that cause privacy
breaches and leaves others intact. Finding an optimal solution based on suppres-
sion for (K,C)L-privacy, however, is NP-hard (see Section 5.3 for proof). Thus, we
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propose a greedy algorithm to eﬃciently identify a reasonably “good” sub-optimal
solution.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Trajectory data anonymization). Given a trajectory database T ,
a (K,C)L-privacy requirement, a utility metric, and a set of sensitive values S, the
task of trajectory data anonymization is to generate a transformed version of T that
satisﬁes (K,C)L-privacy while maintaining the maximum utility with respect to the
utility metric by a sequence of local and global suppressions.
5.3 Anonymization Algorithm
Our proposed anonymization algorithm consists of two phases. First, identify all
violating sequences that breach a given (K,C)L-privacy requirement in a trajectory
database. Second, perform a sequence of local and global suppressions to anonymize
the trajectory database while maintaining as much data utility as possible.
5.3.1 Identifying Violating Sequences
An adversary may use any non-empty sequence with length not greater than L as
background knowledge to launch a linkage attack. Thus, given a (K,C)L-privacy
requirement, any subsequence q with 0 < |q| ≤ L in a trajectory database T is a
violating sequence if its group T (q) does not satisfy Condition 1, Condition 2, or
both in (K,C)L-privacy in Deﬁnition 5.1.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Violating sequence). Let q be a subsequence of a trajectory in
T with 0 < |q| ≤ L. q is a violating sequence with respect to a (K,C)L-privacy
requirement if |T (q)| < K or Conf(s|T (q)) > C for any sensitive value s ∈ S.
Example 5.3.1. Given L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and the sensitive value set
S = {HIV,Hepatitis}. In Table 5.1, the sequence q1 = a1 → b3 is a violating
sequence because |T (q1)| = 1 < K; the sequence q2 = a1 → d2 is also a violating
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sequence because Conf(HIV |T (q2)) = 2/3 = 67% > C. However, the sequence
q3 = b3 → c7 → e8 is not a violating sequence even though |T (q3)| = 1 < K and
Conf(Hepatitis|T (q3)) = 100% > C because |q3| = 3 > L.
To satisfy a given (K,C)L-privacy requirement on a trajectory database T , it
is suﬃcient if all violating sequences in T with respect to the privacy requirement
are removed, because all possible channels for identity and attribute linkages are
eliminated. A naive approach is to ﬁrst enumerate all possible violating sequences
and then remove them. This approach is infeasible because of the huge number of
violating sequences. Consider a violating sequence q with |T (q)| < K. Any super
sequence of q, denoted by q′′, with |T (q′′)| > 0 in T is also a violating sequence
because |T (q′′)| ≤ |T (q)| < K. To overcome the bottleneck of violating sequence
enumeration, our insight is that a few “minimal” violating sequences exist among
the violating sequences, and it is suﬃcient to achieve (K,C)L-privacy by removing
only the minimal violating sequences.
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Minimal violating sequence). A violating sequence q is a mini-
mal violating sequence (MVS ) if every proper subsequence of q is not a violating
sequence.
Example 5.3.2. Given L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and S = {HIV,Hepatitis}. In
Table 5.1, the sequence q1 = d2 → e4 is an MVS because |T (q1)| = 1 < K, and
none of its proper subsequences, d2 and e4, is a violating sequence. In contrast, the
sequence q2 = a1 → d2 is a violating sequence, but not an MVS, because one of its
proper subsequences, a1, is a violating sequence.
The set of MVS is much smaller than the set of violating sequences; therefore,
we can eﬃciently identify all privacy threats by generating all MVS. A trajectory
database T satisﬁes (K,C)L-privacy if and only if T contains no MVS.
Theorem 5.1. A trajectory database T satisﬁes (K,C)L-privacy if and only if T
contains no minimal violating sequence.
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Algorithm 5.1: Identify Minimal Violating Sequences (MVS)
Input: Raw trajectory database T
Input: Thresholds L, K and C
Input: Sensitive values S
Output: Minimal violating sequences V (T )
1: C1 ← all distinct pairs in T ;
2: i = 1;
3: while i ≤ L and Ci = ∅ do
4: Scan T once to compute |T (q)| and Conf(s|T (q)), for ∀q ∈ Ci, ∀s ∈ S;
5: for each sequence q ∈ Ci with |T (q)| > 0 do
6: if |T (q)| ≥ K and Conf(s|T (q)) ≤ C for all s ∈ S then
7: Add q to Ui;
8: else




13: Generate candidate set Ci by Ui−1  Ui−1;
14: for each sequence q ∈ Ci do
15: if q is a super sequence of any v ∈ Vi−1 then




20: return V (T ) = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vi−1;
Proof. Suppose a database T does not satisfy (K,C)L-privacy even if T contains no
MVS. By Deﬁnition 5.1, T must contain some violating sequences. According to
Deﬁnition 5.5, a violating sequence must be an MVS itself or contain an MVS, which
contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, T must satisfy (K,C)L-privacy.
Hence, our ﬁrst step is to eﬃciently identify all the MVS, V (T ), in the given
trajectory database T . Algorithm 5.1 presents the details of generating V (T ). Based
on Deﬁnition 5.5, we generate all MVS of size i+1, denoted by Vi+1, by incrementally
extending non-violating sequences of size i, denoted by Ui, with an additional pair.
This needs to take into consideration the sequentiality of trajectory data. Line 1 loads
all distinct pairs in T as the initial candidate set C1. Line 4 scans T once to compute
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|T (q)| and Conf(s|T (q)) for every sequence q ∈ Ci, and for every sensitive value
s ∈ S. If a sequence q is not violating, it is added to the non-violating sequence set Ui
for generating the next candidate set Ci+1 (Line 7); otherwise, q is added to the MVS
set (Line 9). The next candidate set Ci+1 is generated in two steps. First, conduct
a self-join of Ui (Line 13). Second, remove all super sequences of the identiﬁed
MVS from Ci+1 (Lines 14-18). The second step signiﬁcantly reduces the minimal









1) → · · · → (locyi tyi ) can be joined if the ﬁrst i− 1 pairs are identical and
txi < t
y




1) → · · · → (locxi txi ) → (locyi tyi ). The deﬁnition
of join-compatibility makes sure that every potential candidate sequence would be
generated exactly once.
Example 5.3.3. Given L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and the sensitive value set
S = {HIV,Hepatitis}, the MVS set generated from Table 5.1 is V (T ) = {a1, d2 →
b3, d2 → e4, d2 → e8, b3 → c7}.
5.3.2 Removing Violating Sequences
The second step is to remove all identiﬁed minimal violating sequences using sup-
pression with the goal of preserving as much data utility as possible. However,
ﬁnding an optimal solution is NP-hard.
Theorem 5.2. Given a trajectory database T and a (K,C)L-privacy requirement,
it is NP-hard to ﬁnd the optimal anonymization solution.
Proof. The problem of ﬁnding the optimal anonymization solution can be converted
into the vertex cover problem [27]. The vertex cover problem is a well-known problem
in which, given an undirected graph G = (V,E), it is NP-hard to ﬁnd the smallest
set of vertices S such that each edge has at least one endpoint in S. To reduce our
problem into the vertex cover problem, we only consider the set of MVS of length
2. Then, the set of candidate pairs represents the set of vertices V and the set of
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MVS is analogous to the set of edges E. Hence, the optimal vertex cover, S, means
ﬁnding the smallest set of candidate pairs that must be suppressed to obtain the
optimal anonymous dataset T ′. Given that it is NP-hard to determine S, it is also
NP-hard to ﬁnd the optimal set of candidate pairs for suppression.
Therefore, we propose a greedy algorithm that employs both local and global
suppressions to eliminate all identiﬁed MVS, V (T ), with respect to the given (K,C)L-
privacy requirement in order to eﬃciently identify a reasonably “good” solution.
Generally, suppressing a pair p from V (T ) increases privacy and decreases data util-
ity. So our goal is to design a greedy function, Score(p), that guides us to ﬁnd the
sub-optimal trade-oﬀ between privacy and data utility. In this section, we deﬁne




where PrivGain(p) is the number of MVS that can be eliminated by suppressing p,
and UtilityLoss(p) is the number of either instances or MFS that are lost due to
suppressing p, depending on the given utility metric. Since suppressing p may not
cause utility loss in terms of MFS, we add 1 to the denominator to avoid the divi-
sion by zero error. The function considers both privacy and utility simultaneously
by selecting the anonymization operation with the maximum privacy gain per unit
of utility loss. Considering only privacy gain or utility loss would lead to inferior
performances according to our tests. Again, our anonymization algorithm is inde-
pendent of the underlying data utility metric. To optimize the data utility for other
data mining workloads, we can simply re-design the meaning of UtilityLoss(p).
A key to an eﬃcient solution is to ensure that no new MVS will be generated
in the anonymizing process. Upon satisfying the requirement, the identiﬁed MVS
V (T ) always decreases monotonically. A suppression-based algorithm is guaranteed
to achieve (K,C)L-privacy within less than |V (T )| iterations. One nice property of
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global suppression is that it does not generate any new MVS during the anonymizing
process.
Theorem 5.3. A global suppression does not generate any new minimal violating
sequence with respect to a (K,C)L-privacy requirement.
Proof. Suppose a pair p is globally suppressed from a given trajectory database T .
The database after the global suppression is denoted by T ′.
• For any sequence q in T not containing an instance of p, we have |T ′(q)| =
|T (q)| and Conf(s|T ′(q)) = Conf(s|T (q)). Identically, for any subsequence
q′ of q, which does not contain p either, we have |T ′(q′)| = |T (q′)| and
Conf(s|T ′(q′)) = Conf(s|T (q′)). So q cannot be a new minimal violating
sequence in T ′.
• For any sequence q in T that contains an instance of p, q no longer exists in
T ′, so q cannot be a new minimal violating sequence.
Therefore, no sequence in T will become a new MVS in T ′.
However, local suppression does not share the same property. For example,
locally suppressing c7 from Record#3 in Table 5.1 will generate a new MVS c7 → e8
because in the resulting database T ′, |T ′(c7 → e8)| = 1 < K. Identifying the values
of all newly generated MVS requires expensive computational cost. Moreover, there
is no guarantee that the anonymization algorithm can converge within a bounded
number of iterations, |V (T )|. Therefore, it is beneﬁcial to perform local suppressions
only when no new MVS will be generated. Such a local suppression is called a valid
local suppression.
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Valid local suppression). A local suppression over a trajectory
database is valid if it does not generate any new MVS.
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Algorithm 5.2: Check if a local suppression is valid
Input: Trajectory database T
Input: Thresholds L, K, C, and sensitive values S
Input: A pair p in an MVS m
Output: A boolean value indicating if locally suppressing p from m is valid
1: P ← distinct pair p′ such that p′ ∈ T (m) ∧ p′ ∈ (T (p)− T (m));
2: V ′ ← all size-one MVS and the MVS containing p, V (p);
3: Remove all pairs, except p, in V ′ from P ;
4: Q ← all possible sequences with size ≤ L generated from P after removing super
sequences of the sequences in V (T )− V (p);
5: Scan T (p)− T (m) once to compute |q| and Conf(s|T (q)) for each q ∈ Q and for
every sensitive value s ∈ S′, where S′ is the subset of S in T (p)− T (m);
6: for each sequence q with |q| > 0 do





An intuitive way to check if a local suppression is valid is to re-invoke Algo-
rithm 5.1 and compare V (T ) and V (T ′). However, it is extremely costly. Instead,
Algorithm 5.2 presents an eﬃcient approach to avoid the computational cost of cal-
culating the values of all newly generated MVS. It signiﬁcantly narrows down the
checking space to a very small set of sequences that may be aﬀected by a local
suppression by carefully using the properties of MVS.
Theorem 5.4. Algorithm 5.2 is suﬃcient to check if a local suppression is valid.
Proof. Suppose a pair p in an MVS m is locally suppressed from a given trajectory
database T . The resulting database is denoted by T ′. For any sequence q in T
not containing an instance of p, we have |T ′(q)| = |T (q)| and Conf(s|T ′(q)) =
Conf(s|T (q)). Identically, for any subsequence q′ of q, we have |T ′(q′)| = |T (q′)|
and Conf(s|T ′(q′)) = Conf(s|T (q′)). So q cannot be a new MVS in T ′. If there is
a new MVS, it must contain p. Since p is eliminated from the records containing m,
T (m), we only need to consider the sequences in T (p)−T (m), where T (p) denotes the
records containing p. For a sequence q in T containing an instance of p, if q /∈ T (m),
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we have |T ′(q)| = |T (q)| and Conf(s|T ′(q)) = Conf(s|T (q)) and, therefore, such
q cannot be a new MVS. q is possible to be a new MVS only if q ∈ T (m) and
q ∈ (T (p)− T (m)) (Line 1). Since we only care about new MVS, we could further
ﬁlter out all identiﬁed MVS and their super sequences. For the remaining sequences,
if none of them is a violating sequence, it is suﬃcient to ensure that there is no new
MVS by Deﬁnition 5.5 (Line 4-11).
Example 5.3.4. Consider Table 5.1 with L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and the sensitive
value set S = {HIV,Hepatitis}. For the local suppression of d2 in MVS d2 → e4,
we get P = {d2, f6} and V ′ = {a1, d2 → b3, d2 → e4, d2 → e8}. Since all sequences
in Q = {d2, f6, d2 → f6} are not violating sequences, this local suppression is
valid.
Algorithm 5.3 presents the entire anonymization algorithm. Line 1 calls Al-
gorithm 5.1 to generate the MVS set V (T ). For preserving MFS, Line 2 is needed,
which calls the MFS mining algorithm to build a MFS-tree with a UL table that
keeps track of the occurrences of all candidate pairs in the MFS-tree. We adapt
MAFIA [15], originally designed for mining maximal frequent itemsets, to mine
MFS. For all instances of all pairs in V (T ), their scores for local and global sup-
pressions are calculated and stored in Score table based on Algorithm 5.2 (Line 3).
Diﬀerent instances of a pair in V (T ) have diﬀerent entries in Score table. Only valid
local suppressions are assigned scores. The global suppression scores of all instances
of a pair are the same. Lines 4-17 iteratively select a pair p with the highest score
in Score table to suppress. According to whether the highest score is obtained from
local suppression or global suppression, our algorithm performs diﬀerent strategies.
For local suppression, the algorithm identiﬁes the set of MVS, denoted by V ′, that
will be eliminated due to locally suppressing p, and removes the instances of p from
the records T (m). One extra step is performed for MFS to update the supports
of MFS in the MFS-tree (Line 9). For global suppression, the algorithm removes
all the MVS containing p, and suppresses all instances of p from T . For preserving
87
Algorithm 5.3: Trajectory Database Anonymizer
Input: Raw trajectory database T
Input: Thresholds L, K, C, (K ′)
Input: Sensitive values S
Output: Anonymous T ′ satisfying the given (K,C)L-privacy requirement
1: Generate V (T ) by Algorithm 5.1;
2: Generate MFS by MFS algorithm and build MFS-tree;
3: Build Score table by Algorithm 5.2;
4: while Score table = ∅ do
5: Select a pair p with the highest score from its MVS m;
6: if p is obtained from local suppression then
7: V ′ ← each MVS m′ such that p ∈ m′ ∧ T (m′) = T (m);
8: Suppress the instances of p from T (m);
9: Delete the MFS containing p if their supports are < K ′ after suppression,
otherwise update their supports;
10: else
11: V ′ ← V (p);
12: Suppress all instances of p in T ;
13: Delete all MFS containing p from MFS-tree;
14: end if
15: Update the Score(p′) if both p and p′ are in V ′ (or in the same MFS);
16: V (T ) = V (T )− V ′;
17: end while
18: return the suppressed T as T ′;
MFS, the MFS containing p are removed from the MFS tree (Line 13). Line 15
updates the Score table, which requires two tasks: 1) checking if the pairs aﬀected
by the current suppression are valid for future local suppressions; and 2) calculating
the scores for such pairs. Speciﬁcally, for preserving MFS, a special data structure,
MFS-tree, is created to facilitate the anonymization.
Deﬁnition 5.7 (MFS-tree). MFS-tree is a tree structure that represents each MFS
as a tree path from root to leaf. The support of each MFS is stored at its leaf node.
Each node keeps track of a count of MFS sharing the same preﬁx. The count at
the root is the total number of MFS. MFS-tree has a UL table that keeps the total
occurrences of every candidate pair p. Each candidate pair p in the UL table has a
link, denoted by Linkp, that links up all the nodes in MFS-tree containing p.
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Figure 5.1: MFS-tree for eﬃcient Score updates
Example 5.3.5. Figure 5.1 presents the MFS-tree generated from Table 5.1 with
K ′ = 2. To ﬁnd all the MFS containing f6, simply follow Linkf6, starting from the
f6 entry in the UL table.
5.3.3 Complexity Analysis
Our anonymization algorithm consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we identify all
MVS. The most expensive operation is scanning the raw trajectory database T once
for all sequences in each candidate set Ci. The cost is
∑L
i=1 |Ci|i, where |Ci| is the
size of candidate set Ci. The size of C1 is the number of distinct pairs in T whose
upper limit is |d|, the number of dimensions. Since C2 is generated by self-joining all
pairs in U1, whose size is less than or equal to |C1|, its upper bound is |d|(|d|− 1)/2.
However, when i ≥ 3, the sizes of the candidate sets do not increase signiﬁcantly for
two reasons: 1) All candidates are generated by self-joining, which requires that only
if two sequences share the same preﬁx, their resulting sequence can be considered a
future candidate. When i is relatively large, the chance of ﬁnding two such sequences
decreases signiﬁcantly. 2) The pruning process in Algorithm 5.1 also greatly reduces
the candidate search space. Therefore, a good approximation is C ≈ |d|2. However,
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in the worst case, the computational cost of the ﬁrst step is bounded by O(|d|L|T |),
where |T | is the number of records in T . In the second step, we construct the Score
table, and then remove all MVS iteratively. The most costly operation is to check
if the instances of the pairs in V (T ) are valid to be locally suppressed. The number
of instances of pairs in V (T ) is less than
∑L
i=1 |Ci|i, and thus also bounded by |d|L.
For every instance in V (T ), we need to invoke Algorithm 5.2 at most twice. For
each invocation, in the worst case, it has to go through all records in T . So the cost
of the second step is still bounded by O(|d|L|T |). By incorporating both steps, the
complexity of the entire algorithm is O(|d|L|T |). The scalability of our algorithm is
further demonstrated in Section 5.4.2.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we examine the performance of our anonymization framework in
terms of utility loss due to the anonymization and scalability for handling large




N(T ) and N(T ′) are the numbers of instances of pairs in the original dataset T
and the anonymous dataset T ′, respectively; for preserving MFS, the utility loss is
deﬁned as |U(T )|−|U(T
′)|
|U(T )| , where |U(T )| and |U(T ′)| are the numbers of MFS in T and
T ′, respectively. The formulas respectively measure the percentage of instances and
MFS that are lost due to suppressions. Lower utility loss implies better resulting
data quality. We cannot directly compare our algorithm with previous works [1],
[100], [109], [130] on trajectory data anonymization because none of them can prevent
from both identity and attribute linkage attacks. Instead, we compare our local
suppression method with the global suppression method described in our technical
report [91]. In the following experiments, we show that applying local suppression
along with (K,C)L-privacy would signiﬁcantly lower utility loss in the context of
trajectory data.
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Table 5.3: Experimental dataset statistics
Datasets Records Dimensions Data size Sensitive set Data type
|T | |d| (K bytes) cardinality
City80K 80,000 624 2,297 1/5 Synthetic
STM460K 462,483 3,264 9,810 6/24 Real-life
Two datasets, City80K and STM460K, are used in the experiments. City80K
is a synthetic dataset simulating the routes of 80,000 pedestrians roaming in a
metropolitan area of 26 blocks in 24 hours. The sensitive attribute of City80K
contains a total of ﬁve possible values, one of which is considered as sensitive.
STM460K is a real-life dataset provided by Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al
(STM), the public transit agency in Montre´al. It contains the transit data of 462,483
passengers among 68 subway stations within 48 hours, where the time granularity is
set to hour level. The passengers’ fare types are currently considered as the sensitive
attribute. It contains 24 distinct values and 6 of them are considered as sensitive.
The properties of the two experimental datasets are summarized in Table 5.3.
5.4.1 Utility Loss
To fully study the eﬀectiveness of our anonymization algorithm, we evaluate the
utility loss in terms of varying K, C, L values. Speciﬁcally, for preserving MFS, we
also study the eﬀect of varying K ′ values. Instead of examining the eﬀect of L sepa-
rately, we show the beneﬁt of a reasonable L value over the traditional k-anonymity
(conﬁdence bounding) in combination with other parameters. In Figures 5.2-5.4, the
following legends are used: KCL-Local uses local suppression for (K,C)L-privacy;
KCL-Global uses global suppression for (K,C)L-privacy [91]; Trad-Local uses local
suppression for traditional k-anonymity (conﬁdence bounding); Trad-Global uses
global suppression for traditional k-anonymity (conﬁdence bounding).
Eﬀect of K. We vary the parameter K from 10 to 50 while ﬁxing L = 3, C =







































































































(c) STM460K (Instance) (d) STM460K (MFS)
Figure 5.2: Utility loss vs. K (L = 3, C = 60%, K ′ = 800)
(K,C)L-privacy model under the two diﬀerent utility metrics, the results of which are
demonstrated in Figure 5.2. Recall that k-anonymity is achieved in our framework
by setting L = |d| and C = 100%, where |d| is the number of dimensions in the given
dataset. Comparing the utility loss of the schemes based on (K,C)L-privacy to the
ones based on k-anonymity unveils the utility improvement due to the assumption
of L-knowledge; comparing the schemes using local suppression to those using only
global suppression unveils the utility enhancement due to the employment of local
suppression. Overall, KCL-Local performs signiﬁcantly better than KCL-Global. In
particular, it achieves 75% improvement for instance and 68% improvement for MFS
on the real dataset STM460K. However, local suppression itself is not suﬃcient
to guarantee good data utility. When local suppression is applied to k-anonymity,
the resulting utility loss is still relatively high on City80K. It is interesting to
see that on STM460K the utility loss under (K,C)L-privacy and k-anonymity is































































































(c) STM460K (Instances) (d) STM460K (MFS)
Figure 5.3: Utility loss vs. C (L = 3, K = 30, K ′ = 800)
less. Nevertheless, Figure 5.2 suggests that when combined with local suppression,
(K,C)L-privacy can signiﬁcantly lower the utility loss than can k-anonymity, in the
context of trajectory data.
Eﬀect of C. Figure 5.3 shows the impact of C on the utility loss while ﬁxing
L = 3, K = 30, andK ′ = 800, which allows us to examine the eﬀect of attribute link-
ages. Since k-anonymity is unable to prevent attribute linkages, conﬁdence bound-
ing [114] is used to compare with (K,C)L-privacy. Recall that conﬁdence bounding
is achieved under (K,C)L-privacy by setting L = |d|. When C is small, the utility
loss is high for all anonymization schemes because approximately 20% of the records
of City80K and 25% of the records of STM460K contain a sensitive value. However,
as C increases, the utility loss becomes less sensitive to C. The result also suggests
that applying local suppression under (K,C)L-privacy results in substantially lower
utility loss.
















































(a) City80K (b) STM460K
Figure 5.4: Utility loss vs. K ′ (L = 3, K = 30, C = 60%)
the utility loss by ﬁxing L = 3, K = 30, and C = 60% in Figure 5.4. Generally, asK ′
increases, the utility loss decreases. When K ′ gets larger, the size of MFS becomes
smaller, which, in turn, makes the MFS set and MVS set have less overlap. Hence,
suppressions have less inﬂuence on MFS. We also observe that local suppression
is less sensitive to varying K ′ values due to the fact that local suppression allows
decreasing the support of an MFS rather than always totally eliminating an MFS.
5.4.2 Scalability
Since the computational complexity of our algorithm is dominated by |d|, the num-
ber of dimensions, and |T |, the number of records, we study the scalability of
our anonymization framework in terms of |d| and |T | on relatively large trajectory
datasets generated with similar settings as City80K. Since using local suppression
results in better data utility, we only evaluate the scalability of applying local sup-
pression for preserving MFS (using only global suppression requires less computing
resources), where the following parameters are used: L = 3, K = 30, C = 60%, and
K ′ = 800.
Eﬀect of |T |. Figure 5.5 (a) presents the run time of processing datasets with
4000 dimensions and size ranging from 400,000 to 1,200,000. We can observe that































































(a) Runtime vs. # of records (b) Runtime vs. # of dimensions
Figure 5.5: Scalability
proportional to the dataset sizes. The time of identifying MVS sets also increases
linearly, which conﬁrms our complexity analysis. With the increase of the data size,
the time spent on suppressions, however, drops substantially. When the number
of records increases, there is a much greater chance for a sequence q to satisfy
|T (q)| ≥ K; therefore, the size of MVS decreases signiﬁcantly, so it takes much less
time to perform all suppressions.
Eﬀect of |d|. In Figure 5.5 (b), we increase the dimensions on datasets of 1
million records. The time spent reading raw data and writing anonymized data is
insensitive to the number of dimensions of the given dataset. However, as the number
of dimensions increases, it takes more time to generate the MVS set because the size
of each candidate set increases. The size of the resulting MVS set also increases due
to the increased sparseness. Thus, the time spent on suppressing all identiﬁed MVS
also increases.
Overall, our anonymization framework is able to eﬃciently process large tra-
jectory datasets. The total run time of anonymizing 1 million records with 8000
dimensions is still less than 300 seconds.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we summarize the special challenges of trajectory data anonymiza-
tion and show that traditional k-anonymity and its extensions are not eﬀective in
the context of trajectory data. Based on the practical assumption of L-knowledge,
we achieve a (K,C)L-privacy model on trajectory data without paying extra utility
and computation costs due to over-sanitization. This is the ﬁrst work that intro-
duces local suppression to trajectory data anonymization to enhance the resulting
data utility. Consequently, we propose an anonymization framework that is able
to remove all privacy threats from a trajectory database by both local and global
suppressions. This framework is independent of the underlying data utility met-
rics and, therefore, is suitable for diﬀerent trajectory data mining workloads. Our
experimental results on both synthetic and real-life datasets demonstrate that com-
bining (K,C)L-privacy and local suppression is able to signiﬁcantly improve the
anonymized data quality.
Though we adopt a stronger privacy notion than other existing works, in the
context of trajectory data, by taking into consideration the possibility of inferring
record owners’ sensitive information via trajectory data, the speciﬁcity of trajectory
data enables adversaries to perform other kinds of privacy attacks, especially when





Sequential data, which can be considered a simpliﬁed form of trajectory data, has
been used in a variety of applications, spanning from genome and web usage analysis
to location-based recommendation systems. Publishing such datasets is important
since they can help us analyze and understand interesting sequential patterns. For
example, mobility traces have become widely collected in recent years and have
opened the possibility to improve our understanding of large-scale transportation
networks. Similar to trajectory data, raw sequential data may enable an adversary
to learn sensitive information about a victim. The privacy concern of publishing
sequential data is best exempliﬁed by the case of the Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al
(STM, http://www.stm.info), the public transit agency in Montreal area.
Over the last few years, smart card automated fare collection (SCAFC) sys-
tems have been increasingly deployed in transportation systems as a secure method
of user validation and fare collection. These systems generate and collect passen-
gers’ transit data every day, which, after being anonymized, needs to be shared for
various reasons, such as administrative regulations, proﬁt sharing and data anal-
ysis. Transit data usually contains individual-speciﬁc sensitive information, and
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publishing raw data would directly violate passengers’ privacy. In 2008, the STM
deployed SCAFC systems in its transportation network. Transit information, such
as smart card number and station ID, is collected when a passenger swipes his smart
card at a SCAFC terminal, and is then stored in a central database management
system, where the transit information of a passenger is organized as a sequence
of stations in time order, a kind of sequential data (see a formal deﬁnition in Sec-
tion 6.2.1). The deployment of SCAFC systems allows the seamless integration with
other transit networks of neighboring cities, for example, the Agence me´tropolitaine
de transport (AMT), which consequently requires data sharing among several col-
laborating parties. In addition, periodically, the IT department of the STM shares
transit data with other departments, e.g., the marketing department, for basic data
analysis, and publishes its transit data to external research institutions for more
complex data analysis tasks, such as marketing analysis [112], customer behavior
analysis [14], and demand forecasting [112].
According to its preliminary research [14], [86], [18], the STM can substantially
beneﬁt from transit data analysis at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Yet,
it has also realized that the nature of transit data is raising major privacy concerns
on the part of card users in information sharing [86]. This fact has been an obstacle
to conducting further data analysis much less performing regular commercial opera-
tions. In this chapter, we aim to provide practical solutions to such a real-life transit
data sharing scenario. We point out that our solutions also beneﬁt many other sec-
tors, for example cell phone communication and credit card payment, which have
been facing a similar dilemma in sequential data publishing and individual privacy
protection.
Previous eﬀorts have been made in addressing the problem of transit data
publication at the STM. In Chapter 5, we proposed the local suppression technique
based on the (K,C)L-privacy model. However, its privacy property is still dubious
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when facing a strong adversary (e.g., one knows more than L-knowledge). It is there-
fore urgent to respond to the failure of existing sanitization techniques by developing
new schemes with proven privacy guarantees. For this reason, we employ diﬀeren-
tial privacy [37], one of the strongest privacy models. Diﬀerential privacy provides
provable privacy guarantees independent of an adversary’s background knowledge
and computational power.
Traditional diﬀerentially private non-interactive approaches [12], [39], [125]
are data-independent in the sense that all possible entries in the output domain
need to be explicitly considered no matter what the underlying database is. For
high-dimensional data, such as sequential data, this is computationally infeasible.
Consider a transit database D with all stations drawn from a universe of size m.
Suppose the maximum length of a record (the number of stations in a record) in
D is l. These approaches need to generate ∑li=1mi = ml+1−mm−1 output entries. For
a STM transit database with m = 1, 000 and l = 20, it requires to generate 1060
entries. Hence, these approaches are not computationally applicable with today’s
systems to real-life transit databases.
To tackle the challenge, we develop data-dependent solutions by extending the
ideas proposed in two very recent papers [90], [25]. The general idea of a data-
dependent solution is to adaptively narrow down the output domain by using noisy
answers obtained from the underlying database. However, the methods in [90], [25]
cannot be directly applied to sequential data for two reasons. First, the inherent
sequentiality of sequential data is not considered in [90], [25]. Second, the methods
only work for sets, yet a record in a sequential database may contain a bag of
locations. Therefore, non-trivial eﬀorts are needed to develop a diﬀerentially private
data publishing approach for sequential data.
Protecting individual privacy is one aspect of sanitizing data. Another equally
important aspect is preserving utility in sanitized data for data analysis. In this
chapter, we consider two important data mining tasks conducted at the STM,
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namely count queries (see a formal deﬁnition in Section 6.2.4) and frequent sequential
pattern mining [6]. Count queries, as a general data analysis task, are the building
block of many advanced data mining tasks. In the STM case, with accurate answers
to count queries, data recipients can answer questions, such as “how many passen-
gers have visited both stations Guy-Concordia and McGill 1”. Frequent sequential
pattern mining, as a concrete data mining task, helps, for example, the STM better
understand passengers’ transit patterns and consequently allows the STM to adjust
its network geometry and schedules in order to better utilize its existing resources.
Contributions. In this chapter, we propose two alternative solutions that pioneer
the use of diﬀerential privacy for publishing sequential data. The ﬁrst solution
makes use of a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree while the second solution makes use
of a variable-length n-gram model. We summarize the major contributions of this
chapter as follows.
Publishing sequential data via preﬁx tree. This is the ﬁrst work that intro-
duces a practical solution for publishing large volume of real-life sequential data via
diﬀerential privacy in the non-interactive setting.
• We study the real-life transit data sharing scenario at the STM and propose
an eﬃcient sanitization algorithm to generate a diﬀerentially private sequen-
tial data release by making use of a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree. We design
a statistical process for eﬃciently constructing such a noisy preﬁx tree under
Laplace mechanism, which is vital to the scalability of our solution. We em-
phasize that our approach can be seamlessly extended to trajectory data (see
Section 6.3.1).
• We make use of two sets of inherent constraints of a preﬁx tree to conduct
constrained inferences, which helps generate a more accurate release.
1Guy-Concordia andMcGill are two metro stations on the green line of the STM metro network.
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• We conduct an extensive experimental study over diﬀerent real-life STM datasets.
We examine utility of sanitized data for two diﬀerent data mining tasks per-
formed by the STM, namely count queries (a generic data analysis task) and
frequent sequential pattern mining (a concrete data mining task). Experi-
mental results demonstrate that our approach maintains high utility and is
scalable to large volume of real-life sequential data.
Publishing sequential data via n-grams. To further improve data utility of san-
itized data, we propose the use of a variable-length n-gram model, which outperforms
the state-of-the-art techniques.
• For the ﬁrst time, we introduce the n-gram model as an eﬀective means of
achieving diﬀerential privacy in the context of sequential data. To better
suit diﬀerential privacy, we propose the use of a novel variable-length n-gram
model, which balances the trade-oﬀ between information extracted from the
underlying database and the magnitude of Laplace noise added. The variable-
length n-gram model intrinsically ﬁts diﬀerential privacy in the sense that it
retains the essential information of a sequential database by identifying a set
of high-quality n-grams whose counts are large enough to resist Laplace noise.
• We develop a series of techniques to guarantee good utility under the variable-
length n-gram model, including an adaptive privacy budget allocation scheme,
a formal choice of a threshold value, and the enforcement of consistency con-
straints. These techniques make use of the inherent Markov assumption in
an n-gram model. In addition, we develop an eﬃcient method to generate a
synthetic dataset from released n-grams, enabling a wider spectrum of data
analysis tasks.
• We conduct an extensive experimental study on the variable-length n-gram
model over real-life sequential datasets, which provides important insights for
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Table 6.1: Sample sequential database
Rec. # Sequence
1 L1 → L2 → L3
2 L1 → L2
3 L3 → L2 → L1
4 L1 → L2 → L4
5 L1 → L2 → L3
6 L3 → L2
7 L1 → L2 → L4 → L1
8 L3 → L1
future work. In particular, we demonstrate that our solution substantially
outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions [88], [21] in terms of count query
and frequent sequential pattern mining.
The results of this chapter have been published in [22], [20].
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Sequential Data
Let L = {L1, L2, · · · , L|L|} be the universe of locations, where |L| is the size of the
universe. Without loss of generality, we consider locations as discrete spatial areas
in a map. For example, in a transportation system, L represents all stations in the
transit network. This assumption also applies to many other types of sequential
data, e.g., purchase records, where a location is a store’s address, or web browsing
histories, where a location is a URL. We model a sequence as a time ordered list of
locations drawn from the universe.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Sequence). A sequence D of length |D| is a time ordered list of
locations D = l1 → l2 → · · · → l|D|, where ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |D|, li ∈ L.
A location may occur multiple times in D, and may occur consecutively in D.
Therefore, given L = {L1, L2, L3, L4}, D = L1 → L2 → L2 is a valid sequence. A
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sequential database is composed of a multiset of sequences; each sequence represents
the movement history of a record owner. A formal deﬁnition is given below.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Sequential Database). A sequential database D of size |D| is a
multiset of sequences D = {D1, D2, · · · , D|D|}.
Table 6.1 presents a sample sequential database with L = {L1, L2, L3, L4}.
6.2.2 Preﬁx Tree
A sequential (or trajectory) database can be represented in a more compact way in
terms of a preﬁx tree. A preﬁx tree groups sequences with the same preﬁx into the
same branch. We ﬁrst deﬁne a preﬁx of a sequence below.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Sequence Preﬁx). A sequence S = s1 → s2 → · · · → s|S| is a preﬁx
of a sequence T = t1 → t2 → · · · → t|T |, denoted by S  T , if and only if |S| ≤ |T |
and ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, si = ti.
For example, L1 → L2 is a preﬁx of L1 → L2 → L4 → L3, but L1 → L4 is not.
Note that a sequence preﬁx is a sequence per se. Next, we formally deﬁne a preﬁx
tree below.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Preﬁx Tree). A preﬁx tree PT of a sequential databaseD is a triplet
PT = (V,E,Root(PT )), where V is the set of nodes labeled with locations, each
corresponding to a unique sequence preﬁx in D; E is the set of edges, representing
transitions between nodes; Root(PT ) ∈ V is the virtual root of PT . The unique
sequence preﬁx represented by a node v ∈ V , denoted by prefix(v,PT ), is an
ordered list of locations starting from Root(PT ) to v.
Each node v ∈ V of PT keeps a doublet in the form of 〈tr(v), c(v)〉, where
tr(v) is the set of sequences in D having the preﬁx prefix(v,PT ), that is, {D ∈ D :




























Figure 6.1: The preﬁx tree of the sample data in Table 6.1
noise). tr(Root(PT )) contains all sequences in D. We call the set of all nodes of PT
at a given depth i a level of PT , denoted by level(i,PT ). Root(PT ) is at depth
zero. Figure 6.1 illustrates the preﬁx tree of the sample database in Table 6.1, where
each node v is labeled with its location and |tr(v)|.
6.2.3 N-Gram Model
An n-gram model is a type of probabilistic prediction model based on an (n − 1)-
orderMarkov model. It can compactly model large-scale sequential data and provide
scalable trade-oﬀ between storage and accuracy. N -gram models have been proven to
be very robust in modeling sequential data and have been widely used in probability,
communication theory, computational linguistics (e.g., statistical natural language
processing), computational biology (e.g., biological sequence analysis), and data
compression.
N -gram models estimate the probability of the next location for a given se-
quence by making use of the Markov independence assumption (of order n− 1) that
the occurrence of each location in a sequence depends only on the previous n−1 loca-
tions (instead of all previous locations), where n is typically a small value (e.g., 3-5).
Let the probability that a sequence L1 → L2 → . . . → Li, where Lj ∈ L (∀1 ≤ j ≤ i)
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Table 6.2: Another sample se-
quential dataset
Rec. # Sequence
1 L2 → L3 → L1
2 L2 → L3
3 L3 → L2
4 L2 → L3 → L1
5 L3 → L2 → L1
6 L2 → L3 → L1 → L2 → L3
7 L3 → L2







Gram # Pr Gram # Pr Gram # Pr
L1 → L1 0 0 L2 → L1 1 0.11 L3 → L1 4 0.4
L1 → L2 2 0.4 L2 → L2 0 0 L3 → L2 3 0.3
L1 → L3 0 0 L2 → L3 6 0.67 L3 → L3 0 0
L1 → & 3 0.6 L2 → & 2 0.22 L3 → & 3 0.3
and i ≥ n, is followed by Li+1 ∈ L be denoted by P (Li+1|L1 → L2 → . . . → Li).
Then, under the n-gram model, we have:
P (Li+1|L1 → L2 → . . . → Li) :≈ P (Li+1|Li−n+2 → Li−n+3 → . . . → Li).
In the sequel, the probability P (Li+1|Lj → Lj+1 → · · · → Li) is shortly denoted by
P (Li+1|Lji ).
N -gram models provide a trade-oﬀ between storage and accuracy: a larger n
value retains more information of the dataset, but it requires more storage and time
to process. For example, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the set of all unigrams and 2-
grams, respectively, along with their counts and probabilities for the sample dataset
in Table 6.2, where & is a special symbol representing the termination of a sequence.
Consider the calculation of the (approximated) number of occurrences of L3 → L1 →
L2 → L3, whose true number is 2. Using 2-grams, one possible approximation is
#(L3 → L1) ·P (L2|L1) ·P (L3|L2) = 4 · 0.4 · 0.67 = 1.07. In contrast, using 3-grams,
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a better approximation can be #(L3 → L1 → L2) · P (L3|L1 → L2) = 2 · 1.0 = 2.0.
However, this better scheme requires to process all 3-grams at the cost of storage
and time.
6.2.4 Utility Requirements
In the STM case, sanitized data is mainly used to perform two data mining tasks,
namely count query and frequent sequential pattern mining [6]. Count queries, as a
general data analysis task, are the building block of many data mining tasks. We
formally deﬁne count queries over a sequential database below.
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Count Query). For a given set of locations L drawn from the
universe L, a count query Q over a database D is deﬁned to be Q(D) = |{S ∈ D :
L ⊆ ls(S)}|, where ls(S) returns the set of locations in S.
Note that sequentiality among locations is not considered in count queries,
because the major users of count queries are, for example, the personnel of the
marketing department of the STM, who are merely interested in users’ presence in
certain stations for marketing analysis, known as passenger counting, but not the
sequentiality of visiting 2. Instead, the preservation of sequentiality in sanitized data
is examined by frequent sequential pattern mining. The utility of a count query Q
over the sanitized database D˜ is similarly measured by its relative error [125], [123],
[25], which is computed as:
error(Q(D˜)) = |Q(D˜)−Q(D)|
max{Q(D), s} ,
where s is a sanity bound used to mitigate the inﬂuences of queries with extremely
small selectivities [125], [123], [25].
2A variant of count query that considers sequentiality is employed in Section 6.4.3 to demon-
strate the utility of sanitized data for a broad spectrum of mobility trace analysis tasks.
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For frequent sequential pattern mining, we measure the utility of sanitized
data in terms of true positive (TP), false positive (FP) and false drop (FD) [40].
Given a positive number k, we denote the set of top k most frequent sequential
patterns with size greater than 1 3 on the original database D by Fk(D) and the set
of frequent sequential patterns on the sanitized database D˜ by Fk(D˜). True positive
is the number of frequent sequential patterns in Fk(D) that are correctly identiﬁed
in Fk(D˜), that is, |Fk(D) ∩ Fk(D˜)|. False positive is the number of infrequent
sequential patterns in D that are mistakenly included in Fk(D˜), that is, |Fk(D˜) −
Fk(D)∩Fk(D˜)|. False drop is the number of frequent sequential patterns in Fk(D)
that are wrongly omitted in Fk(D˜), that is, |Fk(D)∪Fk(D˜)−Fk(D˜)|. Since in our
setting |Fk(D)| = |Fk(D˜)| = k, false positives always equal false drops.
6.3 Publishing Sequential Data via Preﬁx Tree
6.3.1 Sanitization Algorithm
We ﬁrst provide an overview of our two-step sanitization algorithm in Algorithm 6.1.
Given a raw sequential dataset D, a privacy budget , a user speciﬁed height of the
preﬁx tree h and a location taxonomy tree T , it returns a sanitized dataset D˜ satisfy-
ing -diﬀerential privacy. BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree constructs a noisy hybrid-granularity
preﬁx tree PT of D using a set of count queries based on the given taxonomy tree
T , which deﬁnes multiple levels of granularities over the location universe. It can
be either public knowledge or generated from the location universe on-the-ﬂy by
specifying a fan-out value. In the STM case, we use a two-level taxonomy tree
where each station can be generalized to the metro/bus line on which it locates. For
the simplicity of illustration, we give our algorithm based on a two-level taxonomy
tree. The extension to a multiple-level taxonomy tree is straightforward. Gener-
atePrivateRelease employs utility boosting techniques on PT based on two sets of
3Nearly all single locations form a size-1 frequent sequential pattern.
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Algorithm 6.1: Preﬁx Tree Sequential Data Sanitization
Input: Raw sequential dataset D
Input: Privacy budget 
Input: Height of the preﬁx tree h
Input: Location taxonomy tree T
Output: Sanitized dataset D˜
1: Noisy preﬁx tree PT ← BuildNoisyPrefixTree(D, , h, T );
2: Sanitized dataset D˜ ← GeneratePrivateRelease(PT );
3: return D˜;
consistency constraints, and then generates a diﬀerentially private release.
Noisy Preﬁx Tree Construction
Our strategy for BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree is to recursively group sequences in D into
disjoint sub-datasets based on their preﬁxes. Algorithm 6.2 presents the details of
BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree. We ﬁrst create a preﬁx tree PT with a virtual root Root
(Lines 2-3). To build PT , we employ a uniform privacy budget allocation scheme,
that is, divide the total privacy budget  into equal portions ¯ = 
h
, each is used
for constructing a level of PT (Line 4). In Lines 6-26, we iteratively construct each
level of PT in a noisy way.
To satisfy diﬀerential privacy, we need to guarantee that every sequence that
can be derived from the location universe (either in or not in D) has a non-zero
probability to appear in the noisy preﬁx tree. Therefore, at each level, for each
node, we need to consider every possible location as its potential child. Our goal
is to identify the children that are associated with non-zero number of sequences
(referred to as non-empty node) so that we can continue to expand them. Here
decisions have to be made based on noisy counts.
In order to achieve good utility, it is critical to prune out nodes associated with
zero number of sequences (empty node) reliably as early as possible. For this reason,
instead of using a simple preﬁx tree, we divide a level of PT into two sub-levels with
diﬀerent location granularities. The ﬁrst sub-level consists of nodes associated with
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Algorithm 6.2: BuildNoisyPrefixTree
Input: Raw sequential dataset D
Input: Privacy budget 
Input: Height of the preﬁx tree h
Input: Location taxonomy tree T
Output: Noisy preﬁx tree PT
1: i = 0;
2: Create a preﬁx tree PT with a virtual root Root;
3: Add all sequences in D to tr(Root);
4: ¯ = h ;
5: Calculate ¯1 and ¯2 s.t. ¯1 + ¯2 = ¯;
6: while i < h do
7: for each non-generalized node v ∈ level(i) do
8: Ug ← the set of generalized nodes from T ;
9: for each node u ∈ Ug do
10: Add sequences S with prefix(u)  S to tr(u);
11: c(u) = NoisyCount(|tr(u)|, ¯1);
12: if c(u) ≥ θg then
13: Add u to PT ;
14: Ung ← u’s non-generalized children in T ;
15: for each node w ∈ Ung do
16: Add sequences S with prefix(w)  S to tr(w);
17: c(w) = NoisyCount(|tr(w)|, ¯2);
18: if c(w) ≥ θng then








27: return PT ;
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generalized location information (generalized node), and then, depending on noisy
counts of these nodes, we decide whether to further expand them to create the second
sub-level in which nodes are associated with non-generalized locations (e.g., ask the
noisy counts of passengers in a metro line and then decide whether to ask counts of
each station on this line). ¯ is then allocated to the two sub-levels as a function of
the fan-out f of the location taxonomy tree T : the ﬁrst sub-level receives ¯1 = 2¯f
and the second receives ¯2 =
(f−2)¯
f
. One important observation is that all nodes on
the same sub-level are associated with disjoint sequence subsets, and therefore the
privacy budget allocated to a sub-level can be used in full for each node in it. We
provide formal analysis on utility improvement of a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree
after presenting Theorem 6.1.
For a dataset with a very large location universe L, processing all locations ex-
plicitly may be slow. We provide an eﬃcient implementation by separately handling
potential non-empty and empty nodes. For a non-empty node u, we add Laplace
noise to |tr(u)| and use the noisy answer c(u) to decide if it is non-empty. If c(u) is
greater than or equal to the pre-deﬁned threshold θ, we deem that u is non-empty






(two times of the standard deviation of noise) while the threshold of a





. Intuitively, this setting more reliably eliminates empty
nodes while having very limited eﬀect on non-empty nodes. Since non-empty nodes
are typically of a small number, this process can be done eﬃciently.
For empty nodes, we need to conduct a series of independent boolean tests,
each calculates NoisyCount(0, ¯′) to check if it passes θ, where ¯′ is the privacy
budget assigned to a node (either ¯1 or ¯2). The number of empty nodes that pass θ,
k, follows the binomial distribution B(m, pθ), where m is the total number of empty
nodes we need to check and pθ is the probability for a single experiment to succeed.
We design a statistical process for Laplace mechanism to directly extract k empty
nodes without explicitly processing every empty node. This is inspired by [29], in
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which a statistical process is designed for geometric mechanism [51].
Theorem 6.1. Independently conducting m pass/not pass experiments based on
Laplace mechanism with privacy budget ¯ and threshold θ is equivalent to the fol-




; (2) select k uniformly random empty nodes without replacement with
noisy counts sampled from the distribution
P (x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 ∀x < θ
1− exp(¯θ − ¯x) ∀x ≥ θ










Since the experiments are independent, the number of successful experiments, k,
follows the binomial distribution B(m, exp(−¯
′θ)
2
). Once k is determined, we can
uniformly at random select k empty nodes. The probability density function of the
noisy counts x for the k empty nodes, conditional on x ≥ θ, is:
p(x|x ≥ θ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩





= ¯′exp(¯′θ − ¯′x) ∀x ≥ θ
The corresponding cumulative distribution function is:
P (x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 ∀x < θ∫ x
θ







































































































































































Figure 6.2: The noisy hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree of the sample data
Now we give a theoretical analysis on the utility improvement due to a hybrid-
granularity preﬁx tree in terms of reduction of number of empty non-generalized
nodes that are mistakenly generated. This number directly reﬂects the level of noise
in sanitized data.
Theorem 6.2. For an empty node v at level i, a noisy hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree
of height h reduces the number of empty non-generalized nodes mistakenly generated
due to identifying v as non-empty by a factor of O(2h−iexp(4
√
2(h− i))).







sider an empty node v at level i. In a simple noisy preﬁx tree, if v is mistakenly
considered as non-empty, the expected value of number of descendants of v, which
are all empty nodes, is E1 = (|L|pθng)h−i. In a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree, the




pθg · fpθng)h−i = (fpθng)(|L|pθgpθng)h−i.











Example 6.3.1. Consider the sequential database D in Table 6.1, the height h = 2,
and the calculated threshold θ = 3. Suppose that L1 and L2 can be generalized to
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L{1,2} and L3 and L4 can be generalized to L{3,4}. The construction of a possible
noisy hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree PT is illustrated in Figure 6.2. A path of PT
may be of a length shorter than h if it has been considered “empty” before h is
reached.
Private Release Generation
We can generate the sanitized database by traversing PT once in postorder (ig-
nore generalized nodes), calculating the number n of sequences terminated at each
non-generalized node v and appending n copies of prefix(v,PT ) to the output.
However, due to the noise added to ensure diﬀerential privacy, we may not be able
to obtain a meaningful and consistent release. For example, in Figure 6.2, consider
the root-to-leaf path Root(PT ) → L1 → L2. We have c(L2) > c(L1), which is
counterintuitive because it is not possible, in general, to have more sequences with
the preﬁx prefix(u,PT ) than with the preﬁx prefix(v,PT ), where u is a child of
v in PT . If we leave such inconsistencies unsolved, the resulting release may not be
meaningful and therefore provides poor utility.
Deﬁnition 6.6 (Consistency Constraint). In a preﬁx tree, there exist two sets of
consistency constraints:
1. For any root-to-leaf path p, ∀vi ∈ p, |tr(vi)| ≤ |tr(vi+1)|, where vi is a child of
vi+1;
2. For each node v, |tr(v)| ≥∑u∈children(v) |tr(u)|.
Our goal is to enforce such consistency constraints on the noisy preﬁx tree
(with all generalized nodes removed 4) in order to produce a consistent and more
accurate private release. We adapt the constrained inference technique proposed
in [61] to adjust the noisy counts of nodes in the noisy preﬁx tree so that the
constraints deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6.6 are respected. Note that the technique proposed
4The utility improvements of constrained inferences on a preﬁx tree with and without general-
ized nodes are almost identical.
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in [61] cannot be directly applied to our case because: 1) the noisy preﬁx tree has
an irregular structure (rather than a complete tree with a ﬁxed degree); 2) the
noisy preﬁx tree has diﬀerent constraints |tr(v)| ≥∑u∈children(v) |tr(u)| (rather than
|tr(v)| =∑u∈children(v) |tr(u)|). Consequently, we propose a two-phase procedure to
obtain a consistent estimate with respect to Deﬁnition 6.6 for each node (except the
virtual root) in the noisy preﬁx tree PT .
We ﬁrst generate an intermediate estimate for the noisy count of each node v
(except the virtual root) in PT . Consider a root-to-leaf path p of PT . Let us orga-
nize the noisy counts of nodes vi ∈ p into a sequence S = 〈c(v1), c(v2), · · · , c(v|p|)〉,
where vi is a child of vi+1. Let mean[i, j] denote the mean of a subsequence of S,
〈c(vi), c(vi+1), ..., c(vj)〉, that is, mean[i, j] =
∑j
m=i c(vm)
j−i+1 . We compute the intermedi-
ate estimates S˜ by Theorem 6.3 [61].
Theorem 6.3. Let Lm = minj∈[m,|p|]maxi∈[1,j]mean[i, j] and
Um = maxi∈[1,m]minj∈[i,|p|]mean[i, j]. The minimum L2 solution S˜ = 〈L1, L2, ..., L|p|〉 =
〈U1, U2, ..., U|p|〉.
The result of Theorem 6.3 satisﬁes the ﬁrst type of constraints in Deﬁnition 6.6.
However, a node v in PT appears in |leaves(v)| root-to-leaf paths, where leaves(v)
denotes the leaves of the subtree of PT rooted at v, and therefore, has |leaves(v)|
intermediate estimates, each being an independent observation of the true count
|tr(v)|. We compute the consolidated intermediate estimate of v as the mean of
the estimates, normally the best estimate for |tr(v)|. We denote the consolidated
intermediate estimate of v by c˜(v).
After obtaining c˜(v) for each node v, we compute its consistent estimate c¯(v)
in a top-down fashion as follows:
c¯(v) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩





where node w is the parent of node v. It follows the intuition that the observation∑
u∈children(w) c˜(u) > c¯(w) is strong evidence that excessive noise is added to the
children. Since the variance of noise in c¯(w) is approximately |children(w)| times
smaller than
∑
u∈children(w) c˜(u), it is reasonable to decrease the children’s counts
according to c¯(w). However, we never increase the children’s counts based on c¯(w)
because a large c¯(w) simply indicates that many sequences actually terminate at
w. It is easy to see that the consistency constraints in Deﬁnition 6.6 are respected
among consistent estimates, and therefore the proof is omitted here.
Analysis
Privacy Analysis. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [69] point out that diﬀerential pri-
vacy must be applied with caution. The privacy protection provided by diﬀerential
privacy relates to the data generating mechanism and deterministic aggregate-level
background knowledge. In the STM case, transit data is independent of each other
and no deterministic statistics of the raw database will ever be released. Hence dif-
ferential privacy is appropriate for our problem. We now show that Algorithm 6.1
satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy.
Theorem 6.4. Given the total privacy budget , Algorithm 6.1 ensures -diﬀerential
privacy.
Proof. Algorithm 6.1 consists of two steps, namely BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree and Gen-
eratePrivateRelease. In the procedure BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree, our approach appeals
to the well-understood query model to construct the noisy preﬁx tree PT . Consider
a level of PT , which is composed of two sub-levels. Since all nodes on the same
sub-level contain disjoint sets of sequences. According to the parallel composition
(Theorem 2.2 [87]), the entire privacy budget needed for a sub-level is bounded by
the worst case, that is, 2¯
f
for the ﬁrst sub-level and (f−2)¯
f
for the second sub-level.
The use of privacy budget on diﬀerent sub-levels follows sequential composition (The-
orem 2.1 [87]). Since there are at most h levels, the total privacy budget needed to
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For GeneratePrivateRelease, we make use of the inherent constraints of a preﬁx
tree to boost utility. The procedure only accesses a diﬀerentially private noisy preﬁx
tree, not the underlying database. As proven by Hay et al. [61], a post-processing of
diﬀerentially private results remains diﬀerentially private. Therefore, Algorithm 6.1
as a whole maintains -diﬀerential privacy.
Complexity Analysis. Algorithm 6.1 is of runtime complexity O(|D| · |L|), where
|D| is the size of the input database D and |L| is the size of the location universe. For
BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree, the major computational cost is node generation and sequence
distribution. For each level of the noisy preﬁx tree, the number of nodes to generate
approximates k(1 + 1
f
)|D|, where k  |L| is a number depending on |L|. For each
level, we need to distribute at most 2|D| sequences to the newly generated nodes.
Hence, the complexity of constructing a single level is O(|D| · |L|). Therefore, the
total runtime complexity of BuildNoisyPreﬁxTree for constructing a noisy preﬁx tree
of height h is O(h|D|· |L|). In GeneratePrivateRelease, the complexity of calculating
the intermediate estimates for a single root-to-leaf path is O(h). Since there can be
at most |D| distinct root-to-leaf paths, the complexity of computing all intermediate
estimates is O(h|D|). To compute consistent estimates, we need to visit every node
exactly twice, which is of complexity O(|D| · |L|). Similarly, the computational cost
of generating the private release by traversing the noisy preﬁx tree once in postorder
is O(|D| · |L|). Since h is a very small constant compared to |D| and |L|, the total
complexity of Algorithm 6.1 is O(|D| · |L|).
Extensions
Our solution can be seamlessly applied to trajectory data. A trajectory is composed
of a sequence of location-timestamp pairs in the form of loc1t1 → loc2t2 → · · · →
locntn, where t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn. The time factor is often discretized into intervals at
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Table 6.5: Experimental dataset statistics.
Datasets |D| |L| max|S| avg|S|
Metro 847,668 68 90 4.21
Bus 778,724 944 121 5.67
diﬀerent levels of granularity, e.g., hour, which is typically determined by the data
publisher. All timestamps of a trajectory database form a timestamp universe.
In this case, we can label each node in the preﬁx tree by both a location and
a timestamp. Therefore, two trajectories with the same sequence of locations but
diﬀerent timestamps are considered diﬀerent. For example, L1T1 → L2T2 is diﬀerent
from L1T2 → L2T3, and the corresponding preﬁx tree will have two non-overlapping
root-to-leaf paths. Consequently, when constructing the noisy preﬁx tree, in order
to expand a node lociti, we have to consider the combinations of all locations and the
timestamps in the time universe that are greater than ti (because the timestamps
in a trajectory are non-decreasing), resulting in a larger candidate set. Due to the
eﬃcient implementation we propose, the computational cost will remain moderate.
6.3.2 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we examine the utility of sanitized data in terms of count queries and
frequent sequential pattern mining, and evaluate the scalability of our approach for
processing large-scale real-life data. In particular, we compare the utility improve-
ments of the method using a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree (referred to as Hybrid)
over the method using a simple preﬁx tree (referred to as Simple). Our implemen-
tation was done in C++, and all experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2
Duo 2.26GHz PC with 2GB RAM. Extensive experiments were conducted on two
real-life STM transit datasets, Metro and Bus, which record the transit history of
passengers in the STM metro and bus networks, respectively. The characteristics of
the datasets are summarized in Table 6.5, where max|S| is the maximum sequence
length and avg|S| the average length.
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Utility
Count Query. In our ﬁrst set of experiments, we examine relative errors of count
queries with respect to two diﬀerent parameters, namely the privacy budget  and
the noisy preﬁx tree height h. We follow the evaluation scheme from previous
works [125], [25]. For each privacy budget, we generate 40,000 random count queries
with varying numbers of locations. We call the number of locations in a query the
length of the query. We divide the query set into 4 subsets such that the query length
of the i-th subset is uniformly distributed in [1, ih
4
] and each location is randomly
drawn from the location universe L. The sanity bound s is set to 0.1% of the dataset
size, the same as [125], [25].
Figure 6.3 examines average relative errors under varying privacy budgets from
0.5 to 1.5 with h = 12. The X-axes represent the diﬀerent query subsets by their
maximum length max|Q|. As expected, the average relative errors decrease when 
increases because less noise is added and the construction process is more precise.
In general, our approach maintains high utility for count queries. Even in the worst
case ( = 0.5 and max|Q| = 3), the average relative error of Hybrid is still less
than 8.2% on both datasets. Such level of relative errors is acceptable for data
analysis at the STM. We can also observe that a hybrid-granularity structure can
substantially reduce average relative errors (with 33%-48% improvement), especially
on Bus, which is more sparse.
Figure 6.4 studies how average relative errors vary under diﬀerent h values with
query length ﬁxed to 6. We can observe that with the increase of h, the relative
errors do not decrease monotonically. Initially, the relative errors decrease when
h increases because the increment of h allows to retain more information from the
underlying database. However, after a certain threshold, the relative errors become
larger with the increase of h, because when h gets larger, the noise added to each
level grows quickly. It is interesting to see that the hybrid-granularity structure































































































































































(c) max|Q| = 9 (d) max|Q| = 12
Figure 6.3: Average relative error vs. privacy budget.
values. This allows a wider range of h values (e.g., 10-16) to be used in order to
obtain desirable relative errors.
Frequent sequential pattern mining. In the second set of experiments, we
demonstrate the utility of sanitized data by frequent sequential pattern mining.
Speciﬁcally, we employ PreﬁxSpan to mine frequent sequential patterns 5.
Table 6.6 shows how the utility changes with diﬀerent top k values while
ﬁxing  = 1.0 and h = 12. When k = 100, the sanitized data generated by Hybrid
is able to give the exact top 100 most frequent patterns that are of size greater
than 1. With the increase of k values, the accuracy (the ratio of true positive to k)
decreases. However, even when k = 300, the accuracy of Hybrid is still as high as




























































































































































(c)  = 1.0 (d)  = 1.25
Figure 6.4: Average relative error vs. preﬁx tree height.
257/300 = 85.7% on Metro and 233/300 = 77.7% on Bus. Again we can observe
that Hybrid always outperforms Simple on both datasets under all k values. When
k = 300, the improvement due to the hybrid-granularity structure is 6.6% on Metro
and 9.9% on Bus.
Table 6.7 presents the utility for frequent sequential pattern mining under
diﬀerent  values while ﬁxing h = 12 and k = 300. Generally, larger privacy budgets
lead to more true positives and fewer false positives (false drops). This conforms
to the theoretical analysis that a larger privacy budget results in less noise and
therefore a more accurate result. Since the most frequent sequential patterns are of
small length, they have large supports from the underlying database. As a result,
the utility is relatively insensitive to varying privacy budgets, and the accuracy is
high even when the privacy budget is small.
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Table 6.6: Utility for frequent sequential pattern mining vs. k
k TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B) TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B)
Simple Simple Hybrid Hybrid
100 99/97 1/3 100/100 0/0
150 143/139 7/11 149/144 1/6
200 178/168 22/32 185/177 15/23
250 209/195 41/55 220/209 30/41
300 241/212 59/88 257/233 43/67
Table 6.7: Utility for frequent sequential pattern mining vs. 
 TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B) TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B)
Simple Simple Hybrid Hybrid
0.5 227/194 73/106 244/215 56/85
0.75 239/206 61/94 253/224 47/76
1.0 241/212 59/88 257/233 43/67
1.25 243/216 57/84 259/238 41/62
1.5 248/224 52/76 261/242 39/58
Table 6.8: Utility for frequent sequential pattern mining vs. h
h TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B) TP (M/B) FP(FD) (M/B)
Simple Simple Hybrid Hybrid
6 234/212 66/88 241/221 59/79
8 240/217 60/83 254/232 46/68
10 241/215 58/85 255/236 45/64
12 241/212 59/88 257/233 43/67
14 241/212 59/88 258/233 42/67
16 240/210 60/90 258/231 42/69
18 240/209 60/91 255/230 45/70
20 238/206 62/94 254/228 46/72
Table 6.8 studies how the utility varies under diﬀerent h values with  = 1.0
and k = 300. It is interesting to see that in general frequent sequential pattern
mining is also insensitive to varying h values. This can be similarly explained by
the large supports of frequent sequential patterns, which make them more resistant
to noise. In addition, we can observe that good performance for frequent sequential


























































(a) Runtime vs. |D| (b) Runtime vs. |L|
Figure 6.5: Runtime vs. diﬀerent parameters.
that for count queries.
Scalability
In the last set of experiments, we examine the scalability of our approach. Recall
that the runtime complexity of our approach is dominated by the database size |D|
and the location universe size |L|. Therefore, we study the runtime under diﬀerent
database sizes and diﬀerent location universe sizes. Figure 6.5.a presents the runtime
under diﬀerent database sizes with  = 1.0 and h = 20 for both Simple and Hybrid.
The test sets are generated by randomly extracting records from Metro and Bus.
We can observe that the runtime is linear to the database size. Moreover, it can
be seen that the computational cost of a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree structure is
negligible. This further conﬁrms the beneﬁt of employing a hybrid-granularity preﬁx
tree.
Figure 6.5.b shows how runtime varies under diﬀerent location universe sizes.
Since Metro is of a small universe size, we only study the eﬀect of universe sizes
on Bus. For each universe size, we remove all locations falling out of the universe
from Bus. This results in a smaller database size. Consequently, we ﬁx the database
size for all test sets to 600,000. Again, it can be observed that the runtime scales
linearly with the location universe size and that the computational cost of Hybrid is
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comparable to that of Simple under diﬀerent location universe sizes. As a summary,
our approach is scalable to large sequential datasets. It takes less than 22 seconds
to sanitize both datasets in all previous experiments.
6.3.3 Summary
All existing techniques for privacy-preserving sequential data publishing are derived
using partition-based privacy models, which have been shown failing to provide suf-
ﬁcient privacy protection. In this section, motivated by the STM case, we study the
problem of publishing sequential data in the framework of diﬀerential privacy. For
the ﬁrst time, we present a practical data-dependent solution for sanitizing large-
scale real-life sequential data, which can also be seamlessly applied to trajectory
data. In addition, we develop a constrained inference technique in order to better
the resulting utility. Our solution has been tested on real-life STM transit data for
two fundamental data analysis tasks performed at the STM and exhibits satisfac-
tory eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency. We believe that our solution could beneﬁt many
other sectors that are facing the dilemma between the demands of sequential data
publishing and privacy protection.
6.4 Publishing Sequential Data via N-Grams
6.4.1 Sanitization Algorithm
The main idea of our scheme is simple: we add properly calibrated Laplace noise
to the counts of high-quality grams and release them. Our goal is two-fold: (1) to
release grams whose real counts are large enough to increase utility 6; (2) to maximize
the sizes of released grams (i.e., the n value) to preserve as much sequentiality
6The added noise is calibrated to the global sensitivity and is independent of the count values.
As a result, larger counts provide better utility.
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information from the underlying dataset as possible. There is a fundamental trade-
oﬀ between the utility of noisy n-grams and their sizes: shorter grams enjoy smaller
relative error due to Laplace noise but carry less sequentiality information; longer
grams contain more sequentiality information but have smaller counts (and thus
larger relative error). In this section, we address this trade-oﬀ by releasing variable-
length n-grams of counts larger than a threshold 7 and of sizes less than a maximal
size nmax
8. For most practical datasets, setting nmax to a small value (e.g., 3-5) has
been suﬃcient to capture most of the sequentiality information. Since short grams
are typically of large counts, this property, which is also experimentally justiﬁed in
Section 6.4.3, explains why the n-gram model is so powerful and why it provides an
excellent basis for diﬀerentially private sequential data publishing.
To identify the set of high-quality (i.e., having low relative errors) n-grams
with possibly varying n values (1 ≤ n ≤ nmax) from an input sequential dataset,
we propose a well-designed tree structure, called exploration tree. It groups grams
with the same preﬁx into the same branch so that all possible n-grams with size
1 ≤ n ≤ nmax can be explored eﬃciently. The exploration starts with unigrams and
then proceeds to longer grams until nmax is reached. Intuitively, if the noisy count
of a gram g is small (i.e., close to the standard deviation of the added noise), its
true count also tends to be small and thus the relative error is large. Since all grams
having the preﬁx g (i.e., all nodes in the subtree rooted at g) have smaller true
counts than g’s true count, they can be omitted from further computation. This
observation makes our approach signiﬁcantly faster than naively processing every
single gram regardless of its size. It also explains why we do not adopt the approach
that generates all possible n-grams and then prunes the tree.
7This threshold is set to limit the magnitude of noise in released data.




Before discussing the details, we ﬁrst give some notations used in our algorithm.
The exploration tree is denoted by T . Each node v ∈ T is labeled by a location
L ∈ L∪{&}, where & is a special symbol representing the termination of a sequence.
The function lb(v) returns v’s location label. Each node v is associated with an n-
gram deﬁned by the sequence of locations from the root of T to v, denoted by g(v).
We slightly abuse the term count to mean the number of occurrences of g(v) in the
input dataset, which is denoted by |g(v)|. Note that an n-gram may occur multiple
times in a sequence. For example, the count of L2 → L3 in the sample database in
Table 6.2 is 6, not 5. Each node v also keeps a noisy version of |g(v)|, denoted by
c(v). In addition, each node v conveys a conditional probability, denoted by p(v),
which predicts the probability of the transition from v’s parent to v. p(v) can be
obtained by normalizing the noisy counts of v’s siblings and v. For example, in
Figure 6.6, p(v4) = P (L1|L2 → L3) = 4/(4 + 0 + 1 + 2) = 4/7. The set of all nodes
in level i of T is denoted by level(i, T ) and these nodes represent all i-grams in the
dataset. The level number of node v in T is denoted by levelNum(v, T ). The root
of T is in level zero.
Detailed Descriptions
Private sequential database construction. Algorithm 6.3 provides an overview
of our approach. It takes as inputs a sequential database D, the total privacy
budget , the maximal sequence length max and the maximal n-gram size nmax, and
returns a sanitized sequential database D˜ satisfying -diﬀerential privacy. max is a
parameter speciﬁed by the data holder to limit the inﬂuence of a single sequence
in computation. The algorithm considers only the ﬁrst max locations in each input
sequence. A larger max allows more information to be retained from D, but requires
more noise to be injected in later computation; a smaller max does the opposite. We
discuss and report the eﬀect of diﬀerent max values in Section 6.4.3, and provide
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Algorithm 6.3: N -gram Sequential Data Sanitization
Input: Raw sequential database D
Input: Privacy budget 
Input: Maximal sequence length max
Input: Maximal n-gram size nmax
Output: Private sequential database D˜
1: Truncate each S ∈ D by keeping the ﬁrst max items;
2: i = 0;
3: Create an exploration tree T with a virtual root;
4: while i < nmax do
5: for each non-leaf node vij ∈ level(i, T ) and lb(vij) = & do
6: Calculate ij ;
7: Uc ← all possible children of vij with labels L ∪ {&}
8: Q = {|g(u1)|, |g(u2)|, · · · , |g(u|I|+1)|}, where uk ∈ Uc;
9: Q˜ = Laplace(Q, max/ij);
10: for each node uk ∈ Uc do
11: Add uk to T ;
12: if c(uk) < θ then






19: Enforce consistency constraints on T ;
20: Construct D˜ from T ;
21: return D˜;
insights for a data holder to select a good max value in practice. nmax bounds
the height of the exploration tree T and thus the maximal size of released grams.
The choice of nmax aﬀects the privacy parameter assigned to each level of T , and,
therefore, is also related to the magnitude of noise. In practice, nmax could be set
to 5, which is the maximal n value that is widely used for n-gram applications in
the literature. Similarly, we present more details on the selection of a reasonable
nmax value in Section 6.4.3. We emphasize that this does not mean that all released
grams have a size of nmax but rather their sizes can vary between 1 and nmax.
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Figure 6.6: The exploration tree of the sample data in Table 6.2
of each sequence in order to bound the inﬂuence of a single sequence by max (Line
1). The construction of T starts by creating an empty tree with a virtual root (Line
3). In Lines 4-18, the algorithm iteratively constructs each level of T . For level i
of T , we decide whether to expand a node vij ∈ level(i, T ) by comparing its noisy
count c(vij) with a threshold θ. If c(vij) ≥ θ, we expand vij by explicitly considering
every possible location in L ∪ {&} as a child of vij in order to satisfy diﬀerential
privacy. By deﬁnition, nodes labeled by & cannot be expanded because it means
the termination of a sequence. The entire exploration process ends when either the
depth of the tree reaches nmax (i.e., all subsequently released grams would be longer
than nmax) or no node can be further expanded (since their noisy counts do not pass
θ). Example 6.4.1 illustrates the construction of an exploration tree.
Example 6.4.1. Given nmax = 5, max = 5 and θ = 3, the construction of a possible
exploration tree over the sample dataset in Table 6.2 is illustrated in Figure 6.6
(ignore the privacy budget information and the node (v8) connected by a dash line
for now).
In the following, we detail the key components of Algorithm 6.3: how to
compute the privacy budget ij for each node in T , how to compute the threshold θ
for each node, how to approximate the counts of nodes in T , and how to reconstruct
a synthetic version of the input database D from T .
Adaptive privacy budget allocation. Given the maximal n-gram size nmax, a
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simple privacy budget allocation scheme is to expect the height of T to be nmax and
uniformly assign 
nmax
to each level of T in order to calculate the noisy counts of all
nodes in this level. However, in reality, many (or even all) root-to-leaf paths have
a length much shorter than nmax for the reason of their counts not being able to
pass θ. Hence assigning privacy budget solely based on nmax is clearly not optimal.
For example, in Example 6.4.1, since the height of the exploration tree is 3 and
nmax = 5, at least
2
5
privacy budget would be wasted in all paths.
To address this drawback, we propose an adaptive privacy budget allocation
scheme that allows private operations to make better use of the total privacy budget
. Intuitively, a desirable privacy budget allocation scheme should take into consid-
eration the length of a root-to-leaf path: for a shorter path, each node in the path
should receive more privacy budget; for a longer path, each node should use less
privacy budget. Therefore, we adaptively estimate the length of a path based on
known noisy counts and then distribute the remaining privacy budget as per the
estimated length.
At the beginning of the construction of T , in the absence of information from
the underlying dataset, we can only assume that each root-to-leaf path is of the same
length nmax so that our algorithm would not exceptionally halt due to running out
of privacy budget. Therefore, 
nmax
is used to calculate the noisy counts of nodes in
level 1. Once we obtain some information from the underlying dataset (e.g., nodes’
noisy counts), we can make more accurate predictions on the length of a path.
For a node v in level i ≥ 2 with noisy count c(v), we predict the height hv of
the subtree rooted at v, denoted by Tv, as follows. Let pmax be the estimation of
the probability of transiting from v to the mode of its children (i.e., v’s child with
the largest noisy count). Assume that the probability of the mode at each level of
Tv is also pmax 9. Under this assumption, we can calculate the largest noisy count
of the nodes in level hv of Tv by c(v) · (pmax)hv . Recall the fact that Tv will not be
9A more precise estimation could be obtained by applying the Markov assumption to each level
of Tv at the cost of eﬃciency.
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further expanded if none of the nodes in level hv can pass the threshold θ. We get
c(v) · (pmax)hv = θ, that is, hv = logpmax θc(v) . Since the height of Tv is bounded by




, nmax − i).
Next we discuss how to calculate pmax for v. Let the i-gram associated with
v be L1 → L2 → · · · → Li (Lj ∈ L for 1 ≤ j ≤ i). Then we need to estimate
the probability distribution of v’s children from noisy counts known by far. We
resort to the Markov assumption for this task. Recall that the order i − 1 Markov
assumption states P (Li+1|L1i ) :≈ P (Li+1|L2i ). Since P (Li+1|L2i ) may not be known
in T (because we expand a node only when it passes the threshold θ), we consider
a chain of Markov assumptions (of diﬀerent orders)
P (Li+1|L1i ) :≈ P (Li+1|L2i ) :≈ P (Li+1|L3i ) :≈ · · · :≈ P (Li+1)
to ﬁnd the best estimation of P (Li+1|L1i ), which is the conditional probability with
the longest condition (i.e., the leftmost conditional probability in the chain) that
is known in T . Since T contains all unigrams, there is always an estimation of




If P (Li+1|L1i ) and P˜ (Li+1|L1i ) are represented by nodes v and v′ in T , respectively,
then v′ is the Markov parent of v in T , and any pair of corresponding nodes in the
above chain are Markov neighbors.
Once pmax is calculated, we can calculate the privacy parameter v that is used






, nmax − i)
,
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where ¯ is the remaining privacy budget (i.e., the total privacy budget  minus the
sum of privacy parameters consumed by v and v’s ancestors). It can be observed
that this scheme ensures that the privacy budget used in a root-to-leaf path is always
≤ .
Example 6.4.2. Continue from Example 6.4.1. For all nodes in level 1, 
5
is used
to calculate their noisy counts. For the expansion of the node labeled by v1 in
Figure 6.6, we have pmax =
10
4+10+9
= 0.43 and hv1 = 1. Therefore, the noisy counts
of v1’s children are calculated with privacy parameter − 5 = 45 . For the expansion
of the node v2, we get pmax =
10
4+10+9
= 0.43 and hv2 = 2. Hence its children’s noisy






. For the expansion of the
node labeled by v3, we have pmax =
4
9
and hv3 = 1. Hence,
2
5
is used to compute
the noisy counts of v3’s children.
The sensitivities of Q (Lines 8-9) in diﬀerent levels are diﬀerent. For Q in level
i, a single record of length ≤ max can change Q by at most max − i+ 1. However,
under the adaptive privacy budget allocation scheme, we have to use the largest
sensitivity among all levels, that is max, in all Laplace mechanisms; otherwise, -
diﬀerential privacy may be violated.
Computing threshold θ. A node in T is not further expanded if its noisy count
is less than the threshold θ. The main source of error in T comes from the nodes
that are of a true count of zero but of a noisy count greater than θ (referred to as
false nodes). For this reason, we design a threshold to limit the total number of
false nodes in T with the goal of lowering the magnitude of noise in T .
For each expansion, a false node v will generate |L| · pθ (expected value) false
nodes, where pθ is the probability of Laplace noise passing θ. This is because a
descendant of v must have a true count of zero. With the expansion of T , the
number of false nodes accumulates exponentially with the factor of |L| · pθ, resulting
in excessive noise. To limit the exponential growth of false nodes, we should demand
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|L| · pθ ≤ 1, that is, pθ ≤ 1|L| . Since, under Laplace mechanism, given the threshold






















we get the threshold θ =
max·ln |L|2
′
. We show in Section 6.4.3 that this threshold
is eﬀective in eliminating false nodes while having very limited inﬂuence on nodes
with large counts (i.e., the high-quality grams we want to identify).
Enforcing consistency constraints. The generated exploration tree T may con-
tain some inconsistencies for the reason that: (1) the sum of children’s noisy counts
is very unlikely to equal their parent’s noisy count, and (2) there are some leaf
nodes whose noisy counts are missing (since their counts cannot pass the threshold
θ). Consequently, we propose a method to resolve such inconsistencies with the goal
of improving data utility. In Section 6.4.3, we experimentally show that this method
helps achieve better performance.
The general idea is to approximate the missing counts by making use of the
Markov assumption and then normalize children’s counts based on their parent’s
count. More speciﬁcally, our method works as follows. If none of the children of
a node v in T exceed the threshold θ, it is strong evidence that v should not be
further expanded, and therefore all children of v (leaf nodes in T ) are assigned noisy
counts 0. If all children pass θ, we ﬁrst calculate the conditional probability of each
child based on the sum of all children’s noisy counts, and then obtain a consistent
approximation by multiplying this probability with their parent’s noisy count. If
some children (but not all) of v pass θ, we approximate the noisy counts of the
other children by the Markov assumption. Let vc and C(vc) denote a child of v
whose noisy count cannot pass θ (called a missing node) and its Markov parent in
T , respectively. Let V denote the set of v’s children. We partition V into V + and
V −, where V + contains all nodes passing the threshold, whereas V − contains the
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rest.




For each vj ∈ V +, let A(vj) denote the noisy count resulted by the Laplace
mechanism in Line 9 of Algorithm 6.3.






vj∈V + A(vj) ≤ c(v), ∀vi ∈ V −, A(vi) =
c(v)−∑vj∈V+ A(vj)
|V −|
(b) Otherwise, ∀vi ∈ V −, A(vi) = 0
4. Renormalization: ∀vi ∈ V , c(vi) = c(v) · A(vi)∑
vj∈V
A(vj)
If vc can ﬁnd a high-quality Markov parent in T (i.e., one representing an
n-gram with n ≥ 2 10), we estimate its counts from its high-quality siblings based
on the ratio deﬁned in Step 1. The idea behind this deﬁnition is that the ratio of
any node insigniﬁcantly changes between Markov neighbors, and hence, it can be
well approximated from the Markov parents. Otherwise, we approximate the noisy
counts by assuming a uniform distribution, that is, equally distribute the count left
among the missing nodes (Step 3). In Step 4, these estimated counts are normalized
by the parent’s count in order to obtain consistent approximations.
Example 6.4.3. Continue from Example 6.4.1. Suppose that A(v9) = 2.1, A(v10) =
4, A(v11) do not pass θ, and A(v12) = 1.9. Since rv11 = 0/(4 + 0 + 0) = 0, A(v11) :≈
(1.9 + 4 + 2.1) · 0 = 0. Finally, renormalizing the result, we obtain c(v9) = 4 ·
10A unigram conveys an unconditional probability and therefore cannot provide a very accurate
estimation.
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2.1/(2.1 + 4+ 1.9 + 0) ≈ 1, c(v10) = 4 · 4/(2.1 + 4+ 1.9 + 0) = 2, c(v11) = 0, c(v12) =
4 · 1.9/(2.1 + 4 + 1.9 + 0) ≈ 1.
Synthetic sequential database construction. The released n-grams are useful
for many data analysis tasks. However, it is often necessary to generate a synthetic
database for diﬀerent types of queries (and some other tasks). Hence, we propose
an eﬃcient solution to construct a synthetic version of the input sequential database
from the exploration tree T (Line 20). The general idea is to iteratively generate
longer grams (up to size max) based on the Markov assumption and then make use
of the theorem below for synthetic sequential database construction.
Theorem 6.5. Given the set of n-grams with size 1 ≤ n ≤ max, the (truncated)
input database (with maximal sequence length max) can be uniquely reconstructed.
Proof. Since max-grams can only be supported by sequences of length max, all
sequences of length max can be uniquely reconstructed by max-grams. Once all
sequences of length max have been identiﬁed, we can eliminate their inﬂuences on
the given set of n-grams by updating the counts of all grams supported by them.
The resulting set of n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ max − 1) can be considered as if they
were generated from an input database of sequences with maximal length max −
1. Therefore, sequences of length max − 1 can be uniquely reconstructed as well.
Following this iterative process, all sequences can be uniquely identiﬁed. This proof
explains the way we generate the synthetic database based on noisy n-gram.
Intuitively, longer grams can be generated by “joining” shorter grams. For-
mally, we deﬁne a join operation over two n-grams. Let g1 = L11 → L12 → · · · →
L1n and g2 = L21 → L22 → · · · → L2n. Then g1 can join with g2 if ∀2 ≤ i ≤ n,
L1i = L2(i−1), denoted by g1  g2, and g1  g2 = L11 → L12 → · · · → L1n → L2n.
Note that the join operation is not symmetric: it is possible that g1 can join with
g2, but not vice versa.
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Let the height of T be h. We iteratively extend T by generating n-grams
with h < n ≤ max, starting from level h of T . We extend T level by level, where
level n + 1, representing all (n + 1)-grams, can be generated by joining all possible
n-grams in level n. Let g1 and g2 be two n-grams that can be joined. We estimate
the count of the joined (n+ 1)-gram as follows:
|g1  g2| = c(g1)× P (L2n|g1)
= c(g1)× P (L2n|L11 → L12 → · · · → L1n)
≈ c(g1)× P (L2n|L12 → L13 → · · · → L1n)





Note that all counts in the above equation are noisy ones for the reason of
privacy (see more details in Section 6.4.2). Since c(L212n) and c(L
21
2(n−1)) must have
been known in the extended T , |g1  g2| can be computed. We keep extending T
until: 1) max has been reached, or; 2) no grams in a level can be joined.
Example 6.4.4. Continue from Example 6.4.1. L2 → L3 → L1 and L3 → L1 → L2
can be joined to generate L2 → L3 → L1 → L2. Its count can be calculated by
c(L2 → L3 → L1)× c(L3→L1→L2)c(L3→L1) = 4× 24 = 2. This 4-gram can be represented as a
new node in T , as illustrated by v8 in Figure 6.6. Similarly, L2 → L3 → L1 can join
with L3 → L1 → L1, resulting in L2 → L3 → L1 → L1. Since these two 4-grams
cannot be joined, the extension of T ends at level 4.
After extending T , we can generate the synthetic database in the following
way. Let the height of the extended T be he. We start from level he. For each
v ∈ level(he, T ), we publish c(v) copies of g(v), and update the count of each node
v′ supported by g(v) by subtracting c(v) · ci (i.e., all nodes representing a gram that
can be generated from g(v)), where ci is the number of occurrence of g(v
′) in g(v).
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nodes and therefore requires at most
n(n+1)
2
updates. With a hash map structure, each update can be done in constant
time.
Example 6.4.5. Continue from Example 6.4.4. For node v8 in level 4 of T , we
publish 2 copies of L2 → L3 → L1 → L2 and update the counts of all nodes
supported by g(v8), that is, the nodes representing L1, L2, L3, L2 → L3, L3 → L1,
L1 → L2, L2 → L3 → L1 and L3 → L1 → L2.
6.4.2 Privacy Analysis
We give the formal privacy guarantee of our approach below.
Theorem 6.6. Algorithm 6.3 satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy.
Proof. (Sketch) Due to the subtle correlation of the counts in the same level of T
(i.e., a single sequence can aﬀect multiple counts in a level), the sequential composi-
tion and parallel composition properties [87] must be applied with caution. Hence,
we prove the theorem by the deﬁnition of -diﬀerential privacy. Consider two neigh-
boring databases D and D′. We ﬁrst consider Lines 1 − 18 of Algorithm 6.3, that
is, the construction of T . Let this part be denoted by A. Then we need to prove
Pr[A(D)=T ]
Pr[A(D′)=T ] ≤ e. In essence, T is built on the noisy answers to a set of count queries
(via Laplace mechanism). Let each root-to-leaf path be indexed by j. We denote a
node in level i and path j by vij, its privacy parameter by ij, and its true count in
D and D′ by Q(D)ij and Q(D′)ij, respectively. Then we have
Pr[A(D) = T ]








We ﬁrst claim that a single record can only aﬀect at most max root-to-leaf
paths. This is due to two facts: 1) all ancestors of a node that is inﬂuenced by the
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additional record must also be inﬂuenced; second,
∑
j |Q(D)ij −Q(D′)ij| ≤ max.
Therefore, Equation 5 could be rewritten as
Pr[A(D) = T ]









i ij = , we have
Pr[A(D) = T ]


























Note that ij is calculated based on noisy counts. Hence, the construction of T
satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy. In addition to the construction of T , we approximate
the nodes’ counts and generate the synthetic sequential database in Lines 19 and
20. Since these two steps are conducted on noisy data and do not require access to
the original database, they satisfy 0-diﬀerential privacy. Therefore, our solution as
a whole gives -diﬀerential privacy.
6.4.3 Performance Analysis
Error Analysis
The error of the sanitized data comes from three major sources: ﬁrst, using the
n-grams with 1 < n ≤ h to estimate longer n-grams with h < n ≤ max (recall the h
is the height of the unextended exploration tree); second, the truncation conducted
to limit the eﬀect of a single record; third, the noise added to the n-grams with
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Table 6.9: Experimental dataset characteristics.
Datasets |D| |L| max|D| avg|D|
MSNBC 989,818 17 14,795 5.7
STM 1,210,096 342 121 6.7
1 < n ≤ h to satisfy diﬀerential privacy. We call the ﬁrst two types of error
approximation error and the last type of error Laplace error. Given a speciﬁc 
value, the total error of our approach is determined by max and nmax. Intuitively,
a smaller max value incurs larger approximation error, but meanwhile it introduces
less Laplace error because of a smaller sensitivity. Analogously, a smaller nmax value
causes larger approximation error, but results in more accurate counts. Therefore
our goal is to identify good values for max and nmax that minimize the sum of
approximation error and Laplace error. In next section, we experimentally study
the eﬀect of varying max and nmax values on the performance of our solution and
provide our insights on selecting good max and nmax values. In general, our solution
is designed to perform stably well under a relatively wide range of max and nmax
values.
Experimental Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the performance of our solution (referred to as N-gram)
in terms of two data analysis tasks, namely count query and frequent sequential
pattern mining. As a reference point, for count query, we compare the utility of our
solution with the approach proposed in [21], which relies on a preﬁx tree structure
(referred to as Preﬁx ); for frequent sequential pattern mining, we compare our
approach with both Preﬁx and the method designed in [88] for ﬁnding frequent
(sub)strings (referred to as FFS ). Two real-life sequential datasets are used in our
experiments. The MSNBC dataset describes sequences of URL categories browsed
by users in time order on msnbc.com. It is publicly available at the UCI machine
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learning repository 11. The STM dataset records sequences of stations visited by
passengers in time order in the Montreal transportation system. It is provided by
the Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al 12. The detailed characteristics of the datasets
are summarized in Table 6.9, where |D| is the number of records (sequences) in
D, |L| is the universe size, max |D| is the maximum length of sequences in D, and
avg |D| the average length of sequences.
Count query. To evaluate the performance of our approach for count queries, we
follow the evaluation scheme that has been widely used in previous works [125],
[123], [25] (also used in Section 4.4 and Section 6.3.2). The utility of a count query
Q is measured by the relative error of its answer on the sanitized sequential database
Q(D˜) with respect to the true answer on the original database Q(D). Unlike the
deﬁnition given in Section 6.3.2. We consider a more stringent instantiation of
count query: the answer to Q is deﬁned to be the number of occurrences of Q in
the database (a single record may contain more than one occurrence of Q). For
example, given Q = L2 → L3, its answer over the database in Table 6.2 is 6.
In the ﬁrst set of experiments, we examine the average relative errors of count
queries under diﬀerent query sizes (i.e., the number of locations in a query) and
diﬀerent privacy budgets. We divide all queries into ﬁve subsets with diﬀerent
maximal query sizes (4, 8, 12, 16 and 20). For each subset, we generate 10,000
random queries of sizes that are uniformly distributed at random between 1 and its
maximal size. Each location in a query is uniformly selected at random from the
location universe.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 report the average relative errors of N-gram and Pre-
ﬁx under diﬀerent query sizes over two typical  values 13 while ﬁxing max = 20
and nmax = 5. It can be observed that the average relative errors of N-gram are
11http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
12http://www.stm.info


























































































(b)  = 1.0
























































































(b)  = 1.0
Figure 6.8: Average relative error vs.  on STM
consistently lower than those of Preﬁx under all settings. The improvements are
substantial, ranging from 32% to 63%. The relative errors of N-gram are relatively
small even under a strong privacy requirement (i.e.,  = 0.1).
To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the n-gram model, we apply the synthetic
sequential database construction technique on non-noisy 5-grams of both MSNBC
and STM, and issue count queries on the two synthetic databases (referred to as
Baseline). The average relative errors of Baseline give the approximation error due
to the employment of the n-gram model, while the diﬀerences between Baseline and
N-gram ascribe to Laplace error. As one can observe, the approximation errors are
relatively small on both datasets, demonstrating that the n-gram model is eﬀective in
capturing the essential sequentiality information of a database. For Laplace error,
we stress that the n-gram model provides a general and ﬂexible framework that
accommodates other more advanced noise injection mechanisms, such as the matrix
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mechanism [76] and the MWEM mechanism [57]. Hence it may require less noise
added than Laplace mechanism, resulting in smaller Laplace error. It may even
allow a larger nmax value to be used and therefore further reduce approximation
error. Thus, we deem that the variable-length n-gram model bears great promise
for diﬀerentially private sequential data release.
To prove the beneﬁt of our adaptive privacy budget allocation scheme, we
report the average relative errors of a variant of N-gram (referred to as N-gram-
Uniform), in which the adaptive allocation scheme is replaced by the uniform al-
location scheme described before. The improvement is less obvious on MSNBC
because many paths are actually of length nmax, whereas the improvement on STM
is noticeable, especially when  = 0.1.
Due to the truncation operation conducted in Algorithm 6.3, any count query
with a size greater than max receives an answer 0 on the sanitized dataset. How-
ever, we point out that in reality it is not a problem because the true answer of
such a query is typically very small (if not 0). For many real-life analyses (e.g.,
ridership analysis), the diﬀerence between such a small value and 0 is negligible.
In addition, this limitation also exists in Preﬁx and is inherent in any diﬀerentially
private mechanism because Laplace mechanism cannot generate reliable answers on
extremely small values.
Next we examine the impact of max and nmax on average relative error of count
queries. In Figure 6.9, we study how relative error changes under diﬀerent max values
with  = 1.0, nmax = 5 and query size equal to 8. In theory, a larger max value allows
more information of the underlying database to be retained at the cost of higher
sensitivity (and hence larger Laplace noise). Therefore, the selection of max needs
to take into consideration the trade-oﬀ between approximation error and Laplace
error. However, in reality, a reasonable max value could be chosen more easily
because the average sequence length of many real-life datasets is relatively small.







































































Figure 6.10: Average relative error vs. nmax ( = 1.0)
by Figure 6.9. Since most sequences in MSNBC and STM are of a small length,
when max is suﬃciently large (i.e., 16), increasing max does not signiﬁcantly lower
approximation error, but simply increases Laplace noise. Moreover, we can observe
that our approach performs relatively stable under varying max values. This can be
explained by the large counts of short grams, which are more resistant to Laplace
noise.
Figure 6.10 examines the performance of N-gram with respect to varying nmax
values, where  = 1.0, max = 20 and query size is 8. Similar to the selection of max,
the selection of nmax also involves the trade-oﬀ between approximation error and
Laplace error. A larger nmax reduces approximation error while increasing Laplace
error. To obtain a reasonable trade-oﬀ, we develop the adaptive privacy budget
allocation scheme and the formal choice of the threshold value, which automatically
select the best gram sizes on the ﬂy. Even a data holder speciﬁes a unreasonably

























































































(b)  = 1.0
Figure 6.11: Eﬀect of node count approximation.
observed that the performance of our solution is insensitive to varying nmax values.
From our experimental results, we believe that, in most cases, nmax = 5 is a good
choice. In addition, we point out that a good nmax value is related to |D| and |L|,
a larger |D| or a smaller |L| suggests a larger nmax value.
One key technique that we develop to improve accuracy of count queries is
to enforce consistency constraints by approximating the counts of the nodes that
cannot pass the threshold. In the next set of experiments, we demonstrate that this
technique indeed improves the accuracy of count queries compared to the case when
we naively set the noisy counts of all nodes that do not pass the threshold to 0.
In Figure 6.11, max = 20 and nmax = 5. MSNBC No-Approx and STM No-Approx
give the relative errors of N-gram without the approximation technique. As we can
observe, this technique improves the relative error for all query sizes under diﬀerent
 values, up to 47%.
Frequent sequential pattern mining. The second data analysis task we consider
is frequent sequential pattern mining, a more speciﬁc data mining task. Given a
positive number K, we are interested in the top K most frequent sequential patterns
(i.e., most frequent sub-sequences) in the dataset. This data analysis task helps, for
example, a transportation agency better understand passengers’ transit patterns
and consequently optimize its network geometry.
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Table 6.10: True positive ratio vs. K value on MSNBC
(a)  = 0.1
K value 20 40 60 80 100
N-gram 100% 90% 93% 96% 94%
Preﬁx 85% 78% 80% 84% 86%
FFS 70% 63% 57% 58% 55%
(b)  = 1.0
K value 20 40 60 80 100
N-gram 100% 93% 97% 99% 97%
Preﬁx 90% 82.5% 85% 90% 89%
FFS 70% 63% 57% 58% 55%
We compare the performance of N-gram with Preﬁx and FFS. All size-1 fre-
quent patterns are excluded from the results since they are of less interest and trivial
in frequent sequential pattern mining. We would like to clarify that FFS actually
has two assumptions: 1) all frequent patterns are of the same length; 2) the lengths
of frequent patterns are identical to the lengths of input sequences. Since generally
these two assumptions cannot be satisﬁed in a frequent sequential pattern mining
task, it is not fair to directly compare FFS with N-gram and Preﬁx. However, there
are very few approaches that support frequent sequential pattern mining under dif-
ferential privacy. Hence we still report the performance of FFS and provide insights
on the key factor that guarantees high utility on frequent sequential pattern mining.
For both FFS and Preﬁx, we have tested various parameter settings and report the
best results we have obtained.
To give an intuitive impression on the performance of these three approaches,
we ﬁrst report their true positive ratios under diﬀerent K and  values in Table 6.10
and Table 6.11. Given K, we generate the top K most frequent sequential patterns
on both the original dataset D and the sanitized dataset D˜, which are denoted by
FK(D) and FK(D˜), respectively. The true positive ratio is then deﬁned to be the
percentage of frequent patterns that are correctly identiﬁed, that is, |FK(D)∩FK(D˜)|
K
.
The results indicate that N-gram can reliably identify the most frequent patterns in
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Table 6.11: True positive ratio vs. K value on STM
(a)  = 0.1
K value 20 40 60 80 100
N-gram 95% 93% 93% 94% 91%
Preﬁx 65% 68% 75% 83% 82%
FFS 35% 33% 35% 36% 43%
(b)  = 1.0
K value 20 40 60 80 100
N-gram 100% 100% 98% 100% 98%
Preﬁx 70% 68% 80% 86% 85%
FFS 35% 33% 35% 36% 43%
a given database with strong privacy guarantee.
To measure the utility of sanitized data more precisely, we adopt the metric
proposed in [25], which further takes into consideration the accuracy of the supports
of patterns in FK(D˜) 14. The utility loss on the sanitized dataset is deﬁned to be
the diﬀerence between FK(D) and FK(D˜), that is,
∑
Fi∈FK(D)




where sup(Fi, FK(D)) and sup(Fi, FK(D˜)) denote the supports of Fi in FK(D) and
FK(D˜), respectively. If Fi /∈ FK(D˜), sup(Fi, FK(D˜)) = 0. Therefore, if the metric
equals 0, it means that FK(D) is identical to FK(D˜) (even the support of every
frequent pattern); if the metric equals 1, it implies that FK(D) and FK(D˜) are
totally diﬀerent.
In Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13, where max = 20 and nmax = 5, we can observe
that our proposal signiﬁcantly outperforms the other two approaches. In addition,
for the frequent patterns that are correctly identiﬁed, the relative error of their
supports is typically very small even when  = 0.1. The main reason is that N-gram

































































(b)  = 1.0
































































(b)  = 1.0
Figure 6.13: Utility loss vs. K on STM
extracts the essential information of a database in terms of a set of n-grams, which
are actually the most frequent patterns in the database. This fact allows N-gram to
perform well even under a small  value. In contrast, in Preﬁx, the noise of a frequent
pattern’s count accumulates quickly in proportion to the number of longer sequences
which contain the frequent pattern. The major limitation of FFS is its preﬁx data
structure, which generates frequent patterns based on very short preﬁxes.
In the last set of experiments, we study the impact of max and nmax on frequent
sequential pattern mining. Figure 6.14 reports the utility loss of N-gram under
diﬀerent max with  = 1.0 and nmax = 5. The aforementioned trade-oﬀ in the
selection of max still applies to frequent sequential pattern mining. This time,
we can clearly observe such a trade-oﬀ in Figure 6.14: when max is small, the
approximate error is the main source of error; when max becomes larger, the total































































Figure 6.15: Utility loss vs. nmax ( = 1.0)
for a wide range of max values. This property makes it easier for a data holder to
select a good max value.
Similar trade-oﬀ due to nmax can be observed in Figure 6.15, where max is
ﬁxed to 20. There exists a nmax value that minimizes the sum of approximation
error and Laplace error. Due to the series of techniques we propose, the utility lost
under diﬀerent nmax values is comparable.
6.4.4 Summary
In this section, we proposed a novel approach of diﬀerentially private sequential
data publication based on a variable-length n-gram model. This model extracts
the essential information of a sequential database in terms of a set of variable-
length n-grams whose counts are relatively large and therefore subject to lower
Laplace error. We developed a set of key techniques that are vital to the success
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of the n-gram model. Furthermore, we designed a synthetic sequential database
construction method, which allows published n-grams to be used for a wider range
of data analysis tasks. Extensive experiments on real-life datasets proved that our
solution substantially outperforms state-of-the-art techniques [88], [21] in terms of





In the last few years, information networks in various application domains, such as
social networks, communication networks and transportation networks, have expe-
rienced vigorous developments. In particular, social networks, such as Facebook,
LinkedIn and Myspace, have become very prevalent. With the growth of informa-
tion networks, a large volume of network data has been generated, which enables
a wide spectrum of data analysis tasks. Network data is typically represented as
graphs, where nodes represent a set of individuals with their attributes, and edges
represent connections between them. Therefore, in this chapter we use the term
network data and graph interchangeably.
It has been shown that with naively sanitized network data (e.g., merely re-
placing explicit identiﬁers by pseudo-identiﬁers), an adversary is able to launch
diﬀerent types of privacy attacks that re-identify nodes, reveal edges between nodes,
or expose node attributes [59]. Therefore, network data needs to be sanitized with
formal, provable privacy guarantees before it can be released to the public.
In addressing privacy issues in network data publication, there has been a series







Figure 7.1: k-isomorphism is insuﬃcient for preventing edge disclosure.
diﬀerent privacy models. Most of these works [133], [60], [82], [30], [134], [26], [132]
focus on preventing node re-identiﬁcation and/or associated attribute disclosure
against adversaries with structural background knowledge. In contrast, only a few
papers [131], [83], [122], [26], [54] consider privacy threats due to edge disclosure,
which lets an adversary learn the sensitive relationships between individuals. More-
over, the papers [131], [83], [122] lack a formal privacy deﬁnition for edge anonymity.
Among all privacy models for network data, k-isomorphism [26] provides relatively
strong privacy protection for edge disclosure (i.e., an adversary cannot determine
if two individuals are connected via a path with a probability ≥ 1
k
). However, we
show that, with moderate background knowledge, an adversary is able to ascertain
a direct link between two individuals on a k-isomorphic graph, as illustrated in
Example 7.1.1.
Example 7.1.1. Consider the 3-isomorphic graph in Figure 7.1. Suppose that the
adversary has successfully identiﬁed Bob as one of {v1, v2, v3} and Ann as one of
{v4, v5, v6} and seeks to learn if there is a direct link between Bob and Ann, which
is considered sensitive. With the background knowledge that Bob and Ann are
connected via a common friend, the adversary can ascertain that both Bob and Ann
are in the same subgraph, and therefore learn that there is a direct link between
Bob and Ann.
The vulnerability of k-isomorphism is largely due to its deterministic nature.
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This fact motivates our use of diﬀerential privacy [37], which requires inherent ran-
domness of a sanitization algorithm. The traditional -diﬀerential privacy provides
rigorous privacy guarantees on a database whose records are generated indepen-
dently ; however, its application to network data is hindered by the fact that network
data may be inherently correlated. In the context of network data, the evidence of
participation [69] of a record (e.g., an edge) may be reﬂected by several other records.
For example, the presence of an edge in a network database can be inferred by the
existence of several other edges. The deletion of a single edge will not be able to
fully mask its presence in the database. Consequently, -diﬀerential privacy fails to
provide the claimed privacy guarantee in the correlated setting (e.g., an adversary
can obtain a probability change greater than e).
In addressing this issue, we propose a stronger variant of diﬀerential privacy,
called (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, which provides provable privacy protection even
when a record is correlated to at most k − 1 other records. We then quantify the
relationship between sensitivity and data correlation, and derive the concept of cor-
related sensitivity, which enables the standard mechanisms, Laplace mechanism [37]
and exponential mechanism [89], to be used for achieving (, k)-diﬀerential privacy.
In addition to correlation, another major challenge of applying (, k)-diﬀerential
privacy (or -diﬀerential privacy) to network data is scalability and utility. This is
conﬁrmed by the recent paper [54], to the best of our knowledge, the only existing
work that studies network data publication in the non-interactive setting under dif-
ferential privacy. It requires the input graph to be dense, which is very unlikely to be
satisﬁable on real-life datasets, and leaves ﬁnding an eﬃcient algorithm as an open
problem. In this chapter, we follow the line of data-dependent solutions [25], [90],
which adaptively make use of noisy information from the underlying database to
improve eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. We ﬁrst explore dense regions of the adjacency
matrix of an input graph using an adapted quadtree, which avoids the high complex-
ity of graph operations, and then propose an eﬃcient use of exponential mechanism
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to reconstruct the leaf nodes of the quadtree while satisfying (, k)-diﬀerential pri-
vacy.
Contributions. Our contributions in network data sanitization are summarized as
follows.
• First, we propose (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, a stronger variant of -diﬀerential
privacy [37], which guarantees provable privacy protection when the under-
lying data is correlated (Section 7.3). (, k)-diﬀerential privacy is a general,
practical version of -diﬀerential privacy and free-lunch privacy [69]. It applies
to not only network data but also any type of data that is correlated. We
introduce the notion of correlated sensitivity, which allows Laplace mechanism
and exponential mechanism to be used for achieving (, k)-diﬀerential privacy,
and show that (, k)-diﬀerential privacy inherits the composition properties of
-diﬀerential privacy.
• Second, based on (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, we propose an eﬃcient non-interactive
solution for network data publication, which prevents an adversary from learn-
ing the existence of a direct link between any two individuals (Section 7.4).
This is the ﬁrst eﬃcient non-interactive solution in the framework of diﬀeren-
tial privacy. Compared with the only previous work [54] on non-interactively
releasing a private graph under diﬀerential privacy, our improvements are sig-
niﬁcant: (1) we achieve the stronger (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, whereas Gupta
et al. [54] achieve (, δ)-diﬀerential privacy, a weaker privacy notion of -
diﬀerential privacy; (2) we lift the impractical assumption that the input graph
has to be dense. We show that theoretically our approach obtains high utility
as long as suﬃcient edge information is contained in some dense subgraphs and
that experimentally our approach performs very well on many diﬀerent types
of real-life network datasets; (3) most importantly, our approach is eﬃcient to
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(a) A sample graph G (b) The adjacency matrix A(G)
Figure 7.2: A sample graph and its adjacency matrix.
• Third, we conduct an extensive experimental study over various types of real-
life network datasets, including social network, collaboration network and
transportation network (Section 7.5). We examine the utility of sanitized data
for diﬀerent data analysis tasks, namely degree distribution and cut queries.
We demonstrate that our approach maintains high utility and scales to large
real-life network data.
The results of this chapter are currently under review in [24].
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Network Data and Adjacency Matrix
In this thesis, we follow the convention of modeling an input network dataset as a
simple graph (i.e., an undirected graph with no loops or multiple edges), G = (V,E),
where V is the set of vertices, E ⊆ V ×V is the set of edges. For a graph G, we use
V (G) and E(G) to respectively denote the vertex set and the edge set of G. When
the graph is clear from the context, we omit G from the notation. We assume that
a vertex labeling has been given in a way that is independent of the underlying edge
set.
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The adjacency matrix of a vertex-labeled simple graph G = (V,E), denoted
by A(G), is a square |V | × |V | matrix satisfying:
A(G)ij =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if(vi, vj) ∈ E(G)
0 otherwise
It is evident that, for any simple graph G, A(G) is a symmetric matrix with
a zero diagonal. Figure 7.2 presents the adjacency matrix of a given simple graph
(ignore the bold lines for now). A (0, 1)-matrix is called a graphic matrix if it is
an adjacency matrix of some simple graph. Apparently, a (0, 1)-matrix is graphic if
and only if it is a symmetric matrix with a zero diagonal.
We deﬁne the density of a region R ⊆ A with size |R| = m× l to be den(R) =∑m
i=1
∑l
j=1Rij/ml. It gives the fraction of elements in R which are equal to 1. The
region in A formed by rows i, · · · , j and columnsm, · · · , n is denoted by A[i, j;m,n].
For example, the densities of A and A[1, 3; 6, 8] are 20/64 = 31.25% and 8/9 =
88.89%, respectively.
7.2.2 Utility Requirement





j=1 |Aij − A˜ij| (i.e., A˜ is as close to A as possible). When A˜




j=1 |Aij − A˜ij| = 0; when A˜ is totally diﬀerent from A,∑|V |
i=1
∑|V |




j=1 |Aij − A˜ij| naturally
makes the published network data useful for many analysis tasks, including degree
distribution and cut queries.
Degree distribution. Given a graph G, we use a vector F (G) of size |V (G)| to
denote the degree frequency sequence of G. The i-th value in F (G) is |{v∈V :deg(v)=i}||V | ,
where deg(v) is the degree of v. For example, the degree frequency sequence of
the graph in Figure 7.2 is {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.625, 0, 0, 0, 0}. Given the degree
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frequency sequences F (G) and F (G˜), we measure their diﬀerence by Kullback-Leibler
divergence (KL-divergence) [68]:







If F (G) = F (G˜), DKL(F (G)||F (G˜)) = 0. We follow the standard convention
that 0 log 0 = 0.
Cut query. In this chapter, a cut of a graph G is deﬁned by any two subsets of
vertices S, T ⊆ V (G) [54]. A cut query returns the number of edges in the cut-set
of a cut, that is, QS,T (G) = |{(u, v) ∈ E(G) : u ∈ S, v ∈ T}|. For example, given
the graph in Figure 7.2, S = {v1, v2} and T = {v6, v7, v8}, we have QS,T = 6.
Similarly, we measure the utility loss of a cut query over a sanitized graph G˜




max{QS,T (G), s} ,
where s is a sanity bound that mitigates the eﬀect of the queries with extremely
small selectivities [125], [123], [25].
7.3 (, k)-Diﬀerential Privacy
-diﬀerential privacy is built on the assumption that all underlying records are in-
dependent of each other. In the context of network data, this assumption does not
always hold. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [69] indicates that in the correlated set-
ting, -diﬀerential privacy cannot provide the claimed privacy protection because
the removal of a single record cannot hide its evidence of participation (e.g., its par-
ticipation could still be inferred by the existence of some other records to which it
is correlated). In this section, we propose a stronger variant of -diﬀerential privacy,
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known as (, k)-diﬀerential privacy, which provides guaranteed privacy even when
the underlying records are correlated.
Deﬁnition 7.1 ((, k)-diﬀerential privacy). A privacy mechanism A satisﬁes (, k)-
diﬀerential privacy if for any two databases D1 and D2 that diﬀer on at most one
record, and for any possible output O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) = O] ≤ e k × Pr[A(D2) = O] (7.2)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A, and k is a measure of the
extent of correlation.
Before we formalize the privacy guarantee provided by (, k)-diﬀerential pri-
vacy with respect to correlation, we ﬁrst deﬁne a k-correlated database.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (k-correlated database). A database D is k-correlated if the exis-
tence of any record in D can be inferred by at most k − 1 other records.
A k′-correlated database is called k-correlation bounded if 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k. The
fundamental observation under (, k)-diﬀerential privacy is that in the correlated
setting an adversary’s probability change is not bounded by the probability change
of a privacy mechanism, but may be magniﬁed by the extent of correlation due to
inference.
Theorem 7.1. If neighboring databases are k-correlation bounded, then (, k)-diﬀerential
privacy bounds an adversary’s probability change by e.
Proof. For k-correlation bounded databases, it is suﬃcient to cancel out the eﬀect
of data correlation on any computation by considering all correlated records (at
most k records) as if they were removed from the underlying database. Therefore,
bounding an adversary’s probability change by e on two databases diﬀering on one
record in the correlated setting is equivalent to bound the probability change of
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a privacy mechanism by e over two databases diﬀering on k records in the non-
correlated setting. A privacy mechanism A that achieves -diﬀerential privacy on
two databases diﬀering on k records gives 
k
-diﬀerential privacy on two databases
diﬀering on one record [37].
We will see how (, k)-diﬀerential privacy helps thwart the privacy attack de-
scribed in [69] after giving the deﬁnition of correlated sensitivity. (, k)-diﬀerential
privacy satisﬁes the monotonic property below.
Theorem 7.2. A (, k)-diﬀerentially private mechanism A gives (, k′)-diﬀerential
privacy for all 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
This is true because Pr[A(D1)=O]
Pr[A(D2)=O] ≤ e

k ≤ e k′ . Theorem 7.2 indicates that
if k is speciﬁed as the upper bound of correlation, (, k)-diﬀerential privacy can
always bound an adversary’s probability change by e. (, k)-diﬀerential privacy is
a generalized, practical version of -diﬀerential privacy [37] with k = 1 and free-
lunch privacy [69] with k = n, where n is the database size. The deﬁnition of
(, k)-diﬀerential privacy is realistic and practical in many applications. In any
case, data with extremely strong correlation (e.g., k = O(n)) cannot be published
with useful information under any privacy model. The k value may vary from
application to application. We leave how to determine a reasonable k value in a
speciﬁc application as an open problem (meanwhile, we experimentally show that
our solution can preserve useful information even when k is relatively large).
The traditional -diﬀerential privacy can be achieved by Laplace mechanism
and exponential mechanism by properly deﬁning global sensitivity. Similarly, (, k)-
diﬀerential privacy can be achieved by Laplace mechanism and exponential mecha-
nism based on the concept of correlated sensitivity.
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Deﬁnition 7.3 (Correlated Sensitivity). For any function f : D → Rd, the corre-
lated sensitivity of f is
CS(f) = k max
D1,D2
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1 (7.3)
for all k-correlated databases D1, D2 s. t. D1 and D2 diﬀer on at most one record.
Correlated sensitivity is deﬁned to be k times of global sensitivity, which im-
plies that extra noise is needed in order to hide the eﬀect of the k correlated records.
We now show that applying correlated sensitivity to Laplace mechanism and expo-
nential mechanism gives (, k)-diﬀerential privacy.
Theorem 7.3. The substitution of correlated sensitivity for global sensitivity in
Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism achieves (, k)-diﬀerential privacy.
Proof. By deﬁnition, (, k)-diﬀerential privacy requires to reduce the probability
change of a private mechanism to e

k in order to cancel out the eﬀect of data cor-
relation. For either Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism, this can be
achieved by increasing global sensitivity k times, which is correlated sensitivity.
We revisit the example provided in [69] under correlated sensitivity to see
how it thwarts the privacy attack described below.
Example 7.3.1. 1 Bob or one of his 9 immediate family members may have con-
tracted a highly infectious disease, in which case the entire family would have been
infected. An attacker asks the query “how many in Bob’s family have this disease?”
to infer if Bob has been infected. The true answer is of high probability to be either 0
or 10. Suppose the noisy answer returned is 12. If this answer is obtained by adding
Laplace noise based on global sensitivity, the attacker learns that the probability of
1The strong attacker mentioned in [69] cannot be prevented as his prior knowledge (without
accessing any database) has allowed him to succeed in a privacy attack.
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10 being the true answer is e10 times larger than the probability of 0 being the true
answer. In contrast, if the answer is obtained by adding Laplace noise based on corre-









It ensures that an attacker’s probability estimate can change by a factor of at most
e.
In the rest of the chapter, we consider a speciﬁc instantiation of (, k)-diﬀerential
privacy in the context of network data. Two neighboring databases are deﬁned as
two databases that diﬀer on at most one edge. This instantiation prevents an ad-
versary from learning the presence of any single edge (i.e., if two individuals are
directly connected) even when its existence can be inferred by k − 1 other edges.
7.4 Sanitization Algorithm
We provide an overview of our solution, called density-based exploration and re-
construction (DER), in Algorithm 7.1, which takes as inputs a graph G, a privacy
“budget” , and a correlation parameter k, and returns a sanitized graph G˜ satisfy-
ing (, k)-diﬀerential privacy. Our solution consists of two steps, and therefore  is
divided into two portions, ′ and ′′, each being used in a step.
First, we design a diﬀerentially private and data-dependent partitioning pro-
cess by adapting a standard quadtree to explore dense regions of the adjacency
matrix A of G, which can be reconstructed later with high accuracy. This process
results in a noisy quadtree QT whose nodes represent a region of A and are asso-
ciated with a noisy count. The major technical challenges in this step include the
design of stop conditions based on an estimation of the height of QT , the selection
of splitting points based on exponential mechanism, an adaptive privacy budget al-
location scheme and an eﬃcient implementation, which are key to the success of the
entire algorithm.
Second, we propose an eﬃcient edge arrangement algorithm to reconstruct a
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Algorithm 7.1: DER Algorithm
Input: Raw graph G
Input: Privacy budget 
Input: Correlation parameter k
Output: Sanitized graph G˜
1:  = ′ + ′′;
2: Generate the adjacency matrix A from G;
3: Noisy quadtree QT ← ExploreDenseRegion(A, ′, k);
4: Sanitized graphic matrix A˜ ← ArrangeEdge(QT , A, ′′, k);
5: Generate G˜ from A˜;
6: return G˜;




j=1 |Aij − A˜ij|. Our method is
based on a novel use of exponential mechanism, which is of independent interest. It
successfully reduces the run-time complexity to O(|V |2), in contrast to the factorial
complexity of a naive implementation.
7.4.1 Dense Region Exploration
Based on the adjacency matrix A, we perform a recursively partitioning process
guided by density in order to identify dense regions (and, implicitly, sparse regions)
of A, which can be reconstructed accurately. This process could be done based on
many popular space-partitioning data structures, such as kd-tree [10], quadtree [42],
and Hilbert R-tree [65]. In this section, we employ quadtree as the basic data struc-
ture for the exploration because it achieves the best trade-oﬀ between utility and
eﬃciency.
A standard quadtree decomposes a given two dimensional region into four
equal quadrants, subquadrants, and so on with each leaf node meeting certain stop
condition. The splitting point of a standard quadtree is independent of the input
data (e.g., it always selects the midpoint of each dimension). Each node in a quadtree
represents a region of A. For our task, we adapt a quadtree in a data-dependent,
diﬀerentially private manner. Each node (except the root) in a quadtree records not
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Algorithm 7.2: ExploreDenseRegion
Input: Raw adjacency matrix A
Input: Privacy budget ′
Input: Correlation parameter k
Output: Noisy quadtree QT
1: i = 0;
2: QT ← ∅;
3: Calculate the height h of QT ;
4: while i < h do
5: if i = 0 then
6: Insert a node representing A to QT ;
7: end if
8: for each non-leaf node u ∈ level(i,QT ) do
9: Calculate privacy budget portion cu and 
p
u;
10: Subregions R ← partition(u, pu, k);
11: for each R ∈ R do
12: c˜ = NoisyCount(R, cu);
13: Insert a node v representing R to QT ;
14: if v meets stop condition then






21: return QT ;
only the region it represents, but also a noisy count of the number of 1’s in its region.
We abuse the term count to mean the number of 1’s in a region. Algorithm 7.2
presents the details of ExploreDenseRegion.
Stop condition. One key problem in the partitioning process is to determine
the height of the quadtree. Previous works [90], [28] normally require a user to
specify the height. In our work, we calculate a good estimate of the height based on
other inputs (Line 3). It is very diﬃcult to calculate a very precise height of a data-
dependent quadtree with our adaptive privacy budget allocation scheme. Instead, we
use a standard quadtree with the geometric budget scheme [28] to derive a reasonably
good estimate. A geometric budget scheme assigns all nodes on the same level i the
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same privacy budget i, and increases the budget by a factor of 2
1/3 with the increase
of nodes’ depth.





2(h+1)/3−1 to nodes with depth i in a quadtree of height h, achieves
maximum accuracy for range queries.









, we calculate h by requiring the size of a leaf region to be greater than twice of
the noise’s standard deviation because we cannot get useful noisy counts on overly














where f is a count query. Apparently, in the k-correlated setting, for a count
query over a region R of A, in the worst case, the correlated sensitivity CS(f) =
min{2k, |R|} 2. From the above equation, we get:
3
√








Theorem 7.5. f(h) = 3
√
2(2h)2 − (2h)5/3 monotonically increases on [0,+∞).
Proof. Let t = 2h. ∀h ≥ 0, t ≥ 1. Plugging t to the equation, we get:












3 − 1) > 0
on (1,+∞). This completes the proof.
2For a region R not containing elements on the diagonal, CS(f) = min{k, |R|} because a single
edge diﬀerence cannot change two elements in this region.
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Because the left hand side (LHS) of Equation 8 increases monotonically, we
can always ﬁnd a maximal h value satisfying Equation 8. This maximal h value is
then used to be the height of the quadtree. In Section 7.5, we demonstrate that this
estimate performs very well for diﬀerent types of real-life datasets.
In addition, we propose another two heuristics to improve the eﬃciency and
utility of our approach. First, if a region is dense enough (the density is calculated
based on noisy counts), then there is no need to further partition it because we can
reconstruct its noisy version with high accuracy. In practice, we consider a region
R with den(R) ≥ 80% to be dense (experiments show that there is no signiﬁcant
utility diﬀerence among the density thresholds in the range [75%, 90%]). Second,
we can stop partitioning a region R if the number of elements with value 1 in R
is small enough. Note that the determination of a sparse region is based on its
noisy count, not its density. Speciﬁcally, we set the threshold to be 80%× |V |2
4h
, the
number of 1’s needed to form at least one dense region. Any region with number of
1’s < 80% × |V |2
4h
is not worth further partitioning as it will only lead to excessive
noise.
Partitioning. For a non-leaf region R, we employ exponential mechanism to ﬁnd
the splitting point that partitions R into subregions with the maximal density dif-
ference among all possible splitting points (Line 10). Intuitively, such a split best
distinguishes the dense and sparse subregions. For a non-leaf region R of size m× l,
there could be at most (m− 1)(l− 1) possible splitting points. We denote the set of
all possible splitting points by P . The utility function of selecting a splitting point
p ∈ P over a region R is designed to be





where R is the set of subregions of R resulted by p.
In order to obtain a reasonably low sensitivity, we constrain the minimum size
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of a region in level i (except the root and leaves) of QT to be |V |2
4i+1
. This guarantees,
depending on the location of the region R, CS(q) = 2k4
i+1
|V |2 (if R contains elements
on the diagonal) or CS(q) = k4
i+1
|V |2 (otherwise). Due to this constraint, we can apply
exponential mechanism on a smaller set of possible splitting points P (no need to
consider the splitting points on level i resulting in a subregion with size less than
|V |2
4i+1













is the privacy budget assigned to the exponential mechanism, as
explained below.
Example 7.4.1. Consider the adjacency matrix in Figure 7.2. Suppose the height
of QT is 2. The ﬁrst possible partition operation is illustrated by the boldest lines,
resulting in four subregions: R1 = A[1, 3; 1, 5], R2 = A[1, 3; 6, 8], R3 = A[4, 8; 1, 5]
and R4 = A[4, 8; 6, 8]. Assume that the noisy counts of R1 and R4 indicate that
they are sparse and the noisy count of R2 indicates that it is dense. DER only needs
to further partition R3. After that, the height has been reached and QT ends with
seven leaf nodes.
Privacy budget allocation. Generally, the total privacy budget  is divided into
two portions: ′ and ′′, each being used in a step. More speciﬁcally,  is divided for
three tasks: count for calculating noisy counts of all (sub)regions, partition for select-
ing splitting points on all internal nodes of QT , and reconstruct for reconstructing all
leaf regions, where ′ = count + partition and ′′ = reconstruct.
The ﬁrst problem is to determine the values of count, partition and reconstruct.
In general, we assign larger budgets to count and reconstruct because, as shown later
in Theorem 7.11, as long as we can obtain relatively accurate noisy counts, we can
always ﬁnd denser (or sparser) subregions, which can be reconstructed with higher
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accuracy. Between count and reconstruct, more budget is given to count because a
suﬃciently dense (or sparse) leaf region can be recovered with reasonable accuracy
regardless of the privacy budget (see Theorem 7.10). Since it is diﬃcult to theo-
retically quantify the values, we experimentally choose proper portions for each of
them, complying with the analysis above.
Once count, partition and reconstruct are ﬁxed, we employ the following allocation
scheme to distribute them to each node of QT (Line 9). For noisy counts, we
employ an adaptive privacy budget allocation scheme based on the geometric budget
scheme [28]. Initially, we assume that each root-to-leaf path in QT will be of the
same length h (e.g., QT is perfect) and assign 2i/3( 3
√
2−1)count
2(h+1)/3−1 to each node with
depth 1 ≤ i < h. Since an input dataset is always non-empty, there is no need to









Then, we adaptively adjust privacy budgets during the partitioning process.
Due to the stop conditions, QT may not be perfect (i.e., a path may stop
before it reaches level h), and, therefore, we want to reallocate the privacy budget
left to fully make use of the total budget. For a leaf node v whose depth i < h,










c˜2 has a better accuracy than c˜1 because V ar(c˜2) < V ar(c˜1). We can replace c˜1 by
c˜2 as a more precise estimate of the true count, but this simple strategy essentially
wastes the privacy parameter used for generating c˜1. Here we propose a strategy
that combines both c˜1 and c˜2 to calculate a more accurate estimate than both c˜1 and
c˜2.











3 > 1. Then
V ar(c˜) < V ar(c˜2) < V ar(c˜1).
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Proof. Since V ar(c˜1) =
2
12







































V ar(c˜) < 2
22
= V ar(c˜2). Since 1 < 2, we get V ar(c˜) < V ar(c˜2) < V ar(c˜1).
For a leaf node v whose depth i < h − 1, the portion of privacy budget left
from partitioning, (2
h/3−2(i+1)/3)count
2(h+1)/3−1 , is added to reconstruct so that we can make full
use of the privacy budget.
For selecting splitting points by exponential mechanism, we use a uniform
budget scheme that equally distributes
partition
h
to each internal node in QT . For
reconstructing leaf regions, each leaf node in QT receives reconstruct plus the privacy
parameter left from partitioning.
Eﬃcient implementation. In order to apply exponential mechanism, for every
internal node of QT , we need to compute the densities of the four subregions re-
sulted from every possible splitting position. A naive implementation takes run-time
O(|V |4) to calculate the densities for all possible splitting points for all nodes on the
same level of QT . We propose a data structure, called count summary matrix C of
size |V |×|V |, which improves the run-time complexity of calculating all densities for
a level of QT from O(|V |4) to O(|V |2). ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ |V |, C[i, j] gives the number of




l=1Aij . C can be constructed
with run-time complexity O(|V |2) using the following observation:
C[i, j] = C[i− 1, j] + C[i, j − 1]− C[i− 1, j − 1] + Aij,
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where C[i, j] = 0 when i < 1 or j < 1. Note that C just needs to be computed once
for the entire sanitization process. Once C is constructed, the density of any region
A[k, l;m,n] can be computed in O(1) by
C[l, n]− C[l,m− 1]− C[k − 1, n] + C[k − 1,m− 1]
(n−m+ 1)(l − k + 1) .
In addition, when the input dataset is extremely large, sampling (i.e., checking the
splitting points with a step larger than 1) could be used at the cost of slightly worse
utility.
Run-time complexity. The run-time complexity of Algorithm 7.2 is given in
Theorem 7.7.
Theorem 7.7. The run-time complexity of Algorithm 7.2 is O(|V |2).
Proof. The complexity of Algorithm 7.2 is dominated by the application of exponen-
tial mechanism to select the splitting points. Suppose the size of a node vi in level j
of QT is mi× li. A single application of exponential mechanism needs to consider at
most (mi−1)(li−1) possible splitting positions. Due to the count summary matrix,
each position can be checked in constant time. Since mili > (mi − 1)(li − 1) is the
area of the region represented by vi, we have
∑
vi∈level(j,QT )mili ≤ |V |2 because the
sum of the areas represented by all nodes on level j cannot be greater than the
total area |V |2. So the complexity of building level j is O(|V |2). Therefore, the
total complexity of building QT of height h must be bounded by O(h|V |2). Since
h  |V |2, the run-time complexity of Algorithm 7.2 can be further considered as
O(|V |2).
Finally, in the exploration process, we can conduct a simple post-processing




In this section, we denote an original region in A by R and its reconstructed coun-





j=1 |Aij − A˜ij| is minimized, it naturally requires to reconstruct
each leaf region R˜ of size m× l with ∑mi=1∑lj=1 |Rij − R˜ij| minimized.
Given a leaf region R˜ of size m × l with a noisy count c˜ ≤ ml, we design
an exponential mechanism to select an edge arrangement r by the following utility
function:





|Rij − R˜ij| (7.6)
Intuitively, the utility function measures how many elements of R˜ are correctly as-
signed with respect toR. The correlated sensitivity of q(R, r) is CS(q) = min{2k,ml}
or CS(q) = min{k,ml}, depending on the location of R in A.






possible arrangements, which is of factorial complexity. Instead, we
propose an eﬃcient implementation, which takes run-time complexity of only O(ml)
for assigning edges in a single leaf region. We ﬁrst implicitly group all arrangements
with the same score into a group. At ﬁrst glance, for any region with sizem×l, there
can be at most ml+1 groups because there are at most ml+1 possible score values
(from 0 to ml as deﬁned in Equation 10). Now we show that the actual number of
groups to consider is ≤ ⌈ml+1
2
⌉
by giving the suﬃcient and necessary condition of a
possible score.
Theorem 7.8. For a leaf region R˜ of size m× l with a noisy count c˜ and the true
count c, a score s is possible if and only if s ∈ [max{c˜+c−ml,ml−c− c˜},min{ml+
c− c˜, ml+ c˜− c}] and s+c+c˜−ml
2
is an integer. The total number of possible scores is
≤
⌈
min{ml + c− c˜, ml + c˜− c} −max{c˜+ c−ml,ml − c− c˜}
2
⌉




Proof. We ﬁrst calculate the lower and upper bounds of a possible score by consid-
ering all possible cases. 1) c˜ ≥ c and c˜ ≤ ml − c: the maximum score is achieved
when c 1’s are assigned to the elements where Rij = 1 and the rest c˜ − c 1’s are
assigned to the elements with Rij = 0, which gives the score ml+ c− c˜; the minimal
score is achieved when c˜ 1’s are assigned to the elements with Rij = 0, which gives
the score ml − c − c˜. 2) c˜ ≥ c and c˜ > ml − c: similarly, the maximum score is
ml+ c− c˜ while the minimum is c˜+ c−ml. 3) c˜ < c and c˜ ≤ ml− c: the maximum
is ml+ c˜−c while the minimum is ml−c− c˜. 4) c˜ < c and c˜ > ml−c: the maximum
is ml + c˜− c and the minimum is c˜− (ml − c). Combining these four cases, we get
the bounds of s.
Next, we prove that s+c+c˜−ml
2
must be an integer in order to make s possible.
Consider the allocation of c˜ 1’s in R˜. Suppose the numbers of elements where
Rij = 0 ∧ R˜ij = 0, Rij = 0 ∧ R˜ij = 1, Rij = 1 ∧ R˜ij = 0, Rij = 1 ∧ R˜ij = 1, are
respectively x, y, z and w. For an arrangement with a score s, we have:
x+ y + z + w = ml
x+ w = s
y + w = c˜
z + w = c
Solving these equations, we get w = s+c+c˜−ml
2
. Apparently, only if x, y, z and
w are non-negative integers, s is possible. Since s ∈ [max{c˜ + c − ml,ml − c −
c˜},min{ml + c − c˜, ml + c˜ − c}], x, y, z and w must be non-negative. So we just
need to require s+c+c˜−ml
2
to be an integer, which consequently guarantees that x, y,
z are also integers. Finally, since s+c+c˜−ml
2
has to be an integer, all possible scores
have to be either all even or all odd. We complete the proof.
We call a group of arrangements with a possible score a valid group. We can
calculate the size of each valid group by Theorem 7.9.
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Theorem 7.9. Given a leaf region R˜ of size m× l with a noisy count c˜ and the true

















is deﬁned to be 1.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 7.8, we have w = s+c+c˜−ml
2
, which means that
we need to assign s+c+c˜−ml
2
1’s to the elements where Rij = 1 and c˜ − s+c+c˜−ml2 1’s


































where ¯ equals reconstruct plus the privacy budget left from the exploration process,
CS(q) = min{2k,ml} or CS(q) = min{k,ml}, and the size of an invalid group is 0.
Finally, conditional on that the group Gi is selected, we can uniformly generate
a random arrangement within Gi by randomly assigning
i+c+c˜−ml
2
1’s to the elements
Rij with Rij = 1 and
ml+c˜−i−c
2
1’s to the elements Rij with Rij = 0. Obviously,
generating such an arrangement could be done with run-time complexity O(1). In
particular, if a generated arrangement makes A˜ii = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ |V |, an
alternative arrangement could be generated because a graphic matrix contains a
zero diagonal.
We give the utility guarantee of our edge arrangement method below.
Theorem 7.10. Given a leaf region R˜ of size m × l with a noisy count c˜ and the
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true count c, with probability 1− β,
∀c˜ < c, q(R˜, r∗) ≥ max{c˜+ c−ml,ml − c− c˜,














∀c˜ ≥ c, q(R˜, r∗) ≥ max{c˜+ c−ml,ml − c− c˜,













where r∗ is the arrangement selected by our approach.
Proof. Let us deﬁne OPTq(R˜) = maxr∈R q(R˜, r), ROPT = {r ∈ R : q(R˜, r) =
OPTq(R˜)} and r∗ = Exponential(R˜,R, q, ¯). In [89], [53], it has been proven that




|ROPT | + t)] ≤ e
−t (7.9)
When c˜ < c, OPTq(R˜) is achieved when all c˜ 1’s are assigned to the elements with










t = ln(1/β), we obtain













Combining the lower bound of a score given in Theorem 7.8, we get the lower bound
of q(R˜, r∗).
When c˜ ≥ c, OPTq(R˜) is achieved when all the elements with Rij = 1 are
assigned 1’s and the rest c˜ − c 1’s are assigned to the elements with Rij = 0. We







. Hence we have, with probability 1− β,



































Similarly, the lower bound in Theorem 7.8 also applies. This completes the proof.
Speciﬁcally, when c˜ = c, we have








We can observe that when c is either relatively large or relatively small with respect
to ml (that is, either den(R) is large enough or small enough), the reconstructed R˜
could be very close to R. The worst utility occurs when c = ml
2
. However, this case
can always be avoided by further partitioning.
Theorem 7.11. Given a region R, any partitioning of R results in sub-regions R′
satisfying either den(R′) ≤ den(R) or den(R′) ≥ den(R), with equality attained if
and only if 1’s are uniformly distributed in R.
The proof is obvious and is therefore omitted here. According to the power
law distribution [41], R is very unlikely to have a uniform distribution. Therefore,
Theorem 7.11 suggests that keeping partitioning a region leads to a more precise
reconstruction. This observation is based on the assumption that c˜ is accurate.
However, when subregions become smaller, the accuracy of c˜ decreases, which causes
extra utility lost in edge assignment. Therefore, it justiﬁes our design of the stop
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condition that takes into consideration both the accuracy of noisy counts and the
size of a leaf region.
After reconstructing each leaf region, we perform an extra step to make A˜
graphic: ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ |V |, if A˜ij = A˜ji, set both A˜ij and A˜ji to either 0 or 1 with
probability 50%.






< |V |2. Therefore, the total complexity of DER is O(|V |2).
7.4.3 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove that Algorithm 7.1 satisﬁes (, k)-diﬀerential privacy.
Theorem 7.12. DER is (, k)-diﬀerentially private.
Proof. Recall that the given total privacy budget  is divided into three portions:
count for calculating noisy counts of all regions, partition for selecting the splitting
points and reconstruct for reconstructing leaf regions.
We ﬁrst show that the sequential composition property [87] and the parallel
composition property [87] also apply to (, k)-diﬀerential privacy.
Theorem 7.13. Let Ai each provide (i, ki)-diﬀerential privacy. A sequence of
Ai(D) over the database D provides (
∑
i i,min(ki))-diﬀerential privacy.
Theorem 7.14. Let Ai each provide (i, ki)-diﬀerential privacy. A sequence of
Ai(Di) over a set of disjoint databases Di provides (max(i),min(ki))-diﬀerential
privacy.
The proof of Theorem 7.13 and Theorem 7.14 is analogous to the proof under
-diﬀerential privacy in [87]. Speciﬁcally, by deﬁnition, any sub-database of a k-
correlated database can be at most k-correlated. According to Theorem 7.2, an
(, k)-diﬀerentially private mechanism is able to bound an adversary’s probability
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Table 7.1: Experimental dataset statistics
Datasets |V | |E| Edge density
ca-GrQc 5,242 14,496 0.00106
ca-HepTh 5,000 17,138 0.00137
wiki-Vote 7,115 100,762 0.00398
STM 1,012 7,860 0.01536
change over all sub-databases by e. Actually, if the correlation parameter of a
sub-database can be precisely calculated, then less noise could be added.
Because of the parallel composition property, the privacy budget used in each
root-to-leaf path of QT is independent of each other, while the privacy budget
within a path follows the sequential composition property. Under our adaptive












+ reconstruct = .
Since the correlated sensitivity is used, our approach satisﬁes (, k)-diﬀerential pri-
vacy and bounds an adversary’s probability change by e on any k-correlation
bounded input dataset.
7.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our sanitization algo-
rithm (DER). As a reference point, we compare the utility of DER with a random
graph of the same numbers of nodes and edges [60], [26] (referred to as Random)
and a sanitized graph generated by a simple Laplace mechanism based approach
proposed in [54] (referred to as Laplace). In all ﬁgures, the results reported are the
average of 10 runs. Our implementation was done in C++, and all experiments were
performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.80GHz PC with 8GB RAM.
Four real-life datasets from three diﬀerent types of networks are used in our
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Table 7.2: Average relative error of large query size
Datasets 0.2 · |V | 0.4 · |V | 0.6 · |V | 0.8 · |V | |V |
ca-GrQc 0.040 0.033 0.036 0.050 0.047
ca-HepTh 0.035 0.037 0.036 0.045 0.042
wiki-Vote 0.041 0.046 0.045 0.042 0.047
STM 0.076 0.043 0.024 0.014 0.009
experiments. 3 ca-GrQc is a subset of the collaboration network of Arxiv general
relativity category. Two authors are connected if they coauthored at least one paper.
ca-HepTh is extracted from the collaboration network of Arxiv high energy physics
theory category. Similarly, there is an edge if two authors coauthored at least one
paper. The wiki-Vote dataset contains social network information about Wikipedia
voting on promotion to administratorship. An edge is created between two persons if
one voted on or was voted by the other. STM provides the transportation network
information of the Montreal transportation system. Two stations are considered
connected if there are more than 500 passengers commuting between them within
one week. The detailed characteristics of the datasets are summarized in Table 7.1.
7.5.1 Data Utility
Cut query. In the ﬁrst set of experiments, we examine the utility for cut queries in
terms of average relative error. We examine all possible query sizes (i.e., the number
of vertices in a cut query), and report the results of 11 representative query sets with
sizes spanning over the full spectrum in Figure 7.3 and Table 7.2. Each query set
consists of queries with sizes that are uniformly randomly distributed between 1
and the speciﬁed maximal size. For each query set, we randomly generate 20,000
queries. The sanity bound s is set to 0.1% of |E|, the same as [125], [25].
Figure 7.3 presents the average relative errors of cut queries of relatively small
3ca-GrQc, ca-HepTh and wiki-Vote are publicly available in the Stanford large network dataset
collection (http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html). STM is provided by the Socie´te´ de trans-











































































































































































(c) wiki-Vote (d) STM
Figure 7.3: Average relative error vs. query size.
query sizes while ﬁxing  = 1.0 and k = 1. Six query sets (with maximal query sizes
3, 5, 20, 100, 200 and 500, respectively) are used to represent the general trends of
the three approaches. As one can observe, the average relative errors of DER are
consistently small under all query sizes. It is worth mentioning that the relative
errors of DER do not monotonically increase with the increase of query sizes. It is
surprising to see that Laplace performs much worse than Random. This is because
Laplace noise generated under a small privacy budget can easily make the original
value of an element (either 0 or 1) indistinguishable. With the increase of query
sizes, both Laplace and Random provide very poor utility. Another interesting
observation is that the utility of Random is subtly related to the edge density: its
performance deteriorates quickly with the increase of edge density.
Table 7.2 inspects the performance ofDER under large query sizes with  = 1.0





































































































































































(c) wiki-Vote (d) STM
Figure 7.4: Average relative error vs. .
0.8 · |V | and |V |, respectively. We can observe that DER also performs stably well
under all large query sizes.
In Figure 7.4, we present relative errors of DER and Random under varying
privacy budgets from 0.2 to 1.0 while ﬁxing the maximal query size to be 0.4·|V | and
k = 1 (Laplace’s relative errors are too large to ﬁt into the ﬁgures). As expected,
the relative error increases when the privacy budget decreases. Nevertheless, DER
achieves relative errors less than 14% on all datasets even when  = 0.2.
We ﬁnally study how average relative errors vary under diﬀerent correlation
parameters while ﬁxing  = 1.0 and the maximal query size to 0.4 · |V | in Figure 7.5.
In general, the relative error increases with the increment of k because larger noise
has to be injected to hide stronger correlation. Roughly, increasing k is equivalent to
decreasing  (as the magnitude of noise is determined by e
k
). However, on a dataset

































































































































































(c) wiki-Vote (d) STM
Figure 7.5: Average relative error vs. k.
actual noise to add is also bounded by the region’s size. This is conﬁrmed by relative
errors of STM . When k = 5 and  = 1.0, the error is 10% while when k = 1 and
 = 0.2, the error is 13%. Moreover, we can observe that DER can still provide
some useful information even when k is relatively large. In practice, many types of
networks (e.g., transportation networks) have relatively small correlation, and, thus,
our approach can provide meaningful data utility without sacriﬁcing privacy.
Degree distribution. In the second set of experiments, we demonstrate the utility
of sanitized data in terms of degree distribution, measured by KL-divergence. Fig-
ure 7.6 presents the KL-divergences for all datasets under diﬀerent privacy budgets
with k = 1. We can observe that our approach is extremely suitable for preserving
degree distributions. Similarly, Laplace can barely provide any useful information















































































































(c) wiki-Vote (d) STM
Figure 7.6: Degree distribution vs. .
empty graph (i.e., |E| = 0). Figure 7.7 examines the KL-divergence for varying cor-
relation parameters with  = 1.0. It demonstrates that DER performs very stable
with increasing correlation. Even when k = 25, it is still able to preserve the general
degree distributions of all datasets.
7.5.2 Eﬃciency
According to the complexity analysis of DER, its run-time is dominated by |V |.
Therefore, we present the run-time of DER under diﬀerent |V | values in Figure 7.8.
The test sets are generated by randomly extracting a subset from the original
datasets. The X-axis represents the percentage of the test sets’ |V | values with
respect to the original datasets. It can be observed that roughly the run-time grows











































































































(c) wiki-Vote (d) STM
Figure 7.7: Degree distribution vs. k.
is used in the non-interactive setting, it meets the scalability requirement of most
real-life applications. In the few extreme cases, we note that DER can substantially
speed up by sampling (see Section 7.4.1) at the cost of slight utility degradation
(using the step of 10 on ca-GrQc, ca-HepTh and wiki-Vote makes DER roughly 8
times faster with 10% utility deterioration).
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose the (, k)-diﬀerential privacy model, a stronger variant
of -diﬀerential privacy, which provides provable privacy guarantees over correlated
databases. Based on this privacy model, we present an eﬃcient non-interactive
approach for publishing network data. This is the ﬁrst work that gives a practical




























Figure 7.8: Run-time vs. |V |.





With the general trend of digitalization, information sharing has become part of
the routine activity of many individuals, companies, organizations, and government
agencies. Privacy-preserving data publishing techniques have been playing an in-
creasingly important role in privacy protection in information sharing. Early re-
search of PPDP focuses on protecting private and sensitive information in relational
and statistical data. However, with the deployment of privacy-threatening technol-
ogy, such as smart card automated fare collection systems and social networks, the
privacy concerns in sharing high-dimensional data, including set-valued data, trajec-
tory data, sequential data and network data, have been substantially raised. In this
thesis, we response to these privacy concerns by developing eﬃcient and eﬀective
non-interactive data publishing solutions for various utility requirements. We recap
the major contributions of this thesis as follows:
• In Chapter 4, we presented the ﬁrst study of set-valued data publication in
the framework of diﬀerential privacy. We proposed a probabilistic partitioning-
based algorithm that provides guaranteed utility. Our work also contributes
to the research of diﬀerential privacy by initiating the line of data-dependent
non-interactive solutions, which are more eﬀective and eﬃcient than existing
data-independent solutions.
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• In Chapter 5, we proposed the (K,C)L-privacy model to acknowledge the
emergence of heterogeneous trajectory data publishing scenarios. We devel-
oped a generic anonymization framework, which for the ﬁrst time introduces
local suppression to trajectory data anonymization. This framework also dis-
tinguishes itself by accommodating diverse data utility metrics and therefore
supporting various data analysis tasks.
• In Chapter 6, motivated by the real-life demand of the STM, we developed
two alternative solutions for sequential data publication. These solutions are
the pioneers in the use of diﬀerential privacy for publishing sequential data.
The ﬁrst solution makes use of a hybrid-granularity preﬁx tree structure and
performs constrained inferences to boost utility, while the second solution in-
troduces the use of a variable-length n-gram model for achieving diﬀerential
privacy, along with a set of novel noise reduction techniques. Both of them
have exhibited desirable performances on diﬀerent real-life datasets.
• In Chapter 7, we proposed a variant of diﬀerential privacy, known as (, k)-
diﬀerential privacy, to address its deﬁciency over correlated data. Based on
this stronger privacy notion, we provided a holistic solution for publishing
large-volume real-life network data that is useful for cut queries and degree
distribution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst practical solution
for publishing network data in the spirit of diﬀerential privacy.
In conclusion, as a preliminary eﬀort toward privacy in high-dimensional data
publishing, this thesis has reported encouraging results, which demonstrate great
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